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Abstract
Problem-oriented policing is an approach to policing within which primacy is 
attached to preventing the recurrence of problem behaviours which fall within the 
remit of the police rather than merely reacting to individual calls for service as and 
when they occur. This study was bom of weaknesses in existing accounts of the 
delivery of problem-oriented projects. Framed almost entirely in top-down 
conceptions of project implementation, existing studies tend to neglect the 
behavioural features that shape what projects deliver and the links between the 
behavioural and structural features of them. This study will examine the legitimacy of 
the dominant top-down approach to studying patterns of implementation and whether 
top-down and bottom-up approaches are sufficient to explain the implementation of 
problem-oriented projects. Drawing on evidence from in-depth case studies of two 
problem-oriented projects, it identifies the factors that shaped their execution. Top- 
down features of leadership, resources, theory, guidance, accountability and 
management all played a role in shaping what the projects achieved but bottom-up 
features of practitioner re-negotiation of aims, values, routines and conflict were also 
present.
The study concludes that neither approach is sufficient for explaining the delivery of 
problem-oriented projects. Both top-down and bottom-up factors play a role and there 
are strong dependencies and relationships between them. An alternative approach to 
conceiving implementation is proposed, drawing on a broad theoretical framework 
developed by Giddens (1984). First, it is contended that the structural and behavioural 
features of projects are mutually dependent. Project structures both transform and are 
transformed by their interaction and reproduction by practitioners. Second, it is 
suggested that there may be limits to the nature of constraint in project settings as 
formal systems of project management may have limited authority unless they are 
sanctioned and mobilized by the very people they are trying to monitor and control. 
Third, projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing 
taken-for-granted sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices.
New project structures interact with these and are likely to transform and be 
transformed by interaction with them. As such they are not likely to be implemented 
in a straightforward manner. Fourth, project structures change over time as they are 
re-negotiated by practitioners and are influenced by unanticipated events and 
unintended consequences of actions.
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Chapter one
Introduction
The basic premise of problem-oriented policing is that the primary focus of the police 
service should be to prevent problems from reoccurring rather than reacting to 
criminal events as they occur (Goldstein, 1979; 1990). The aim is to reduce demand 
on the police service through developing tailor-made responses to systematically 
identified crime problems that are a matter of community concern (Goldstein, 1990). 
The principles of problem-oriented policing have been adopted explicitly by 
increasing numbers of police services in the UK and they underpin a range of policy 
developments. Despite its prominence in the rhetoric of policing policy and practice, 
however, studies have shown that whilst in principle problem-oriented policing is 
promising as a means of reducing crime there have been difficulties in delivering it on 
the ground. There remains a need to better understand the difference between what 
Goldstein envisaged and what is implemented in the name of problem-oriented 
policing in practice (Knutsson and Clarke, 2006).
This study was bom of weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of 
problem-oriented projects. Accounts of the delivery of problem-oriented policing are 
strongly framed in top-down conceptions of implementation. Existing studies tend to 
identify a gap between what projects aimed to achieve and what was delivered in 
practice on the ground. This gap is explained almost entirely in terms of the 
organisational and technical features of the police service. However, understanding 
the wider role of behavioural and contextual factors that influence projects is 
important if the implementation of problem-oriented policing is to be properly 
understood. Evidence from the field of policing more generally suggests that it is not 
only technical and organisational issues that impact on the behaviour of police 
officers, and studies have pointed to a number of characteristics of police officers and 
the police context that appear to have an impact on efforts to affect change within the 
organisation (discussed in more detail in chapter three). In the field of public policy 
more widely, studies have pointed to weaknesses in top-down approaches to analysing 
and understanding implementation. Studies have shown that the bottom-up features of
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practitioner routines, values, interaction and conflict can all shape patterns of 
implementation and others have pointed to a need to draw elements of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches together (discussed further in chapter three).
This study is thus concerned with examining the legitimacy of the dominant top-down 
approach to studying the implementation of problem-oriented policing within the 
police service. In particular it is concerned with examining whether either top-down 
or bottom-up approaches can sufficiently explain the delivery of problem-oriented 
projects.
This introductory chapter briefly discusses the meaning of implementation in the 
context of problem-oriented policing. It charts and examines the extent and nature of 
implementation of problem-oriented policing in the UK. It goes on to discuss the 
weaknesses in existing studies of implementation and sets out the rationale for and the 
aims of this study. It finishes by describing the agenda for the forthcoming chapters.
Implementation and problem-oriented policing
‘Implementation’ has been described as the activity that occurs between policy 
expectations and (perceived) policy outcomes (Hall and Hupe, 2002). Hill and Hupe 
(2002) argued that the process of implementation presupposes a decision to act. 
Implementation presupposes the formulation of series of actions and/or outcomes that 
need to be accomplished and a decision to act upon that. Analysis of implementation 
has to be connected to specific policies as particular responses to specific problems 
(Hill and Hupe, 2002). There needs to be a starting point and an end to 
implementation with a goal to work towards as the implementation of a project or 
policy cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation research has, however, tended to have a dual 
character. It is concerned with describing and explaining what happens as 
programmes and projects are implemented but also is concerned with setting out how 
these programmes ought to be implemented (Hill and Hupe, 2002). It thus has tended 
to have a descriptive and a normative focus.
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In the context of this study the concern is then to examine and account for the patterns 
of implementation of problem-oriented policing within the UK police service. 
Problem-oriented policing is associated with the implementation of four main 
processes: the identification and analysis of a problem; understanding what causes it; 
the development and implementation of appropriate responses based on that analysis 
and insight; and, an evaluation of the impact of those responses (this process is 
discussed in detail in chapter two). This study, then, seeks to examine what happens 
after a decision has been made to implement the processes of problem-oriented 
policing to address a specific crime problem.
Problem-oriented policing in practice
There is a fairly long history of accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing in the UK and beyond. Implementation of the concepts was first attempted in 
the early 1980s in Madison, Wisconsin in the US (see Goldstein 1990). In the UK, 
Surrey Constabulary similarly began experimenting with the ideas in the early 1980s, 
followed by London’s Metropolitan Police Service and Thames Valley Police. By the 
mid-1990’s, Northumbria, Thames Valley, West Yorkshire and Merseyside police 
services were all associated with the implementation of problem-oriented policing 
(Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Large-scale experiments were set up in Leicestershire and 
Cleveland Constabularies and evaluated by the Home Office research directorate 
(Leigh et al., 1996; 1998). Today Lancashire Constabulary probably has the most 
mature form of problem-oriented policing anywhere in the UK (Bullock and Tilley,
2003).
Problem-oriented principles also underpin a number of national developments in 
policing policy and practice. These have included the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, 
the National Intelligence Model and the plans for the roll out of Neighbourhood 
Policing. Indeed problem-oriented policing has become widely considered to be an 
appropriate means through which policing should be done (Crawford, 1998; Read and 
Tilley, 2000). There are very many examples of successfully implemented problem- 
oriented projects which have reduced crime and other problems locally and evidence 
suggests that the implementation of problem-oriented principles can reduce specific 
crime problems. In their international review of what works in reducing crime
published in 1997, Sherman and colleagues concluded that problem-oriented policing 
generally was promising as a means of crime reduction (Sherman et al., 1997).
However, authors have typically agreed that whilst the language of problem- 
orientation is routinely spoken in the police service, recurrent problems are observed 
in its implementation (Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock and Tilley, 2003; 
Laycock and Webb, 2003; Bullock et al., 2006; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). 
Mainstreaming of the principles throughout whole police services is indeed rare 
(Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). Problem-oriented policing in the UK is probably best 
conceived as a series of individual projects, many of which are associated with highly 
motivated individuals rather than a mainstream policing activity (Kirby and Reed,
2004). Even so, many of these individual projects bear little resemblance to problem- 
oriented policing as it was originally conceived (Goldstein, 2003). There remains a 
need to better understand the difference between what Goldstein envisaged and what 
is implemented in the name of problem-oriented policing in practice (Knutsson and 
Clarke, 2006).
Accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing
Despite its current prominence in the rhetoric of policing policy and practice the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing has not been straightforward. In 
addition, there are weaknesses in existing accounts of implementation which means 
that there remains a need to better understand the delivery of problem-oriented 
projects. These shortcomings are briefly outlined in the following sections and 
discussed in more detail in chapter three.
First, existing studies explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing 
contain methodological weaknesses. These accounts are not typically based on 
systematic data collected for the purpose in hand. For example, The Home Office 
report, Not Rocket Science? Problem-solving and Crime Reduction, published in 2000 
by Read and Tilley is an important British text that examines the extent and nature of 
implementation of problem-oriented policing across England and Wales. This report 
however, was based on data collected as part of an inspection of problem-oriented 
policing in England and Wales by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
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(HMIC). As an official inspection, the data collection for this was based on an 
examination of the extent to which police services were implementing the principles 
of problem-oriented policing as part of the government’s performance management 
framework and did not seek to understand the nature of implementation of problem- 
oriented policing more broadly. In addition, some existing accounts of the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing have been based largely on the 
commentaries of experts on implementation of problem-solving. For example, the US 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services published 
Problem-oriented Policing: Reflections on the first 20 years by Scott in 2000. 
However, this text is based, largely, on the commentaries of experts on problem- 
oriented policing in the academic and policing arena and not on detailed observations 
of implementation in practice. It was (to a degree) based on perceptions on the nature 
of implementation by those responsible for studying it or managing it rather than on 
systematic observations of the actual experiences of those who implemented it in 
practice.
Second, as it has been noted already, most accounts of the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in top-down conceptions of project 
implementation. Top-down approaches to understanding project implementation are 
typically concerned with what policy makers or managers are trying to achieve 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981). Policy making is considered to be made at the top of an 
organisation and translated into actions for practitioners to implement.
Implementation is seen as a process of setting aims and objectives and gearing 
practitioners towards delivering them. For the top-down approach key to 
implementing a new project is the provision of adequate resources, the development 
of instructions to guide practitioners in how to implement interventions and clear lines 
of management and authority to ensure that practitioners comply with the project aims 
and minimise deviation from them. The analysis of implementation should start at the 
top of an organisation, with what the policy maker or manager is trying to achieve. 
The extent to which this has been realised in practice is examined and the gap 
between the two explained. Explanations are usually framed in terms of the 
organisational and technical factors that influence patterns of delivery and the 
implication is that through providing adequate resources, tightening up rules and
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procedures, the gap between what was intended and that which was delivered could 
be minimised.
Studies of the implementation of problem-oriented policing are strongly framed in 
terms of explaining the perceived gulf that exists between the ideal of problem- 
oriented policing as envisaged by Goldstein and the realities that are found as it 
operates in practice on the ground. Accounts have looked to see how the 
implementation of Goldstein’s model has deviated in practice from what was intended 
(see for example, Leigh et al, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Braga,
2002; Bullock et al, 2002; Bullock et al, 2006). They have tended to describe 
patterns of implementation, note the differences between what was planned and what 
was implemented and provide suggestions and guidance (sometimes in the forms of 
checklists) which police managers or policy makers could use to improve 
implementation (see for example, Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al, 
2002; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006). Existing research in this area has overwhelmingly 
sought to explain the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing through 
top-down conceptions. Explanations focus on the organisational (for example, 
organisational structures, leadership, performance management, training, project 
management) and the technical (for example, the availability of data, analytic and 
evaluation capacity) aspects that facilitate or hinder its execution. The implication of 
this is that the implementation of problem-oriented policing would be enabled if these 
organisational or technical constraints were attended to. They are focused therefore 
primarily on providing management guidance about how to improve the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing in practice rather than on developing 
understanding of how the concepts come to be implemented on the ground. There is 
nothing wrong with explanations that provide practical organisational and 
management responses to the problems of project implementation: they can help to 
tighten up organisational processes; offer more control and help for project managers; 
and, help policy makers to think about the reasons for implementation problems and 
what to do about them (Stone, 1980; Gunn, 1984). Checklists are indeed useful for 
monitoring programme implementation and understanding it (Sabatier, 1986). 
However, whilst these accounts can be useful other accounts suggest that they may be 
partial because they neglect the non-organisational and non-technical aspects of 
implementation. In particularly they neglect to account for bottom-up features that
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influence implementation and any overlap between top-down and bottom-up features 
of implementation.
Studies have indeed questioned top-down assumptions and focused on the importance 
of understanding individual and organisational behaviour and interaction in 
approaching the analysis of implementation (Lipsky, 1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; 
Hjem and Porter, 1981). They have been labelled ‘bottom-up’ approaches to 
understanding implementation. These accounts have tended to be critical of the view 
that policy makers or managers can and should control the political, organisational 
and technological processes that influence project implementation on the ground and 
this is seen as a key conceptual flaw to top-down approaches. Practitioners have a 
level of discretion to make choices about what to do on a day-to-day basis. For a 
number of reasons, professionals can skew delivery as they implement interventions 
in ways that were not intended (Elmore, 1979). Generally, practitioners may adopt 
coping or diversionary mechanisms in order to get the job done or to twist 
implementation towards their own ends (Lipsky, 1980). The implementation of 
projects is considered to be dynamic and changing and the relationship between 
project aims and what is eventually implemented is an interactive one. In contrast to 
top-down approaches it is argued instead that practitioners have discretion and that 
this discretion inevitably creates modification of project aims and objectives. Power, 
vested interest, individual motivation and human behaviour are all key to bottom-up 
approaches to understanding patterns of implementation. In terms of understanding 
implementation then, analysis should start with the practitioners responsible for 
delivering interventions. These issues are clearly important not just for analysing and 
understanding implementation but also for seeking to develop means to improve 
implementation: if the causes of implementation problems are not technical or not 
rooted in organisational features, then they are likely to require rather different 
solutions (Stone, 1980). Others have pointed to need to pull together aspects of top- 
down and bottom-up approaches in understanding implementation (e.g. Sabatier, 
1986).
It is contended that the dynamics of project implementation and the role played by the 
action and interaction of practitioners in determining what gets done and why in 
practice have been overlooked in the existing literature examining the delivery of
problem-oriented policing. This would seem to be important in understanding 
implementation in the field of policing. The police service is highly resistant to 
change and reluctant to change its predominately reactive culture to a proactive one 
(Goldstein, 1990; 2003). Other research has shown that police officers enjoy high 
degrees of professional discretion in their day-to-day activities which has proved 
difficult to control (Reiner, 2000). In addition, as will be discussed in detail, inter­
agency working is important for problem-oriented policing but the nature of inter­
agency working has been shown to be problematic (Hough, 2006). These issues will 
be examined in further detail in chapter three.
Top-down and bottom-up approaches are summarised and compared in Box 1.1 
(below).
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Box 1.1: Top-down and bottom-up approaches compared
Top-down Bottom-up
Starting point for 
analysis of 
implementation
The aims of policy 
makers/managers
Implementation structures and 
interaction of practitioners
Identification of 
main players in 
implementation
Start at the ‘top’
(those who design initiatives)
Start at the ‘bottom’ 
(those who implement 
initiatives)
Objective setting Objectives are set at the top 
and followed by practitioners
Question policy makers’ 
ability to set clear goals
Location of policy 
making
Policy makers views are key Policy making is dynamic
Control of 
implementation
Through the provision of 
adequate resources, setting 
clear objectives and exercising 
controls, practitioners will 
implement policy
Policy makers cannot control 
the environment in which 
programmes are implemented
Nature of 
discretion
Through setting up accounting 
systems and holding 
practitioners to account, the 
impact of discretion can be 
minimised
Policy makers cannot control 
the impact of practitioner 
discretion because 
implementation is a low 
visibility activity
Nature of conflict Conflict is dysfunctional and 
can be co-ordinated to ensure 
that practitioners achieve 
common aims
Conflict is an inevitable result 
of practitioners conceiving 
implementation in different 
ways
Evaluative
criteria
Focus is on the extent to which 
the programme objectives are 
attained
Much less clear. Anything that 
is relevant to the policy issue
Overall focus How can processes be steered 
towards the implementation of 
a programme’s objectives
The interaction of practitioners
9
Adapted from Sabatier, 1986
To summarise the argument so far, existing explanations of the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing are limited because:
• key accounts have not been based on data collected for the purpose in hand and 
sometimes based on participant commentaries from key individuals who have the 
benefit of hindsight rather than on systematic examination of the implementation 
of projects;
• existing studies are framed in a primarily top-down approach;
• there is an over focus on explaining the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing in terms of organisational structures and technological issues;
• the impact of patterns of practitioner behaviour and contextual issues are 
neglected;
• they are focused on providing guidance for improving implementation, rather than 
on understanding implementation; and,
• explanations are not framed in existing theories that seek to orient the analysis and 
understanding of implementation.
This study
There remains a need to examine the legitimacy of the top-down assumptions that 
dominate approaches to analysing and understanding the implementation of problem- 
oriented policing. This study examines in detail the implementation of two problem- 
oriented projects which sought to address very different problems: one based in 
Manchester and another based in Cambridge. In doing so this study aimed to examine 
whether the dominant top-down approach is sufficient for understanding patterns of 
implementation of problem-oriented projects and to investigate whether a bottom-up 
approach might be more appropriate. It also aimed to consider whether a different 
means of approaching the implementation of problem-oriented projects might better 
explain observed patterns of implementation.
In particular then it seeks to examine the following two hypotheses.
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1. That top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are 
sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with 
the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.
2. That bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation 
are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated 
with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.
Overview of the report
The following chapter discusses the rational for implementing a problem-oriented 
approach in the police service. It sets out its basic concepts in terms of the 
identification and analysis of problems, developing and implementing responses to 
them, and evaluating the effectiveness of new responses. It examines the existing 
evidence pertaining to the nature of implementation of the processes of problem- 
oriented policing within the police service arguing that there have been difficulties at 
all stages.
Chapter three develops this further reviewing the existing explanations of 
implementation of problem-oriented approaches. It examines the role played by 
existing police organisational structures, leadership and management, performance 
management structures, analytical skills, the availability of data and appropriate 
analysis skills, training, project management skills and the police organisational 
culture in shaping the implementation of problem-oriented projects. It then sets out 
weaknesses of existing explanations of the implementation of the problem-oriented 
approach in the police service. It highlights the over-emphasis on organisational and 
technical explanations, the inattention to behavioural and contextual ones and the 
neglect of wider theories that seek to explain the implementation of projects in the 
field of public policy. In doing so, this chapter finishes by setting out in detail the 
rationale for and the aims and objectives of the study.
Chapter four sets out the justification for and implementation of the research design to 
meet the study’s aims. It discusses the research design in detail, examining the role of
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qualitative research, the case study and triangulation in the social sciences and 
discusses the limitations of the approach. It then describes the rationale for the 
primary methods employed (interviews, document analysis and observations). It 
discusses the practicalities of implementing the research design in terms of 
negotiating access to the case studies, ethics and researcher roles. It sets out the 
practical arrangements for collecting and analysing the data in detail. It ends by 
reviewing the link between the project aims and the research design employed to 
address them and sets out the framework for the following results chapters.
Chapter five is the first results chapter and it is concerned with describing and 
examining the interventions that the two case studies planned to implement, the 
processes and structures through which implementation was conducted and the 
interventions, outputs and outcomes that the projects finally managed to deliver in 
practice. As such, this chapter starts by describing the funding arrangements for the 
two projects. It goes on to examine the profile of the problems that the projects were 
trying to tackle focusing on the crime (and other) data which the projects used to 
understand the problems that they were tackling. The development of the responses in 
the two projects is charted. The implementation structures, staffing and management 
arrangements that were set in place in order to deliver them are then examined. This 
chapter sets out in detail the projects’ aims and objectives and examines the main 
outputs of the two projects and the difference between what was planned and what 
was actually achieved in practice. This chapter provides the basis for the following 
two results chapters which seek to use top-down and bottom-up principles to explain 
the patterns of implementation of the two projects.
Chapter six is concerned with those top-down factors that shaped the implementation 
of the two projects. As the literature review will set out in detail top-down analysis of 
implementation of projects is concerned with identifying what managers or policy 
makers were trying to achieve and examining the extent to which this was realised in 
practice. Subsequent understanding of project implementation is conceived primarily 
in terms of the organisational and technical factors that shape implementation. Framed 
by the literature review but grounded in the evidence collected from the case studies, 
this chapter sets out the role played by leadership, resources, project theory,
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objectives and guidance, management and accountability in shaping the 
implementation of the two projects.
In contrast chapter seven examines the bottom-up factors that help to explain the 
implementation of the case studies. As will be set out in detail, bottom-up approaches 
are concerned primarily with how practitioners experience and understand 
implementation and the interaction between individuals and organisations. In 
particular, this chapter examines the role played by practitioners’ negotiation of 
project aims, the nature of inter-agency working and the role played by day-to-day 
routines, values and conflict in shaping project implementation.
Chapter eight draws on evidence from the study to examine the extent to which top- 
down and bottom-up approaches help to explain the nature of implementation in the 
two projects. It examines what the projects planned to achieve and what was actually 
achieved and draws on the top-down and bottom-up literature to explain this. It goes 
on to argue that whilst these top-down and bottom-up explanations can be useful in 
orienting analysis and understanding implementation, they are limited. As such, the 
chapter finishes by setting out an alternative way that project implementation could be 
conceived framed by the work of Anthony Giddens, drawing on evidence from the 
study.
The final chapter returns to the original aims of the study, reviews the evidence in 
relation to them and provides final conclusions.
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Chapter two
The concepts of problem-oriented policing and their 
implementation in the UK police services
Introduction
This chapter reviews the main concepts of problem-oriented policing. It starts by 
setting out Goldstein’s rationale for problem-oriented policing and describes its basic 
elements: the identification and understanding of problems, development and 
implementation of responses and the evaluation of the impact. It then reviews the 
evidence relating to the nature of implementation of these processes in the UK police 
services. In doing so, it provides the basis for chapter three which examines existing 
dominant explanations for the nature of the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing in detail.
The rationale for problem-oriented policing
Problem-oriented policing was developed by Herman Goldstein, an American 
academic and former advisor to the police service and described in an article 
published in 1979 and later in a monograph published ini 990. Goldstein was critical 
of the way that the police service focused on maximising organisational efficiency to 
the detriment of focusing on what he believed should be its core outcome: reducing 
problems that concern local people.
Goldstein described a number of characteristics of modem policing that shaped the 
development of the problem-oriented approach. First, he argued that traditionally the 
police service has concentrated investment in their internal organisational processes 
rather than in developing more effective ways of dealing with key crime problems. 
Goldstein argued that over-focus on the organisational processes was a problem for all 
bureaucracies but was particularly acute in the police service. Goldstein believed that
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the police service management has assumed that through attending to organisational 
processes demand on the service would be reduced but he argues that this assumption 
is questionable. Second, Goldstein was critical of the primarily reactive way that the 
police deal with incidents. The police spend most of their time reactively responding 
to requests for help from the public. This, Goldstein argued, consumes vast resources, 
fosters the view that this is the key role of the police (within and outside the service) 
and encourages superficial responses as it does not solve problems or prevent them 
from resurfacing. As such the dominant reactive approach fails to provide the best 
service to the public. A further consequence of this is that it encourages narrow 
performance management systems that focus on response times and officers therefore 
concentrate on responding to problems but not on preventing them. Third, Goldstein 
argued that the community has not been fully engaged in policing. This, he felt, is a 
waste of resources because the police service relies on the involvement of the public 
for information about problems and crimes to provide an adequate service and as such 
the impact that the police can have on problems is in part related to the relationship 
that it builds with the community. Fourth, Goldstein argued that the police service 
does not make best use of its rank and file officers. Police resources have been 
allocated to making more efficient use of officer time rather than to maximising 
exploration and development of their talents and creativity. Goldstein argued that 
giving police officers more freedom would improve the quality of responses to 
problems and would result in greater job satisfaction. Through adopting a problem- 
oriented approach, officers would also feel that they were accomplishing more 
because they would not merely be repeatedly responding to incidents but would be 
preventing them from occurring in the first place. Goldstein believed that change in 
the police service has been hampered by failure to address cultural issues. Like others, 
Goldstein noted the power of police subculture and the effect that it has had on 
attempts to affect change in the police service and he argued that the strength of 
police subculture needs to be addressed. Fifth, Goldstein believed that the police 
service has failed to address problems holistically. In implementing problem-oriented 
policing Goldstein argued that the police service should outline a plan for doing so but 
also to set out the implications that this would have for the police organisation. As 
well as calling for more direct focus on the substance of policing '...the problems that 
constitute the business o f the police and how they handle them ' (Goldstein, 1990: 32),
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he called for a change in the predominately reactive direction of police effort and the 
following sections spell out the basic elements of problem-oriented policing.
The basic elements of problem-oriented policing
In its very broadest sense, problem-oriented policing describes a framework that aims 
to improve the way that the police service operates and problem-oriented policing has 
been described as a scientific approach to improving the way that the police do 
business (Scott, 2000). Its basic premise is that the core of policing should be to 
understand and prevent problems recurring rather that to react to criminal events as 
they occur. The concept involves four main processes: scanning (identifying) then 
analysing a problem; developing responses to the problem; and, evaluating the impact 
of that response.
Scanning and analysing problems
The purpose of scanning is to identify problems and to specify them appropriately in 
order to develop responses to tackle them. Scanning, in the context of problem- 
oriented policing, is about identifying and homing in on patterns of recurring 
incidents that are open to intervention:
The first step in problem-oriented policing is to move beyond handling incidents. It 
calls for recognising that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems.
This pushes the police in two directions (1) it is required that they better recognise the 
relationships between incidents (similarities of behaviour, location, persons involved, 
etc.); and (2) that they take a more in-depth interest in incidents by acquainting 
themselves with some of the conditions and factors that give rise to them.
Goldstein, 1990: 33
Goldstein (1990) described problems as clusters of similar, related or recurring 
problems that represent a substantive community concern and which constitute police 
business. Problems could be identified in different ways including through routine 
analysis of police calls for service data or analysis of information from other parts of 
the police organisation or other agencies. Problems may, of course, also be brought to 
the attention of the police by the community or by rank and file police officers.
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Goldstein also gave examples of how identified problems might be prioritised for 
analytic attention. These included: the impact that a problem was having on a 
community in terms of its size and cost; the presence of life-threatening conditions; 
community interest and the likelihood of support for it; the degree to which the 
problem threatened police/community relations; the interest and support of rank and 
file officers; and, the potential for progress with dealing with the problem (Goldstein, 
1990: 78).
Once a patterned problem has been identified, systematic information about that 
problem should be gathered in order to analyse it and describe it in detail. Scott 
(2000) stated that:
Goldstein's ideal model of problem-oriented policing calls for analysis that is
systematic, thorough, insightful, discriminating, and honest; that is, the analysis
should provide the most comprehensive understanding of the problem possible.
Scott, 2000: 59
Goldstein called for ‘...a broad inquiry, uninhibited by past perspectives'. This 
inquiry should reach out to answer a range of questions about the nature of the 
recurring problem and in doing so should utilise a range of data sources and 
references. These could include: examination of data from police files; capturing the 
knowledge of rank and file officers; interviews with victims and offenders; enquiries 
with the wider community including surveys; examination of information that other 
agencies may hold; and, reviews of available literature. Goldstein argued that the 
collection and analysis of these data sources needed to be rigorous but noted that the 
extent of methodological rigour might reasonably be limited because of time and cost 
constraints, the lack of the skills required to conduct thorough analysis of problems 
within the police service and police officer aversion to long quantitative reports 
(Goldstein, 1990: 91).
The purpose of analysis in the context of problem-oriented policing is to identify 
‘pinch points’. These refer to the points at which practical interventions that have a 
real chance of reducing the identified problem can be identified and responses
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targeted. Ultimately a tight definition of a problem is important if effective responses 
are going to be developed from them. Goldstein argued that statutory criminal justice 
labels are normally too broad to facilitate the development of responses, perpetuate 
the view that problems are police problems and in any case police labels should be 
used cautiously since they may turn out to be wrong:
At the most elementary level, citizens, as well as the police and others who work 
within the criminal justice system, overuse miscellaneous terms such as ‘crime’, 
‘street crime’, ‘disorder’, ‘delinquency’ and ‘violence’. Surprisingly, many police 
agencies continue to use generic terms to categorise portions of their business. 
Researchers interested in specific types of police calls are often still required, in this 
day of elaborate computer capacities, to ‘dig out’ by hand those cases that constitute a 
substantial, distinctive portion of a police agencies regular work load. Overly broad 
categorisations of incidents impede efforts to gain insight into discrete substantive 
problems.
Goldstein, 1990: 39 
Developing and evaluating responses
After identifying problems, the aim is to develop tailor made responses to them, to 
initiate ‘ ...an uninhibited search for a tailor made response' and to identify far- 
reaching and imaginative ’ responses to problems which go beyond the criminal 
justice system (Goldstein, 1990:43):
Once police break out of the mould of looking only within the criminal justice system 
for solutions, large vistas are open to exploration. Problem-oriented policing includes, 
as one of its key elements, taking full advantage of this opportunity by encouraging a 
far-reaching and imaginative search for alternative ways in which to respond to 
commonly recurring problems, un-curtailed by prior thinking.
Goldstein, 1990: 44
Goldstein (and others) pointed to the very many possible responses that could be 
explored as means of tackling problems other than relying on criminal justice 
interventions. As well as use of the criminal or civil law to control behaviour 
Goldstein noted the following: targeting attention at repeat victims and repeat 
offenders; connecting with services provided by other government agencies;
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mediation and negotiation between victims and offenders; conveying information 
about how to reduce the chances of victimisation; mobilising the community to take 
action to prevent crime; mobilising existing forms of social control within 
communities or families; altering the physical environment to reduce the opportunities 
for crime to occur; increasing regulation; and, developing new forms of authority. In 
addition, Goldstein (1990) argued that a tailor-made response is likely to consist of a 
range of interventions. The nature of that response would much depend on the 
analysis, the factors considered when weighing up alternatives and the values attached 
to them.
Developing responses is not, then, a sterile exercise. Analysis could lead to a wide 
range of possible alternatives that need to be assessed and the values reflected in the 
ultimate choice of responses would vary. Goldstein argued that there are, 
nevertheless, a fairly uniform set of factors that should be considered when selecting 
alternatives, which included:
• the potential that the response has to reduce the problem;
• the specific impact that the response will have on the most serious aspect of the 
problem (or those social interests deemed most important);
• the extent to which the response is preventative in nature, thereby reducing 
recurrence or more acute consequences that are difficult to handle;
• the degree to which the response intrudes into the life of individuals and depends 
on legal sanctions and the potential use of force;
• the attitude of the different communities most likely to be affected by adoption of 
particular interventions;
• the legality and civility of the response, and the way in which it is likely to affect 
overall relationships with the police;
• the financial costs;
• the availability of police authority and resources; and,
• the ease with which the response can be implemented.
(Goldstein, 1990: 143)
The final stage of the problem-oriented process is to evaluate the impact of the 
response. The aim of evaluation in this context is: to guard against one ineffective
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response replacing another; to ensure that a response is effective over time; and, to 
ensure that the response does not revert back to its reactive, traditional form. 
Goldstein (1990) pointed out that evaluation is not a straightforward task and called 
for the development of evaluation skills within police services. Like others, Goldstein 
noted that this is challenging and suggested that the police service should develop 
relations with universities, where the skills to evaluate responses are typically found 
and should look to government and other funding bodies for financial assistance for 
this.
The basic elements of problem-oriented policing are summarised in box 2.1.
Box 2.1 Basic elements of problem-oriented policing
Identification and 
understanding of 
substantive problems
A problem should be a 
matter of community 
concern
• Problems should not be administrative or 
internal matters of the police service unless 
that is facilitating problem-oriented policing
• Rank and file police officers should be 
involved in identifying problems
• The community should be involved in 
identifying problems
Incidents should be grouped 
and systematically analysed; 
seek to identify links 
between incidents to identify 
pinch points at which 
interventions could be 
targeted
• Events that constitute a problem should be 
similar in some way (place, time, 
characteristics of offenders or victims etc.)
• If there is no grouping then it is not problem 
that should be tackled with a problem-oriented 
approach
• Police recorded crime systems should be the 
starting point of analysis
• Other forms of data to analyse problems could 
include talking to victims and offenders
• The range and depth of analysis dependent on
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the size and magnitude of the problem 
• Assessment of what is already known about 
the nature of the problem and whether more 
needs to be known
Development of tailor- 
made responses
Analysis of nature of existing 
response
• Interviews with police officers
• Observation of current responses
Review of existing evidence 
about the problem
• An examination of available literature and 
other evidence
The development of tailor- 
made solutions that go 
beyond law enforcement
• For example, use of civil law, attention to 
situation features, mobilising the resources of 
other agencies etc.
Evaluation of the impact
Review of implementation of 
responses
• To prevent one ineffective response being 
replaced by another and to guard against 
responses reverting to traditional approaches
• Extent of evaluation task should be linked to 
nature and scope of problem being tackled
• Evaluation is a specialist and potentially 
expensive undertaking
Implementing problem-oriented policing
Goldstein’s 1979 article stimulated a number of experiments in police agencies who 
attempted to put the principles into practice and triggered debate regarding how best 
to implement the approach (Sherman, 1992). As set out in the introduction there is 
now a relatively long history of problem-oriented policing in the UK and elsewhere 
and interest in the principles of problem-orientation has exploded.
Whilst studies have referred to the seemingly ‘simple,’ ‘sensible’ and ‘common sense’ 
nature of problem-oriented policing (Sherman, 1992; Leigh et al., 1996; Read and 
Tilley, 2000) most agree that high quality, broad-based problem-oriented policing is
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rare (Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 2000; Knutsson and Clarke, 2006; Scott, 2006). 
Despite its prominence in current policing policy and practice, implementing 
problem-oriented policing in police services has proved to be difficult (Laycock and 
Webb, 2003). The early efforts to implement problem-oriented policing in the UK and 
the US reported mixed successes and implementation problems. At the time of 
writing, problem-oriented policing is probably best conceived as a series of projects 
often associated with highly motivated individuals rather than a mainstream police 
activity (Kirby and Reed, 2004). Even so, Goldstein argued that many of these 
projects barely resemble problem-oriented policing as it was conceived (Goldstein, 
2003).
The following sections review the existing evidence relating to the implementation of 
the main processes of problem-oriented policing, in terms of:
• analysing and understanding problems;
• developing and implementing tailor made interventions; and,
• evaluating problem-oriented responses.
Analysing and understanding crime problems
High quality analysis of problems is the driver of high quality problem-oriented 
responses. However, studies have pointed to shortcomings in the police service’s 
capacity to analyse crime problems. A number of problems in the analysis for 
problem-oriented policing have been identified: it is often missed out entirely; is 
superficial and lacks rigour when it is conducted; focuses overly on police data; and, 
is not sufficiently disaggregated to facilitate the development of targeted responses. 
These issues are discussed in the following sections.
First, studies have argued that it is not uncommon for the analysis stage of problem- 
oriented policing to be missed out all together (Capowich and Roehl, 1994; Cordner, 
1998; Sampson and Scott, 2000; Bullock et al, 2002; Bullock et al., 2006). In an 
examination of 100 proposals for funding for problem-oriented projects from the 
governments Targeted Policing Initiative, Bullock et al, (2002) found that 13 per cent 
contained no analysis about the nature of the problem that they were seeking to tackle. 
More recently, in an analysis of 150 Tilley Award projects Bullock et al., (2006)
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similarly found little or no quantitative analysis in 22 (15%) of the projects. Because 
of its central role in identifying appropriate interventions if the analysis section is 
missed, the problem will not be properly understood, the response will not be properly 
tailored to the nature of the problem and in all likelihood the problem will persist 
(Sampson and Scott, 2000).
Second, studies have pointed to how analysis of problems can be basic and lacking in 
rigour and specificity (Clarke, 1998; Scott, 2000; Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock et 
al., 2006). Scott (2000) stated that Goldstein’s ideal of analysis which is ‘... 
systematic, through, insightful, discriminating and honesf is rarely achieved in 
practice (Scott, 2000:59). For example, in their examination of 266 problem-oriented 
projects Read and Tilley (2000) found limited used of data. In answer to the question 
‘please outline the original problem that prompted the initiative’ only three percent of 
the projects presented any hard data. Twelve per cent provided data in answer to the 
question ‘what conclusions were drawn about the nature and extent o f the problem ’ 
and five per cent included data in response to the question ‘summarise the main 
findings o f the analysis using data as appropriate ’ (Read and Tilley, 2000:8). Bullock 
et al. (2002) similarly found that the extent of analysis presented in 100 proposals 
received for funding from the Targeted Policing Initiative varied greatly. Judged on 
the extent to which proposals identified crime specific problems; used appropriate 
data; focused on the problem; and, demonstrated an understanding of the problem, 
over three-quarters (77%) of the proposals received were judged as containing 
insufficient analysis. More recently, Bullock et al (2006) noted the simplistic data 
analysis that characterised the entries to the Tilley Awards. They found that almost 
half of the 150 projects that they examined presented only simple counts of crime, 
incidents or survey responses, and for 44 per cent of these (n=32) this was the only 
type of analysis carried out.
Third, it has been seen that Goldstein highlighted the potential for utilising a range of 
data from other sources and stressed that police data should only be the starting point 
for understanding problems (Goldstein, 1990). Other sources of data could include 
those held by other statutory agencies, surveys of the public and from interviews with 
offenders. Utilising a range of data is then clearly considered to be important for 
problem analysis but studies have identified that problem-oriented policing tends to
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focus predominately on police data (Leigh et a l, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Scott, 
2000; Lamm Weisel, 2003; Bullock et al, 2006). For example Leigh et a l (1998) 
found that officers in Cleveland largely relied heavily on their own knowledge and 
that which they had picked up from other officers in identifying problems. Officers 
were asked to name at least one impetus for their initial conclusion that there might be 
a problem. Of the 257 sources cited, 105 (41%) were ‘own knowledge ’ or ‘ from 
contact with other officers ’ (Leigh et a l, 1998: 28). In their examination of 266 
questionnaires pertaining to problem-oriented projects UK-wide, Read and Tilley 
(2000) similarly highlighted the reliance on police data to analyse problems. They 
found that the data most commonly used to analyse problems was recorded crime data 
(61%), followed by command and control incident data (39%), force intelligence 
(25%), and local authority information (22%). They found that other sources of 
information and data were used very rarely (Read and Tilley, 2000). Similarly in their 
examination of 100 proposals received for funding from the Targeted Policing 
Initiative, Bullock et al (2002) found that most of the proposals relied on police 
recorded crime statistics to analyse problems. Only one-third of the proposals 
scrutinised contained information from agencies other than the police. In their 
examination of 150 Tilley Award entries, Bullock et al (2006) similarly found that 
relatively few data were presented and used in the analysis from sources other than 
the police, and what were used did not appear to be particularly well utilised. For 
example, they found that 82 of the projects (55%) used police recorded crime data in 
the analysis of the problem, and in 23 of these (29%) this was the only source of data 
for the analysis. They found little use of data from local authorities, health authorities, 
the probation service or other emergency services.
Lastly, it has also been argued that a discrete problem focus is essential if officers are 
to understand why a problem recurs and develop responses to it (Goldstein, 1990). It 
is common for problems to be inadequately defined and disaggregated for the purpose 
of analysis (Clarke, 1998; Scott 2000; Eck 2001). Broadly defined problems are a 
common feature of the implementation of problem-oriented policing and this has led 
to poorly focused responses that are too ambitious (Clarke, 1998). Scott (2000) 
similarly argued that characterising problems with broad labels such as ‘drugs ’, 
‘violence ’, ‘disorder’, ‘neighbourhood decline ’ or ‘juveniles ’ without specifying what 
the behaviour actually is ‘...often results in simplistic analysis o f the problem and,
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consequently, to hopelessly inadequate responses' (Scott, 2000: 49). The lack of 
discrete focus and broadly defined problems creates difficulties for the 
implementation of projects because problems are conceived on too large a scale to 
manage in a practical sense (Scott, 2000). Eck (2001) similarly noted inadequate 
problem definition in problem-oriented projects and argued that problems need to be 
better specified and defined if responses are to be properly focused. He suggested that 
at the very least problems needed to be specified in terms of:
• the nature of the problematic behaviour and this should be in terms of the actions 
of individuals rather than in terms of their status',
• the harm that a problem is causing;
• evidence of the repetitive nature of the problem; and,
• an assessment of how the problem is seen through the eyes of the public.
The tendency to conceive problems in terms of broad categories has indeed been 
noted by empirical studies. For example, Leigh et al (1998) noted the use of broad 
categories such as ‘general disorder ’ or ‘crime and general disorder' in their study of 
the implementation of problem-oriented policing in the Cleveland police service.
Developing and implementing tailor-made interventions
Studies have suggested that the development and implementation of problem-oriented 
responses has not been straightforward. Problems have related to: refining data into 
information that is useful for developing responses; knowing what to do when 
problems have been identified; developing a range of alternative responses; working 
in partnership; and, adequately targeting responses.
Collecting information and then refining it into data that are useful for the 
development of responses has not been straightforward. Very generally, studies have 
suggested that whilst information may be available to orient responses it is not always 
clear that police officers make use of it (Leigh et al., 1998). For example in their 
study of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Cleveland Constabulary, 
Leigh et al (1998) noted that an Information Unit Sergeant routinely gave data to 
police officers for the purpose of developing responses to problems but the police
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officers preferred to rely on their own knowledge about problems and information 
picked up from other officers (Leigh et a l , 1998).
Research has also highlighted that there have been difficulties in developing tailor- 
made solutions to problems once they have been identified. Some authors have 
suggested that police officers do not appear to routinely take account of the literature 
on crime reduction when developing responses to problems (Clarke, 1998; Tilley,
1999) Indeed, in their examination of 266 problem-oriented initiatives, Read and 
Tilley (2000) found that the commonest source of advice in developing new responses 
to problems was from colleagues in the same force (42%) or a different force (43%). 
Townsley et al (2003) argued that that there is more help available for officers 
seeking to develop problem-oriented responses (they noted the Home Office Tool 
Kits available at www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits) but argued that it is not clear if 
these are actually being used. They referred to a small scale survey of officers that 
they had conducted and found that 58 per cent (n=not stated) had not read a Home 
Office report in the six months prior to the survey. In their review of 150 entries to the 
UK Tilley Award by Bullock et al (2006) similarly found that projects rarely 
indicated that they had made use of existing literature about how to address problems 
when developing their projects. In total, 41 of the 150 projects analysed referred to 
research or literature that provided additional information. It may, of course, be the 
case that projects had referred to the literature when searching for appropriate 
solutions to the problem identified but did not reference it in the project submission. 
However, this finding certainly concurs with that of other studies.
It has been seen that Goldstein (1990) pointed to the need for officers to develop a 
range of alternatives to criminal justice system responses for tackling problems and to 
recognise that there are many ways of tackling problems. Despite the wide range of 
potential alternatives available for tackling problems, research has shown that police 
officers continue to rely on conventional policing responses such as high visibility 
policing, arrests and incapacitation in addressing problems (Clarke, 1998; Leigh et a l , 
1998; Cordner, 1998; Scott, 2000; Matassa and Newbum, 2003). Leigh et a l (1998) 
for example found that direct police-led actions against alleged offenders were most 
favoured by officers: 40 per cent of all the actions recorded by Cleveland and 
Leicestershire police services were traditional police responses of patrol,
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observations, surveillance, warrants, arrests and warnings. In addition, a tendency to 
revert to traditional police responses has been noted (Leigh et al, 1998; Matassa and 
Newbum, 2003). In a study of the implementation of problem-oriented hate crime 
projects in the Metropolitan Police Service, Matassa and Newbum (2003) pointed to 
how police officers perceived deficiencies in the ability of partner agencies to 
implement interventions and so they tended to resort to traditional policing methods 
of improved high visibility patrol and surveillance of offenders.
Very closely related to the previous point, Goldstein stressed the need for the police 
service to search for the best response to problems which would not necessarily be 
enforcement of the law. The implication of this is that, where appropriate, the police 
service should seek to draw in the resources of other agencies to deliver responses to 
problems. Generally it has been well recognised that the police service has to get 
others on board in implementing problem-oriented policing and that it had not always 
happened (Pollard, 1996). Studies of the implementation of problem-oriented policing 
suggest that the involvement of other agencies in delivering responses has been 
limited (Leigh et al., 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Matassa and Newbum, 2003; 
Townsley et al., 2003; Bullock et a l, 2006; Scott, 2006). In their study based on the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing in all 43 police services in England and 
Wales, Read and Tilley (2000) argued that opportunities to engage partners were 
being missed and concluded that:
Notwithstanding the emphasis on partnership, problem-solving was not always 
deemed to need the full involvement of partners at all stages. Partnership involvement 
in deciding what to do was seen sometimes to lead to fudging of schemes as 
partnerships lose focus accommodating the varying interests, and ideologies of 
partners are satisfied at the expense of clear thinking and targeted action.
Read and Tilley, 2000: 31
More specifically, Leigh et al (1998) noted that just under one third (31%) of the 
responses implemented in Cleveland Constabulary were implemented by the police 
service alone. Bullock et a l ’s 2006 review of the Tilley Award entries similarly 
showed that the projects were strongly associated with the police service: of the 150
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problem-oriented projects examined, the police were wholly responsible for half of 
them.
Lastly, and on a more practical level, inadequate targeting of responses has been 
highlighted by a range of studies (Clarke 1998; Scott 2000; Bullock et al 2002). In 
order to be targeted, the preventive ‘grease’ of an intervention must get to the crime 
‘squeak’ (Farrell and Pease, 1993; Hough and Tilley, 1998). This means that 
interventions must not merely focus on a high crime rate area or a given crime but on 
an identified and significant aspect or attribute of that problem (Bullock et a l 2002). 
It might, for example, within geographical hotspots, make sense to target repeat 
victims, hot products, or known repeat offender. Unless well targeted, an intervention 
is unlikely to use resources effectively or to channel measures to the specified 
problem and its identified causes (Bullock et a l , 2002). Empirical studies have 
identified inadequate targeting in problem-oriented projects. For example, the 
reviewing by Bullock et al (2002) of 100 problem-oriented projects plans submitted 
to the government’s Targeted Policing Initiative found that it was common for 
analysis to be inadequately used to inform the identification of an appropriate 
intervention and as a result many proposals were not sufficiently targeted. For 
example, they scored only two of the 100 proposals examined as being very well 
targeted.
Evaluating problem-oriented policing projects
Evaluation of problem-oriented policing projects is required to avoid replacing one 
ineffective response with another and to guard against a response reverting to its 
previous form (Goldstein, 1990). There is generally consensus in the literature that 
whilst evaluation of problem-oriented projects is important it is rarely well done 
(Bazemore and Cole, 1994; Read and Tilley 2000; Scott, 2000; Bullock et al 2006).
It is not uncommon for evaluation to be omitted altogether (Capowich and Roehl, 
1994; Clarke, 1998; Cordner, 1998; Tilley, 1999; Read and Tilley, 2000). In their 
study of the implementation of problem-oriented policing in England and Wales, 
Read and Tilley (2000) for example noted that:
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Evaluation continues to be a weakness, and raises doubts about the status of self- 
assessed successes. There is relatively little systematic evaluation. What there is is 
generally weak. Few evaluations are independent. Evidence is used selectively. There 
is little undue satisfaction with reduction as an indictor that the initiative was 
effective without attention to alternative explanations, or to possible side effects. 
There is little attention paid to how initiatives may have had their effects.
Read and Tilley, 2000: 9
Difficulties associated with evaluation include the measurement of processes 
(measurements of practitioner activity and outputs), outcomes (the impact that the 
initiative had on the specified problem) and costs (Scott, 2000).
Process evaluation then involves documenting the actions taken in implementing a 
project and assessing whether the interventions were implemented as intended (Scott,
2000). When assessing the overall effectiveness of an intervention is it important to 
know whether it has been implemented as intended and what else may have been 
going on in the same place at the same time in relation to a specific problem. Scott 
(2000) argued that generally there was a tendency to measure processes and to neglect 
outcomes of problem-oriented projects:
Evaluators misconstrue process evaluation for outcome evaluation; that is, they limit 
their inquiry to determining how well and to what degree the police and others 
actually implemented their plan of action. While this information is vitally important, 
it cannot be substituted for some inquiry about what effect the plan of action, 
however well implemented, had on the problem.
Scott, 2000: 90
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that measurement of processes in 
problem-oriented projects may be more prevalent than measurement of outcomes. 
Read and Tilley (2000) for example found that of the 266 initiatives that they 
examined, 85 per cent were monitored compared with 69 per cent that were evaluated.
Notwithstanding a possible preference for process measurement over outcome 
measurement, studies have identified practical difficulties in conducting process 
evaluations in the context of problem-oriented policing. Practitioners have not always
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understood the need to maintain detailed records which they may see as time- 
consuming, labour intensive and only peripheral to their day-to-day job (Bullock et 
a l, 2002). Bullock et al (2002) also noted that the collection of detailed activity data 
can be seen as intrusive by practitioners who do not always understand the need to 
collect such detailed information. Forrest et al (2005) similarly argued that quite 
detailed record keeping by practitioners is required if sufficient information is to be 
collected to allow processes to be linked to ultimate outcomes and that this can be 
difficult to achieve in practice. A related issue is that (important as monitoring 
processes and assessing outcomes might be) practitioners might find the assessment 
of projects to be boring, expensive, pointless and possibly even threatening once they 
believe that the original problem has been resolved and as a result, they may overlook 
it (Bullock et a l , 2002).
As Scott (2000) stated it is certainly the case that there are particular problems with 
outcome assessment in problem-oriented projects. As has been seen, Read and Tilley 
(2000) identified little independent evaluation, selective use of evidence in outcome 
evaluation and little consideration of the effectiveness of the project or the possibility 
of alternative explanations for results in the projects that they examined. Read and 
Tilley (2000) concluded that not one of the 266 projects that they had assessed had 
unequivocally been able to show that any reductions in the size of problems were due 
to the intervention or identified and measured plausible side effects. More recently 
Bullock et al (2006) identified weaknesses in outcomes measurements in their review 
of 150 entries for the UK Tilley Awards. Where some form of evaluation had been 
conducted (before-and-after designs in two-thirds of the projects) they nevertheless 
noted a range of problems about the evaluation design including variable length of 
before-and-after periods (which were often too short) and non-equivalent before-and- 
after periods.
Lastly, Scott (2000) argued that assessment of costs was important as part of the 
evaluation of problem-oriented initiatives. He stated that few problem-oriented 
projects included any economic assessment of the problem. Indeed Bullock et al 
(2006) found very little use of cost data in the evaluation of the 150 projects that they 
examined. Generally assessment of cost effectiveness of policing programmes and 
interventions is considered to be important but it is very rarely conducted (Roman and
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Farrell, 2002). Whilst it is the case that economic assessment in the police service has 
become more important, it is in its infancy.
Summary
This chapter has set out the principles of problem-oriented policing. It has been 
argued that problem-oriented policing is widely considered to be a common sense 
way of conducting policing. However, the implementation of the processes of 
problem-oriented policing is very clearly problematic. Box 2.2 (below) summarises 
the main problems associated with the implementation of the principles of problem- 
oriented policing. The following chapter reviews the existing literature that seeks to 
explain the persistence of these problems in delivering problem-oriented policing.
Box 2.2: Summary of implementation problems
Element of problem-oriented policing Implementation problems
Identifying, analysing and understanding 
problems
• Often missed out altogether
• Superficial or limited
• Rarely look towards understanding 
why problems reoccur
Developing and implementing tailor 
made responses
• It is not clear that analysis is used to 
inform interventions
• The focus is on providing descriptive 
statements rather than inferences
• The use of broad categories has 
resulted in a lack of focus
• Not clear that police officers are 
aware of alternatives to the criminal 
justice system
• Focus on police type response
• Failure to involve the community
• Poor targeting
Evaluation of responses • Not uncommon to be missed 
altogether
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• Rarely well done
• Something of an after thought
• Failure to measure processes,
difficulties in attributing outcomes,
failure to conduct cost-effectiveness
or cost-benefit analyses
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Chapter three
Explaining the delivery of problem-oriented policing in the 
police service
Introduction
The preceding chapter provided a review of the evidence relating to the 
implementation of the key stages of problem-oriented policing. There are problems 
associated with all the main processes. This chapter examines the dominant 
explanations of the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing and the 
observed implementation problems. For focus, it largely draws on evidence related 
specifically to the implementation of problem-oriented policing rather than on wider 
evidence related to implementing new programmes in the police service more 
generally. It looks at the role played by: leadership and management, enthusiastic 
advocates, organisational structures, performance management structures, analytical 
skills, data and analysis, training, project management skills and police culture in 
explaining patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing.
It goes on to describe weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing. In particular it questions the dominance of top-down 
approaches to analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing and its emphasis on facilitating its delivery through attention to 
organisational and technical issues. It draws attention to the likely importance of 
behavioural and contextual (bottom-up) issues in examining implementation in the 
policing and crime reduction environment. In doing so it draws on wider theories that 
seek to explain the implementation of projects in the field of public policy. The 
chapter then reviews the rationale for and the aims and objectives of the study and 
sets out the link between the study’s theoretical orientation, aims and research design.
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Factors shaping the delivery of problem-oriented policing
Leadership
Very many studies have argued that leadership plays an important role in the delivery 
of problem-oriented policing (Maguire and John 1995; De Paris, 1997; Leigh et a l, 
1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Cohen, 2001; Scott, 2006). In general terms it has been 
argued that committed, enthusiastic and involved leadership facilitates 
implementation of problem-oriented policing ‘....clearly support for the concept o f  
problem-solving by senior officers will encourage it. More than that, though, 
problem-solving seemed to be commoner the more knowledgeable and directly 
involved the senior managers were in the work o f their staff (Read and Tilley, 2000: 
26).
Leadership is considered to be important in shaping the nature of implementation 
because it facilitates access to the resources that are required to implement problem- 
oriented projects and sends important messages to the organisation regarding how 
policing should be done. Goldstein (1990) for example argued that the role of chief 
officers is central and that change from a reactive towards a problem-oriented 
organisation depends a lot on ability to enlist the support of leadership. Scott (2006) 
similarly argued that because the delivery of problem-oriented policing challenges the 
prevailing reactive status quo the authority to implement the new style is required.
The full engagement of senior police staff will also raise the capacity of the police 
service to invest in the rigorous research and analysis that is so important for problem- 
oriented responses (Goldstein, 2003; Scott, 2006).
Read and Tilley (2000) found that those forces where there was a clear commitment 
to problem-oriented policing at a senior level were more developed in terms of 
implementing problem-oriented policing. Bullock et al. (2006) also identified that 
strong leadership had been a key factor in facilitating the implementation of problem- 
oriented policing in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies. In both police services 
the drive from the top of the organisation facilitated access to resources to implement 
interventions and sent powerful messages about how officers were supposed to be 
doing their jobs (Bullock et al, 2006)
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On a slightly different note it has been argued that the implementation of problem- 
oriented policing has been characterised by the presence of committed and 
enthusiastic individuals (Kirby and Reed, 2004). This certainly resonates with Read 
and Tilley (2000) who argued that implementation of problem-oriented policing was 
facilitated by the presence of committed and enthusiastic leaders. Bullock et al 
(2006) also noted that the presence of committed and enthusiastic staff has 
characterised the implementation of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and this 
was seen by many officers to have facilitated its implementation over time. However, 
in the longer term this reliance on the enthusiasm of committed individuals in 
maintaining momentum for the delivery of problem-oriented policing might be 
problematic. Scott (2000) argued that it presents a longer-term risk for the future 
health of problem-oriented work when those committed staff move on. Kirby and 
Reed (2004) similarly argued if implementation continues to be associated with key 
individuals problem-oriented policing will never become a mainstream policing 
activity:
At present, the delivery of problem solving in the UK is best characterised as being 
based on isolated pockets of good practice generated by a small number of highly 
motivated individuals. If this remains the case then problem solving will never reach 
the organisational mainstream and, as a consequence, policing in the UK will face 
significantly more difficulties when tackling the wide range of current and future 
challenges. Further, failed attempts not only consume resources but sap motivation 
and affect the reputation of the forces who attempt this approach.
Kirby and Reed, 2004:2
Organisational structures
At a broad level, studies have pointed to how the organisational structure of a police 
service can influence how problem-oriented policing is implemented. As was seen in 
the preceding chapter, Goldstein (1990) argued that organisational issues in the police 
service are important only in so far as they relate to the goal of addressing community 
problems. However, it has been suggested that a dominant style of policing cannot be 
replaced by another without attention to the organisational processes that orient an 
agency and the actions of its staff (Brown and Sutton, 1997). It has been argued that
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the hierarchical nature of the police service is structured largely to facilitate reactive 
policing and does not suit the implementation of problem-oriented policing. Very 
generally a number of authors have pointed to how the bureaucratic nature of the 
police service and particularly the formalised accounting systems that are associated 
with it are unsuited to facilitating change within the organisation (Wilkinson and 
Rosenbaum, 1994; Brown and Sutton, 1997; De Paris, 1997). Police organisational 
structures have typically been hierarchical, based on semi-military lines and organised 
to facilitate reactive, emergency-driven policing (Goldstein, 1990; Brown and Sutton, 
1997). This hierarchy with centralised policy making and top-down, risk averse 
management structures have been considered to conflict with the more flexible kinds 
of structures which are required to facilitate the delivery of problem-oriented policing 
(Eck and Spelman, 1987; Leigh et al., 1996). For example, Leigh and colleagues 
concluded in 1996 that ‘...management structures o f forces in England and Wales are 
not well adapted to the bottom-up approach that characterises problem-oriented 
policing ’ (Leigh et al., 1996: 39).
Closely related to organisational structure, it has been argued that performance 
management structures influence the delivery of problem-oriented policing. It has 
then been suggested that there is a need for managers to reassess the traditional tasks 
and strategies of police officers if problem-oriented policing is to be implemented 
more effectively (Brown and Sutton, 1997). Fielding (1994) argued that performance 
measurement of individuals in the police service has been based on arrests in 
particular and this is inappropriate for measuring individual performance in problem- 
oriented policing.
Conventional policing performance management systems tend to be based on 
response times, arrests and detection rates but authors have suggested that these are 
not effective for holding officers to account for success in dealing with community 
based problems and for implementing problem-oriented policing:
Performance measurement systems based on response time, clearance rates, and 
numbers of arrests offer little aid in the evaluation of police efforts to address 
community needs and problems. Measurement systems based entirely on these 
indictors offer no way to hold police departments externally accountable for
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addressing community concerns and for engaging in community problem-solving 
activities.
Braga, 2002: 120
Braga (2002) went on to argue that the police service needs to account for the quality 
of processes in dealing with problems and not just on outputs and outcomes:
In policing, there are may important reasons to pay attention to processes as well as 
to outcomes, Society as a whole has expectations about how the police will do their 
work, as well as what the results of the work will be. This is particularly true when 
discussing how the police use the authority of their officers: the powers to stop, to 
detain, to arrest and to use force to accomplish these goals 
Braga, 2002:119
Metcalf (2001) argued that good implementation of problem-oriented policing rests 
on having easy-to-understand and recognisable organisational values that are reflected 
in a commitment to performance. She suggested that this does not fit well with the 
police service which is top-down and directional in its management approach. Like 
others, Metcalf (2001) agreed that the police service is primarily concerned with the 
achievement of measurable objectives (such as numbers of arrests or detections) 
rather than in the processes of how policing is conducted, which she argued is key for 
implementing problem-oriented policing. Metcalf (2001) argued that whilst there has 
been an acknowledgement that policing styles would have to change to facilitate 
problem-oriented policing; this has not happened in practice. This might be because it 
is easier for police supervisors to measure outputs such as arrests rather than the 
flexibility and creativity called for in solving problems (Metcalf, 2001). Goldstein 
(1990) similarly argued that routinised jobs are easier to supervise than those that 
require flexibility and creativity. The unstructured nature of problem-oriented policing 
makes it difficult to manage and maintain (Metcalf, 2001). However in the absence of 
suitable performance measurement indicators, it is difficult to motivate officers to 
change the way that they conduct policing (Braga, 2002). Indeed, implementation of 
problem-oriented policing in the Metropolitan Police Service in the early 1980s 
appeared to have petered out because their management structure was out of step with 
the approach and adopting it would have involved taking more risks and abandoning
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some of the traditional expectations of line management (Leigh et al 1996, drawing 
on Hoare et a l, 1984).
Some studies have also pointed to how the development of specialist ‘structures’ 
within police services plays a role in shaping implementation. Read and Tilley (2000) 
argued very generally that the development of structures (such as tasking and filing 
systems to co-ordinate problem-oriented responses) can facilitate the implementation 
of problem-oriented policing though they said very little about what these might look 
like. Additionally the provision of dedicated teams, which had the capacity to look in 
detail at problems and develop responses, facilitated implementation, although again 
not much detail was provided about these (Read and Tilley, 2000). Bullock et a l, 
(2006) also noted the role played by specialist structures in their examination of 
implementation in Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies. In Hampshire, for 
example, a small dedicated central team was attempting to foster problem-oriented 
work through proving specialist advice and practical support for problem-oriented 
projects. This team and the day-to-day leadership and management and support that it 
provided was considered by officers to have played an important role in developing 
problem-oriented policing across the police service.
On a slightly different note, some studies have suggested that the availability of 
rewards more generally might facilitate implementation and some police services 
have attempted to encourage and develop problem-oriented policing through offering 
rewards. Leigh et al (1998) noted an attempt to encourage the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing in Cleveland through a competition, the prize for which 
was a trip to an annual American problem-oriented policing conference. Read and 
Tilley (2000) also noted that in some of the police services that they visited problem- 
oriented work appeared to be incentivised through commendations for particularly 
good work. Similarly Bullock et al (2006) found that a strong internal award scheme 
was seen by officers to provide an incentive to conduct problem-oriented work in 
Lancashire Constabulary and that winning the UK Tilley Award was a considerable 
source of pride amongst officers. In contrast, they found that in Hampshire, senior 
police officers accepted that performance in problem-oriented policing needed to be 
rewarded to encourage officers but acknowledged that presently this is not occurring 
systematically. That said, a very successful problem-oriented project (which had won
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the American equivalent of the Tilley Award) evidently had a wide impact throughout 
the Constabulary and had been influential in making officers think differently about 
the role of analysis and about what can be achieved through the implementation of a 
problem-oriented policing approach (Bullock et a l , 2006).
Analytical skills, analysts and data
Given the key role of analysis in implementing problem-oriented responses, the 
analytic capacity of police services has been shown to be important in shaping the 
nature of implementation. Studies have suggested that that there are limitations in the 
analytic capacity of the police service and in the availability of suitable data which 
has had an impact on what has been achieved and these help to explain some of the 
problems identified in the previous chapter.
Limitations in the analysis stages of problem-oriented policing are often attributed to 
the general analytic capacity of the police service. Studies have pointed to a shortage 
of analysts which has inevitably limited the police service’s capacity (Goldstein,
1990; HMIC, 2000; Read and Tilley, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002). Read and Tilley 
(2000), for example, argued that low salaries combined with poorly developed career 
prospects for analysts, results in high turnover of staff. It has been noted that analytic 
skills of this kind are in demand and people with these skills can find better paid jobs 
within the private sector. Others have pointed generally to the need for a career 
structure to develop the analyst role within the police service and to encourage people 
into the profession (HMIC, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002).
In addition to general shortages of analysts, studies have pointed to how analysts can 
be misused within the police service and this limits the role that they can play in 
delivering problem-oriented policing. Read and Tilley (2000) argued that the role of 
crime analysts within police services was not usually to inform the development of 
problem-oriented responses and it was likely to be confined to producing routine 
management data displaying performance in crime trends. In their review of the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing in Lancashire and Hampshire 
Constabularies, Bullock et al (2006) found that although crime analysts were 
employed in both Constabularies, in practice they were largely at the disposal of
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senior officers and were mostly used for performance management monitoring and for 
servicing the requirements of the National Intelligence Model.
As well as limitations in the overall analytic capacity to understand problems, studies 
have pointed to issues related to the availability and quality of data which has had an 
impact on the quality of problem-oriented work. This limits what can realistically be 
achieved. Scott (2000), for example, argued that good analytic systems were often 
lacking within the police service and that understanding of data within the police 
service was generally poor. Indeed police databases are often not designed with 
analysis in mind and this limits sophisticated analytical work (Irving and Dixon, 
2002). Irving and Dixon (2002) argued that standard police datasets are incomplete 
and inaccurate and this limits what can be achieved with them. Braga (2002) similarly 
argued that official crime data have shortcomings. Arrest and investigations data are 
subject to underreporting and an enforcement bias and calls for service data (whilst 
not so affected by police discretion) are influenced by underreporting (Braga, 2002)
Bullock et al (2002) described a range of problems associated with the utilisation of 
other police databases for problem-oriented policing. First, there are problems with 
routine record keeping which include: data not being collected or recorded at all; 
being kept only in an aggregated form; or, being kept as paper records. Second, data 
are sometimes wrongly entered into data bases by police officers and other staff. 
Fields may be left blank for example, or entered incorrectly or entered into the wrong 
fields. Third, data can be entered in a way that makes them difficult to work with. For 
example, sometimes more than one variable is entered in the same column on a 
spreadsheet and this makes manipulation of the data hard. Fourth, changes in 
recording practices (for example Home Office ethical recording standards which were 
introduced in April 2002, see Home Office, 2000) have also caused difficulties for 
comparing crime trends over time. Lastly, the police service uses an array of systems, 
which may not be compatible with standard software such as Excel or SPSS, which 
creates problems in extracting data from systems.
Studies have shown that there have been difficulties in sharing information between 
agencies which help to explain the observed reliance on police data in the analysis 
stages of problem-oriented policing. A persistent practical issue hindering exchange
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of data has been the interpretation of data protection legislation by practitioners 
(Bullock et al., 2002; Irving and Dixon, 2002). Drawing on a 2001 study, Irving and 
Dixon (2002) argued that, the provisions of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act not 
withstanding, data sharing within the community safety arena is in its infancy.
Bullock et a l (2002) summarised other standard practical data sharing difficulties. 
There have been practical difficulties exchanging data between different computer 
systems because crime and incidents are not coded to a specific point or are geo­
coded to different boundaries. For example police data are usually organised around 
beats and basic command unit areas whilst local authority data are often organised by 
electoral wards. Also, they pointed to a failure to collect and/or record information 
and a failure to code and/or enter information in standard ways.
Teaching the principles and developing skills
Studies have pointed to the importance of training for officers who may find it hard to 
translate the concepts of problem-oriented policing into everyday practice. Goldstein 
(1990) argued that a commitment to problem-oriented policing should pervade all 
training and that there should also be an attempt to hire people with the relevant skills 
and abilities to match those associated with problem-oriented policing, using 
affirmative action if necessary. There is some evidence to suggest that training can 
improve an officer’s ability to conduct problem-oriented policing. The District Audit 
Northern Region (1999), for example, showed that the divisions in Lancashire 
Constabulary where most progress had been made in implementing problem-oriented 
policing were those with active training for officers (Norris, 1999). Read and Tilley 
(2000) also argued that in the police service areas where problem-oriented policing 
was most developed, officers were trained in the principles.
However, the availability for training in problem-oriented policing appears to be 
variable and a lack of training may be a barrier to the implementation of problem- 
oriented policing. Read and Tilley (2000) found that across the UK the provision of 
training was very variable with some police service areas offering training in 
problem-oriented policing for all officers and some offering none at all. With this 
variation in availability of training it is perhaps not surprising that evidence suggests 
that officers struggle to understand the principles of problem-oriented policing within 
the police service which inevitably influence what is delivered in practice.
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Dissemination of knowledge
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the development of problem-oriented 
responses may be hampered by an officer’s lack of knowledge about how to deal with 
crime problems more widely. Studies have shown that officers preferred to rely on 
their own knowledge and that of their colleagues and on conventional policing 
methods rather than look more widely for solutions to problems. It has been argued 
that this tendency to rely on traditional police responses occurs, at least partly, 
because police officers do not have the capacity and experience to develop and 
implement other kinds of responses. For example, Brown and Sutton (1997) argued 
that officers found it hard to see law enforcement as just one of a potential range of 
responses to problems. Eck (2003) similarly argued that, whilst not necessarily 
ineffective, conventional law enforcement responses to problems (such as arrests and 
prosecution) are probably overused because police officers are unclear about what the 
alternatives are.
Many authors have pointed generally to the importance of a collective body of 
knowledge on how to tackle crime problems as a means of facilitating the delivery of 
problem-oriented responses (Hoare et al., 1984; Scott, 2000; Irving and Dixon, 2002; 
Eck, 2003; Goldstein 2003; Townsley et al., 2003). Goldstein (1990) argued that 
police officers do not have access to a body of evidence about the behaviours and 
problems that they are expected to deal with and that in these circumstances it is 
hardly surprising that the police often do not know what to do when dealing with 
problems. Scott (2000) similarly noted that there is not an organised body of 
knowledge about how to deal with the problems to which the police are called. This, 
he suggests, is partly because there is not enough evidence about effective ways of 
dealing with specific problems:
While there is more relevant research on some community problems than many 
police officers realize, it is far less than one might expect given how common many 
problems are and how many public resources are spent trying to address them. There 
simply isn't enough quality research conducted to reliably inform the police about 
what does and does not work with respect to most crime and disorder problems. 
Outside of a few specialized areas that have received substantial research interest, the
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body of applied research on crime and disorder problems is not large. Again, 
compared to the body of literature in most other professions, the amount of published 
research about common community problems seems miniscule.
Scott, 2000: 64
Local co-ordination and project management skills
Co-ordination and project management skills at the local level have been identified as 
playing a role in how problem-oriented projects are delivered (Hope and Murphy, 
1983; Sutton, 1996; Braga, 2002; Brown, 2006). General issues related to the 
availability of suitable staff for problem-oriented work have been highlighted. These 
include difficulties in recruiting and retaining project managers and other staff to 
implement project interventions once they have been developed (Brown, 2006). 
Brown (2006) argued that project management is an essential element in the 
implementation of problem-oriented projects but there have been problems which 
include shortages of project management skills, difficulties in recruiting suitable 
individuals (which are often related to unattractive short-term contracts) and the time 
that it can take to recruit in the public services. Bullock et al (2002) similarly argued 
that a high level of turnover of personnel in problem-oriented projects was common. 
They argued that this reduces enthusiasm and momentum for projects, promotes a 
lack of ownership and, on a practical note, creates delays as time is spent trying to 
recruit new staff. Delays and time-consuming obstacles are common problems in the 
delivery of project interventions and have included technical difficulties and problems 
installing equipment (Hope and Murphy, 1983). Braga (2002) noted that many 
responses (such as demolishing buildings and changing the use of public space) are 
time-consuming because of the time that it can take to identify and contact property 
owners and plan the specifics of such works. Technical issues stem from the time that 
it can take to procure and install equipment and the rules and regulations associated 
with purchasing it (Braga, 2002; Bullock et a l , 2002; Brown, 2006).
Engaging partners
Studies suggest that there have been difficulties engaging partner agencies in 
problem-oriented work and this inevitably impacts on the range of project 
interventions which could realistically be delivered. Accounts of the implementation 
of problem-oriented policing have pointed to problematic relationships between
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partners. Braga (2002) argued that the development of partnerships with other 
agencies was one of the least discussed and least well implemented elements of 
problem-oriented policing. He argued that whilst the development of partnerships to 
tackle problems was essential they can be difficult to setup and maintain in practice 
(Braga, 2002). Townsley et a l (2003) stated that effective partnership work in a 
problem-oriented context is rare. They suggested that this might be because the 
motivation for working in partnership becomes strained when partner agencies are 
unable or unwilling to match the speed at which the police service is able to respond 
to problems. Matassa and Newbum (2003) noted problematic relationships between 
partners in their study of the implementation of problem-oriented hate crime reduction 
projects in London. They suggested that these were caused by differences in working 
practices and cultures, differing interpretations of the purpose of the initiatives and 
differing levels of commitment to the implementation of the projects, but they did not 
elaborate on the nature of these. Similarly, Scott (2006) noted that problem-oriented 
work conducted in partnership is rare and like Matassa and Newbum (2003) 
suggested that this might be related to the different procedural and cultural parameters 
within which practitioners work. He went on to state that the tendency of agencies to 
engage with problem-oriented work might be dependent on how closely their aims 
and objectives align with those of the police service (Scott, 2000). The issue of 
interagency working in the crime reduction arena more generally is returned to in 
chapters seven and eight.
Police organisational culture
A number of studies have pointed to the role played by police ‘culture’ in explaining 
the nature of implementation of problem-oriented policing. In this context, this refers 
to the influence of the dominant reactive police organisational culture and the inherent 
difficulties of changing this to a proactive problem-oriented one. It has already been 
argued that the police task has come to be seen as that of providing rapid responses to 
incidents as they arise. A number of studies have indeed pointed out the potential this 
has for influencing the nature of the implementation of problem-oriented policing 
(Bennett and Kemp, 1994; Leigh et al 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000; Goldstein, 2003; 
Townsley et al, 2003; Bullock et a l , 2006). Bennett and Kemp (1994) noted very 
generally that a change in the dominant police culture was required for implementing 
problem-oriented policing but that this is time-consuming and needs constant
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reinforcement from senior managers. Leigh et al (1998) found a tendency for police 
officers to revert to reactive policing styles where they were not pushed by managers 
to do otherwise. They argued that police management had to give constant and 
consistent messages about the need to change towards a problem-oriented 
organisation and what that change will mean in practice. Townsley et al (2003) 
similarly noted that police officers tend to be primarily driven to responding 
reactively to emergencies. They suggested that the broader problem-oriented ways of 
thinking advocated by policy makers and academics may appear unattractive to 
officers who may feel that adopting such an approach might result in them becoming 
less operationally competent. In their study of problem-oriented policing in 
Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies, Bullock et al (2006) also argued that 
aspects of the dominant reactive police culture obstructed some efforts to implement 
problem-oriented policing. They concluded that despite the efforts to affect change in 
Lancashire and Hampshire Constabularies, the pressure was still for providing 
immediate responses to incidents as they occur; that police officers found it very 
difficult to move away from the traditional police interest in perpetrators of crime 
rather than thinking about different ways of solving problems; and, that because of 
their preference for practical action, problem-oriented policing was resisted by some 
as being bureaucratic, academic, and about filling in forms.
Summary
Those factors that have been mooted as explaining the implementation of problem- 
oriented policing are summarised in Box 3.1 below:
Box 3.1: Summary of factors in the implementation of problem-oriented policing
Factor Examples
Leadership and management 
skills
• Have not always enlisted key personnel
• Lack of clearly stated commitment
• Resources not used to build capacity
• Inflexible management styles
The nature of the police 
organisation
• The police service is resistant to change
• There is not sufficient clarity about the role and
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function
Organisational structures • Structures can be inflexible
• Highly hierarchical organisation
• Resistant to risk taking
Analysis • Weaknesses in analytic skills
• Access to data
• Practical constraints to sharing data
• Making use of data
Performance management and 
incentives
• Success in problem-oriented policing is not 
rewarded
• Management structures typically based on 
arrests
• Over focus on the outputs of policing rather than 
on the processes
Training the principles and 
developing the skills
• Insufficient training of principles
• Lack of understanding of the concepts, purpose 
and how they contribute
Local project management 
skills
• Difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff 
locally
• Time-consuming delays caused by, for example, 
the time it takes to procure equipment
Dissemination of knowledge • No collective body of information about how to 
resolve specific problems
Police organisational culture • The time and effort that it takes to change the 
dominant reactive police culture
• Focus on offenders rather than other ways of 
tackling problems
• Aversion to form filling
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Weaknesses in existing accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing
Studies have, then, pointed to a range of factors that explain the implementation 
difficulties identified in chapter two. The following sections of this chapter provide a 
detailed discussion of the weaknesses in the existing explanations of the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing which can be summarised as follows.
• Key accounts have not been based on data collected for the purpose in hand and 
sometimes on participant commentaries from key individuals who have the benefit 
of hindsight.
• Existing studies are framed in a primarily top-down approach to project 
implementation.
• There is an over-emphasis on explaining the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing in terms of organisational and technological issues.
• Accounts are focused on providing guidance for improving implementation rather 
than on understanding implementation.
• The impact of patterns of practitioner behaviour and contextual issues are 
neglected.
• Explanations have not been framed in existing theories that seek to orient the 
analysis and understanding of implementation from the wider field of public 
policy.
Methodological weaknesses
Existing studies explaining the implementation of problem-oriented policing have 
inherent methodological weaknesses.
In some cases the accounts are not based on systematic data collected in order to 
understand patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing. Not Rocket 
Science? (Read and Tilley, 2000) was based on data collected as part of a thematic 
inspection of the implementation of problem-solving in England and Wales (Beating 
Crime, 2000). It was aimed primarily at checking that the police service were 
implementing problem-solving as it was intended as part of the government’s 
performance management framework. The same applies to Scott’s 2000 review of the
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implementation of problem-oriented policing in the US, which was based primarily on 
a review of existing accounts and on discussions with experienced practitioners and 
academics rather than on systematic analysis of implementation of the processes as 
understood by those who implemented them.
Related to the above, accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing 
have tended to focus on providing guidance for how to improve implementation rather 
than to provide explanations of implementation. Generally, studies have described 
observed weaknesses in problem-oriented policing, implementation problems and 
provided guidance (including checklists) which police managers or policy makers 
could use to improve implementation. This includes both the Read and Tilley (2000) 
and Scott (2000) reviews. These key accounts, then, have focused primarily on 
providing guidance about how to improve the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing rather than to produce specific understanding of how the concepts are 
implemented. As was pointed out in the introduction, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with explanations that provide practical responses to the problems of 
implementation. In the context in which the Read and Tilley and Scott reports were 
produced (by the UK Home Office and US Department of Justice respectively) which 
was to help improve the delivery of problem-oriented policing, it is not surprising that 
they focus on these issues. However, the result of this is that there remains a gap in 
the literature and a need to understand better the patterns of implementation rather 
than to examine the extent to which implementation mirrors Goldstein’s ideal, and to 
propose solutions to observed implementation problems.
Focus on top-down approaches to implementation
Whilst perhaps not explicitly so, accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing are strongly framed in top-down conceptions of project implementation. As 
has been seen, many recent studies of the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing examine the difference between the ideal described by Goldstein in 1979 and 
1990 and what is actually found when the principles are implemented in an 
operational setting. Studies tend to identify a gulf between Goldstein’s ideal and what 
is going on in practice in the name of problem-orientation and chapter two sets out in 
detail the nature of the problems that are observed. The preceding sections of this 
chapter show that existing studies have overwhelmingly sought to explain this gulf in
48
terms of the organisational (for example, structures, performance management, 
leadership, training and project management) and technical (especially availability of 
data and analytic capacity) aspects that facilitate or hinder its implementation at an 
operational level. Examples of the top-down focus of accounts are discussed in the 
following sections.
Read and Tilley (2000) examined the extent of problem-oriented policing in the UK 
and identified weaknesses in its implementation. It concluded that there were only 
two police services systematically implementing problem-oriented policing at the 
time of the study. It goes on to describe those factors that the authors considered 
facilitated implementation and provides general ‘lessons’ for the delivery of problem- 
oriented work. These exclusively focus on the staffing, training, software, structures 
and rewards that would improve implementation. As has been seen the report also 
provides checklists against which implementation could be monitored.
Scott (2000) similarly focuses almost exclusively on how the police service (and other 
agencies) should react to the challenges of implementation that it identifies rather than 
on examining and understanding the patterns of implementation of problem-oriented 
policing. In particular, Scott (2000) focuses on how problem-oriented principles 
should be taught within the police service, the ways that analysis improved and new 
knowledge about effective ways of dealing with crime problems transferred.
Braga (2002) dedicated a chapter of his book {Problem-oriented Policing and Crime 
Prevention) to how the delivery of problem-oriented policing could be facilitated. He 
suggested three main areas where attention should be focused to improve 
implementation: raising the capacity of the police service to conduct crime analysis; 
the measurement of performance; and, the engagement of partners. Braga’s views on 
how performance in problem-oriented policing should be measured have already been 
noted in this chapter. In terms of engaging partners, he suggested that this could be 
facilitated through developing and distributing guides which set out what each agency 
does and how these services could be accessed. Braga (2002) also noted that there are 
other internal and external administrative arrangements required to facilitate the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing (including redefining the role of line-
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level police officers, the importance of leadership, improving line-level management 
of officers and decentralising authority in the police service).
A more recent edited collection examining the implementation of problem-oriented 
policing and situational crime prevention (Putting Theory to Work: Implementing 
Situational Prevention and Problem-oriented Policing) edited by Knutsson and 
Clarke (2006) focuses (almost) exclusively on the organisational and technical factors 
that explain implementation. Two chapters examine the implementation of problem- 
oriented projects. In his chapter, Implementing crime prevention: lessons learnt from 
problem-oriented policing projects, Scott reviews the literature that examines those 
factors that help to explain whether or not problem-oriented projects get implemented. 
Again, these are framed almost exclusively in organisational and technical terms. 
Scott’s chapter especially highlights the importance of the characteristics, skills and 
actions of project managers and highlights the role of leadership, support of key 
senior individuals, continuity of staffing, ownership, communication of objectives and 
the professional capacity of key individuals. The availability and flexibility of 
resources for the delivery of problem-oriented responses was also stressed.
In the same volume Brown discusses implementation failure in problem-oriented 
projects almost solely in relation to project management. Whilst Brown acknowledges 
that other factors are at play in shaping the implementation of projects (although he 
does not state what they are) he stresses the importance of the qualities and capacity 
of staff, the senior support for projects and access to resources and project 
management. Brown argues that good project management is essential for 
implementing projects but that there are weaknesses in this area which include 
shortages of skilled staff and problems recruiting and retaining skilled project 
managers. He goes on to make specific recommendations about how project 
management could be improved to minimise implementation failure.
Many recent studies have focused primarily on identifying the difference between 
what Goldstein envisaged and what was delivered in practice and examining the 
organisational and technical reasons why problem-oriented projects often fall short of 
Goldstein’s ideal. Throughout these texts, then, the implication has been that through 
providing the appropriate organisational structures (such as leadership, structures and
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project management) and through addressing capacity and technical issues the 
delivery of problem-oriented projects will be improved.
It is, however, contended that these organisational and technical explanations are 
unlikely to fully explain observed patterns of implementation. Although they have not 
been well-developed in the context of explaining the delivery of problem-oriented 
projects it has already been seen that the dominant reactive police culture and the 
problematic nature of partnership working have resulted in some of the difficulties 
that have been encountered.
More widely, studies have pointed to a number of characteristics of the police service, 
police officers and the crime reduction context that appear to have an impact on 
efforts to affect change. For example, studies have suggested that the police service is 
highly resistant to change and this has impeded efforts generally to implement new 
programmes and practices within the service (Hanmer, 2003). Related, police officers 
have a high level of discretion to make decisions about their day-to-day activities 
because in practice they operate away from the immediate gaze of their management. 
It has been argued that there has been an assumption that because of the hierarchical 
nature of the police service, change can be imposed from the top of the organisation 
through the tightening of rules and regulations but that this assumption is questionable 
because of this discretion (Chan, 1997). Perhaps most importantly in the context of 
this study, partnership working in the criminal justice arena has not been without 
problems and there is currently some sense that the difficulties of doing so have been 
underplayed (Hough, 2006). Engaging agencies in partnership working has not been 
straightforward. It has been harder to engage some agencies in partnership working 
with the police service than it has others. In particular it has been noted that the 
probation service has been hard to engage (HMIC, 2000) as has the health service 
(Irving et a l, 2001; Philips et al., 2002). Studies have pointed to practical problems 
which have impacted on what partnerships can achieve when they get together. Byrne 
and Pease (2003), for example, pointed to a high ratio of talk to action and lengthy 
delays in implementing decisions in a partnership setting. Gilling (2005) (drawing on 
Phillips et a l , 2002) summarised practical problems as being related to data sharing, 
technical capacity, expertise in crime auditing and consultation and setting targets. 
However, explanations for the difficulties associated with partnership working have
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also been shown to relate to wider ideological and cultural factors. Partnerships draw 
together agencies with different cultures, ideologies and traditions as well as different 
working routines and as such conflicts exist between these organisations when they 
work together (Crawford, 1998). These issues are discussed in greater detail in 
chapters seven and eight.
There would then seem to be reasons to infer that approaching the analysis of 
implementation primarily in terms of top-down features is limited because it does not 
do enough to account for the potential for practitioner behaviour and the wider 
features of the police organisation and wider crime reduction context to affect patterns 
of implementation. Indeed, in the field of public policy there has been a wider debate 
about how the analysis of implementation of programmes and projects should be 
approached. As was seen in the introduction, this has fallen primarily into two camps 
(top-down and bottom-up) which conceive implementation rather differently. This 
debate has challenged the legitimacy of a top-down approach to understanding the 
execution of projects and programmes.
The following sections of this chapter examine the wider literature from the field of 
public policy that has shaped approaches to the analysis of implementation of 
projects. It discusses the top-down approach in detail and the bottom-up challenge to 
its claim to be able to explain the implementation of programmes and projects. It then 
examines those proposals that advocate drawing elements of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches together to understand implementation. It finishes by setting out how 
these top-down and bottom-up approaches to conceiving implementation will be used 
to frame this study.
Understanding project implementation
In the field of public policy there has been a long debate concerning how 
implementation of programmes and projects should be approached and understood. 
These debates started in the early 1970s following the publication of Pressman and 
Wildavsky’s influential study, Implementation, published in 1973, and continued into 
the 1980s when they started to peter out (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6, 
2006).
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As was discussed in the introduction to this study the debate about implementation 
has been characterised by two broad approaches ‘top-down ’ and ‘bottom-up ’. Bottom- 
up and top-down approaches have differing descriptive and normative characters. 
They seek to describe implementation in rather different ways and consequently the 
implications for explaining the delivery of projects are different, as are the 
implications for how projects should be implemented. These approaches are discussed 
in the following sections.
Top-down approaches to understanding implementation
Top-down approaches to understanding programme implementation are concerned 
primarily with what the policy makers or managers are trying to achieve and 
examining the difference between what managers intended and what was realised in 
practice (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Barrett and Fudge, 1981).
How would you know if a programme had been implemented well or poorly? -  by 
observing the difference between intended and actual consequences and this can be 
used to alter programmes and/or their modes on the basis of this.
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xv
The top-down approach starts by identifying a policy objective; it looks at the extent 
to which the actions of practitioners were consistent with that objective, the main 
factors that shaped the patterns of implementation and how policy is reformed on the 
basis of those factors (Sabatier, 1986).
Despite their primary interest in examining implementation from the point of view of 
the policy maker or manager, top-down approaches are not naive about the potential 
for programmes to deviate from their planned paths as they are delivered on the 
ground ‘.. .programmes are altered by their environments and organisations are 
affected by their programmes, mutual adaptation changes both the context and the 
content o f what is implemented’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xv). Indeed in their 
study of programme implementation Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) pointed to the 
wide range of participants involved, the numbers of decisions that needed to be made
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and the consequent negotiation with a wide range of participants, which, they argued, 
made ultimate successful implementation very difficult and time-consuming:
What is apparently simple and straightforward is really complex and convoluted. We 
did not appreciate the numbers of steps involved, the numbers of participants whose 
preferences have to be taken into account, the number of separate decisions that are 
part of what we think of as a single one. Least of all we appreciate the geometric 
growth over time where each negotiation involves a number of participants with 
decisions to make, whose implications ramify over time.
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973
However, top-down approaches consider that the impact of this can be minimised 
through setting management controls to limit the extent of deviation and to control the 
environment so ‘...the worst aspects can be alleviated’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973: xviii).
Particularly important for top-down approaches has been the development of project 
theory based on clear, well understood sequences of cause and effect and setting clear 
project objectives. Top-downers have argued that project or programme interventions 
should be based on clear and well understood theories of cause and effect because 
new projects might just be bad ideas (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In addition to this, 
the sequences of cause and effect should be as short and as direct as possible because 
long sequences of cause and effect are considered to be more likely to break down 
over time and so interventions less likely to be successful (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973). Setting clear objectives is important to facilitate the development of project 
guidance. Top-down analysts have argued that in practice project objectives might be 
vague, ambitious and conflictual but that this is problematic because where objectives 
are not discretely laid out then neither is the means of achieving them:
In most policies of interest, objectives are characteristically multiple (because we 
want many things not just one), conflicting (because we want different things) and 
vague (because that is how we can agree to move on without having to agree on what 
exactly to do). So if the objectives are not uniquely determined, neither are the modes 
of implementation for them.
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 168
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In addition to setting clear objectives and having a project theory based on clear cause 
and effect mechanisms, the establishment of systems of accountability through which 
the activities and outputs of practitioners can be monitored are considered to be 
important for minimising deviation from project plans (Parsons, 1999; Berman,
1978). The assumption is that the project theory, objectives and guidance should be 
clearly set out and top-down systems of communications, practitioner management 
and systems of accountability set up to in order to minimise deviation and avoid 
implementation problems, and the moral is that policy makers should not promise 
change if the conditions for implementing new programmes are not right (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973).
The focus on setting out the conditions under which project deviation and 
implementation problems could be minimised has led authors to develop models that 
describe the ideal implementation conditions against which those responsible for 
implementation could make decisions about how projects and programmes might be 
implemented in practice (for example, Hood, 1976; Mountjoy and O’Toole, 1979; 
Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Again, it is important to stress that these authors are not 
suggesting that ideal conditions are necessarily present or necessarily can be, only that 
they need to be for comparative purposes. Indeed, in order to avoid charges of naivety 
in respect to whether these conditions could be achieved in practice, they tend to be 
framed in terms of arguments about the unattainability of such perfect implementation 
in complex situations (Hupe and Hill, 2002).
In his book, The Limits to Administration, Hood (1976) set out such conditions for 
perfect administration as follows.
1. The administrative system has to be unitary with a single line of authority.
2. Norms and rules enforcement are uniform -  objectives are clearly given and are 
actionable by officials.
3. There is perfect obedience or administrative control.
4. There is perfect communication and co-ordination between administrative units.
5. There are no time pressures.
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Mountjoy and O’Toole (1979) argued that there are two key elements for successful 
implementation of policy: the provision of resources and adequate instruction. They 
considered that since breaking established routines is expensive, agencies should be 
given proper resources and instruction to facilitate implementation. They stated four 
regimes in which policies could be implemented and the consequences for 
implementation.
1. New resources with vague instructions: practitioners will interpret policy in ways 
which may not be the same as the policy makers.
2. New resources with specific instructions: the goals of individuals within 
organisations are less important and implementation relatively straightforward.
3. No resources and vague instructions: would result in voluntary activity which 
could not be anticipated.
4. No resources and specific instructions: practitioners would prioritise according to 
their own judgements.
For Mountjoy and O’Toole (1979), then, implementation problems are largely 
concerned with the extent to which policy makers can exercise control. This is 
especially in relation to control of the environment in which policies are made, control 
of the practitioners and the extent to which they adapt policies in the process of 
implementation.
This was developed into more detailed assumptions of perfect implementation by 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) as below.
1. That circumstances external to implementing agencies do not impose crippling 
constraints: these are factors that the implementers cannot control (could be either 
physical or political). Generally however, it is thought that little that can be done 
about this.
2. That adequate time and resources are available: time constraints can be related to 
external constraints and the common problem of managers expecting too much 
too soon.
3. That the required combination of resources is available: it is not just the case that 
resources are required. They are required at the right stages of programme 
implementation. Resources do not simply refer to the availability of money but 
also to the availability of capable staff and capacity generally, e.g. equipment.
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4. The programme must be based on a valid theory of cause and effect: the new 
programme might just be a bad idea and/or based on inadequate understanding of 
a problem.
5. That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few if any 
intervening links: policies based on long sequences of cause and effect are more 
likely to break down.
6. That dependency links are minimal: where implementation is reliant on single 
agencies, success is more likely. Where implementation requires agreement at 
different stages it is less likely to be implemented.
7. That there is understanding and agreement of objectives: there needs to be 
agreement at all stages and just because something was initially agreed does not 
mean that it will always be agreed. Objectives need to be clearly understood and 
communicated.
8. That tasks are fully specified in the correct order: there needs to be detail of who 
is doing what and when and there is a managerial task to ensure that it is all 
followed through.
9. That there is perfect co-ordination and communication: there needs to be good 
communication amongst the elements responsible for implementation and this is 
unlikely to be sustainable.
10. That those in authority have perfect compliance: this is unlikely to be achieved as 
there may be conflicts of interest and disputes, there may be a lack of formal 
powers to demand compliance and where management of change is involved it 
becomes even harder.
Bottom-up critique
Rather than focusing on what policy makers were trying to achieve, bottom-up 
approaches have focused on the importance of individuals and groups of individuals 
interacting in analysing and understanding programme implementation and as such 
they offer a different descriptive and normative approach to analysing and 
understanding implementation of programmes.
In his study, Street-level Bureaucrats, published in 1980, Lipsky argued that 
practitioners have high levels of discretion which, for a variety of reasons, is difficult 
to control. This discretion allows street-level bureaucrats to develop routines through
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which they deal with the complexity of their day-to-day tasks and make choices about 
action and inaction. This discretion and these routines both facilitate their work but 
also help to explain why the outcomes of programmes and policies sometimes diverge 
from what was intended by managers and policy makers. Lipsky argued that lower- 
level workers often do not share the perceptions and preferences of their managers 
and so they cannot be assumed to be working towards common goals. Practitioners 
may not consider orders from above to be legitimate and the means that managers 
have of making practitioners comply may not be sufficient to ensure that they do so.
This deviation is possible because of the discretion that practitioners have to cope 
with the complexity that they face in their day-to-day tasks. The discretion of 
practitioners is difficult to control because they have some resources to resist 
directives from managers. These resources include the difficulties of sacking staff in 
the public sector, but also include the practitioner’s wealth of expertise and 
information which makes organisations dependent on them. In addition, for Lipsky, 
the relationship between practitioners and their managers is difficult because they 
may have conflicting goals. Practitioners aim to process clients and maximise their 
day-to-day autonomy to do so, and managers tend to honour workers’ day-to-day 
preferences if they (the managers) are rewarded in work performance. This is unlike a 
top-down conception of the relationship between managers and practitioners 
‘ ...compliance with agency objectives may still be the managerial problem but it is 
complicated by the ability o f street-level bureaucrats to resist organisational 
pressures with their own resources (Lipsky, 1980: 25).
More, Lipsky argued that the individual action of practitioners does, in effect, 
constitute policy '... the decisions o f street-level bureaucrats, the routines they 
establish and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out ’ (Lipsky 1980: xii). For Lipsky 
then, policy is not made at the top of the organisation, it is made at the bottom and this 
is where analytical effort should be concentrated. The implication is that tightening 
mechanisms of controlling practitioners will not impact on implementation and that 
other ways would have to be found to meet the expectations of local people and 
politicians. Lipsky was, in fact, not very optimistic about the chances of reforming 
institutions although he does offer some suggestions including encouraging greater
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client autonomy and helping street-level bureaucrats become better proponents of 
change, through, for example, greater professionalisation and self-regulation.
Hjem and Porter (1981) also adopted a bottom-up approach to analysing programme 
implementation. They were particularly interested in the interaction between different 
agencies in understanding programme implementation. They framed their analysis in 
terms of implementation structures which are formed within pools of organisations 
and through processes of self-selection. Like others, Hjem and Porter noted the wide 
range of individuals involved in the implementation of programmes and looked for a 
way to analyse the many individuals and organisations who participate in programme 
implementation. ‘Implementation structures’ found within ‘pools of organisations’ are 
their key unit of analysis. Implementation structures comprise subsets of members of 
organisations through which purposeful actions to implement programmes are taken. 
These individuals are likely to be self-selected and the programmes and projects 
themselves are informed by the initiative of those individuals who have selected them. 
These individuals adjust parts of the programmes in which they participate to meet 
organisational needs. Hjem and Porter, like Lipsky, argued that professional 
discretion is required in order that practitioners can manage the complex and diverse 
situations that practitioners have to deal with and because of that it is difficult to set 
up rules to direct practitioners towards specific forms of behaviour. In terms of 
analysing implementation, they make the case for a phenomenological approach. 
Again, like Lipsky they suggest analysis of implementation should start with the line- 
level practitioner and concern should be with understanding the motives of those who 
participate in projects, their understanding of the programme or projects and their 
behaviour.
Barrett and Fudge (1981) also argued that the view that policy is made at the top of an 
organisation and is translated into practitioner action via a series of rules and 
procedures that guide practitioner behaviour on the ground is misleading. This, they 
argued, downplays the role played by power relationships, conflicting interests and 
values in shaping the nature of implementation. In addition, they suggest that it cannot 
be assumed that there is a compliant relationship between those at the top of an 
organisation and those at the bottom. They argued that organisations and practitioners 
are very often autonomous or semi-autonomous and, like Lipsky, they argued that
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practitioners may pursue their own interests and priorities rather than those set at the 
top of an organisation. This problem of the management control of practitioners exists 
even in unitary hierarchical organisations but where multiple organisations are 
involved the implications are multiplied. For Barrett and Fudge (1981) 
implementation of projects and programmes should be conceived in terms of: 
ideological commitment that practitioners have to certain ways of working; the 
organisation context in which practitioners deliver interventions; and, in power 
relations between agencies:
From this perspective, implementation (or action) may be regarded as a series of 
responses: to ideological commitment, to environmental pressures, or to pressures 
from other agencies (groups) seeking to influence or control action.
Barrett and Fudge, 1981:13
They saw implementation as a process of establishing a consensus through 
negotiation. This consensus will be shaped by the extent to which different actors and 
agencies share value systems and objectives to support particular policies or 
programmes. Policy cannot be considered to be fixed but negotiated over time:
Policy cannot be defined as fixed but as a series of interactions around which 
bargaining takes place and which may be modified as each set of actors attempts to 
negotiate to maximise its own interests and priorities.
Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 24
Barrett and Fudge also rejected the assumption that practitioner compliance and 
control are administrative and managerial issues. Lack of control is also a deliberate 
reaction to authority. Like Lipsky, Barrett and Fudge argued that it can be assumed 
that practitioners will try and avoid interference with their freedom and autonomy. 
Implementation of new policies or programmes requires negotiation, compromise and 
bargaining with those who are responsible for enacting them.
The implications for Barrett and Fudge (1981) are that it is important to observe what 
is happening in practice and why when understanding implementation. This focuses 
attention on the behaviour of practitioners in explaining implementation and forces an
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examination of the way that individual action can play a role in shaping 
implementation.
Comparing top-down and bottom-up approaches
Bottom-up approaches differ from top-down approaches in terms of their descriptive 
and normative assumptions (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6,2006). First, they 
question the top-down perspective on the location of policy making and in particular 
whether analysis of programme and project implementation should begin with what 
the policy maker was trying to achieve. They question the top-down assertion that the 
study of implementation should focus on the difference between what a manager was 
trying to achieve and what was realised in practice. Instead, the role that the 
interaction of practitioners plays in determining implementation is emphasised and 
therefore the case for starting analysis of implementation at that level is made. As a 
consequence, bottom-up approaches have tended to start by identifying the 
individuals and groups involved in implementation and have asked about goals, 
strategies, activities and contacts and as such they provide a mechanism for moving 
from the bottom to the top in understanding programme implementation (Sabatier, 
1986).
Second, top-down and bottom-up approaches differ normatively in their views of how 
implementation ought to be conducted. In particularly, the top-down argument that 
aspects of the technological and organisational environment can be manipulated to 
improve the implementation of programmes and projects has been questioned. 
Bottom-up accounts tend to be pessimistic about the possibility of changing 
practitioner behaviour and authors vary in their views about how this might be 
achieved (Peck and Perri 6, 2006). For example, Hjem and Porter (1981) pointed to 
the wide variety of consumer and producer groups involved in implementing 
programmes and suggested that they should have significant and perhaps equal 
influence on the nature of implementation as, say, an elected representative. Lipsky 
(1981) on the other hand, framed the question differently, his main concern being how 
best to mn services and initiatives whether or not they are reminiscent of the original 
ideas of the policy maker.
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Box 3.2 below summarises and compares top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
understanding implementation.
Box 3.2 Comparison of top-down and bottom-up approaches
Top-down Bottom-up
Starting point for 
analysis of 
implementation
The aims of policy 
makers/managers
Implementation structures and 
interaction of practitioners
Identification of 
main players in 
implementation
Start at the top Start at the bottom
Objective setting Objectives are set at the top 
and followed by practitioners
Question policy makers ability 
to set clear goals
Location of policy 
making
Policy makers determine 
policy and delivery
Policy making is dynamic
Control of 
implementation
Through the provision of 
adequate resources, setting 
clear objectives and exercising 
controls practitioners will 
implement policy
Policy makers cannot control 
the environment in which 
programmes are implemented
Nature of 
discretion
Through setting up accounting 
systems and holding 
practitioners to account, the 
impact of discretion can be 
minimised
Policy makers cannot control 
the impact of practitioner 
discretion because 
implementation is a low 
visibility activity
Nature of conflict Conflict is dysfunctional and 
can be managed to ensure that 
practitioners achieve common 
aims
Conflict is an inevitable result 
of practitioners conceiving 
implementation in different 
ways
Implication for 
implementation
Managers should seek to 
maximise compliance from 
practitioners
Varies. Ultimately that 
practitioners should implement 
what they feel appropriate 
using funds and human
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resource management as they 
feel appropriate
Evaluative
criteria
Focus is on the extent to which 
the programme objectives are 
attained
Much less clear
Anything that is relevant to the
policy issue
Certainly does not require 
careful analysis of policy
Overall focus How can processes be steered 
towards the implementation of 
a programmes objectives
The interaction of practitioners
Adapted from Sabatier, 1986
Strengths and weaknesses of top-down and bottom-up approaches
Top-down models provide useful practical responses to the problem of programme 
and project implementation. They can help to tighten up organisational processes, 
offer more control over practitioners, can help managers and policy makers to think 
about reasons for implementation failure and for identifying ways of addressing it 
(Stone, 1980; Gunn, 1984). Similarly they are useful for creating checklists against 
which implementation could be monitored and understood (Sabatier, 1986). On the 
other hand, if the causes of implementation problems are not technical, then they are 
likely to require rather different solutions (Stone, 1980). Although they do not 
discount the possibility of deviation from project plans, top-down approaches can 
overlook the dynamics of implementation and the role of the practitioners in shaping 
what is achieved. This means that they can ignore the coping or diversionary 
mechanisms that practitioners may adopt to get the job done or to twist 
implementation towards their own ends. Additionally, the top-down emphasis on clear 
and consistent objectives is generally considered to be mistaken because so few 
programmes contain them (Sabatier, 1986). Generally, they may overstate the role of 
management in determining what projects and programmes deliver in practice.
Bottom-up approaches are primarily concerned with the interaction between 
practitioners and so are much more likely to be able to identify the role of those 
individuals involved in implementation and the processes through which programmes
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are implemented. They are much better able to identify how practitioners delivered 
project interventions and their motives. As such, these approaches may be able to 
identify the relative roles and the relative importance of, say different agencies and 
individuals. They are particularly appropriate where there are a lot of organisations 
and actors involved in implementation. Similarly, through the focus on individuals 
rather than programme aims, these approaches are much better able to identify 
unintended consequences of projects. However, bottom-up approaches may underplay 
the role played by managers in shaping the nature of implementation and the extent to 
which practitioners are able to frustrate their wishes and it may not be desirable for 
the role of managers to be considered so marginal in implementing projects.
These are summarised in box 3.3 below.
Box 3.3: The strengths and weaknesses of top-down and bottom-up approaches
Top-down Bottom-up
Strengths
• Useful frameworks for analysing 
implementation and making 
predictions about the nature of 
implementation
• Frameworks manageable for the 
purposes of evaluation
• Identifies and accounts for the role 
and motivation of individuals and 
organisations in programme 
implementation
• Particularly useful where a number of 
agencies are involved
• Better able to identify unintended 
consequences of policy
• Particularly useful where there is no 
dominant legislation
Weaknesses
• Programmes often do not have well 
stated objectives
• Underplays the role of the practitioner
• It is difficult to argue that 
management should play no role in 
determining the nature of 
implementation
• May overstate the impact that
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practitioners can have on
implementation
The case for synthesis
Since the mid-1980s a general acknowledgement of the weaknesses associated with 
top-down and bottom-up approaches has led a preference for synthesising elements of 
both rather than focusing exclusively on one or the other within the field of public 
policy analysis (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Peck and Perri 6,2006). Studies tend to adopt 
elements of both as a methodological framework to guide analysis of implementation. 
However, as has been seen, approaches to implementation tend to be characterised by 
both descriptive and normative concerns. Reflecting this, some synthesisers have gone 
beyond concern about how to approach the analysis of implementation and have 
identified features of programmes and the local context that indicate what 
implementation might look like. As such, they have attempted to offer a means of 
helping policy makers and practitioners determine the circumstances in which either 
top-down or bottom-up approaches to implementing projects would be the most 
appropriate. There has been no dominant synthesis, just an acknowledgment that the 
study of implementation should address the concerns of both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. In the interests of completeness the following sections briefly examine 
key studies which have integrated top-down and bottom-up approaches.
Elmore (1980) advocated a process of forward and backward mapping which was 
primarily aimed at determining what sort of policy instruments should be used to 
implement programmes on the basis of an analysis of existing organisational context 
and practitioner preferences. Forward mapping involves setting out the stated 
objectives, outputs and outcomes of a proposed policy (the top-down features) and 
backward mapping involves examining and specifying the features of the local 
organisational context and practitioner behaviour and preferences (the bottom-up 
features) that need to be addressed to implement those stated objectives and 
outcomes. Elmore suggested that the local conditions that would need to be addressed 
to achieve those objectives should be described and this should be repeated over time 
until middle ground between the policy makers’ aims and what is realistic within the 
specified organisational context was reached. This may mean, of course, that policies 
or programmes are altered over time to suit local circumstances. This approach has
65
been considered useful because it offers policy makers and practitioners a means of 
thinking about how to approach implementation over time; however, it does not 
provide general explanations for how projects or policies are implemented (Matland, 
1995).
In a similar vein, Berman (1980) attempted to bring elements of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches together and set out the circumstances in which adopting one 
approach to implementation might be more appropriate than the other. Berman argued 
that a policy needs to be matched to the context in which it is being implemented 
because the effectiveness of implementation depends on how a proposed policy 
interacts with an existing organisational context. Implementation could be conceived 
in either top-down or bottom-up terms depending on the policy context and situational 
parameters. Berman (1980) set out five broad parameters that shaped the 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use one or the other approach. 
These related to: the scope of change; the certainty over the effectiveness of project 
technology or project theory; the level of conflict over project goals; the nature of the 
organisational setting; and, the stability of the organisational environment. Berman 
argued that where the scope of change is high, there is a high level of conflict over 
project aims or where an organisational setting is highly flexible and unstructured 
and/or the environment unstable, a bottom-up approach to implementing the project 
would be most appropriate. That is to say, practitioners should have more flexibility 
to transform project aims to suit local circumstances and individual and organisational 
preferences. In contrast, where there is a high degree of certainty over the technology 
or project theory top-down approaches (where practitioners are expected to follow the 
objectives set out at the top of an organisation) might be more appropriate.
Sabatier (1986) developed what has perhaps become the most influential attempt to 
bring elements of top-down and bottom-up approaches together. Sabatier advocated 
using the bottom-up unit of analysis (the practitioners and groups of practitioners 
responsible for implementing a project or programme) rather than the top-down unit 
of analysis of what managers were trying to achieve. This bottom-up approach is 
however combined with the top-down concern of understanding and controlling the 
socio-economic and legal conditions which constrain practitioner behaviour:
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Synthesis adopts bottom-up units of analysis and combines them with the various 
strategies employed by relevant actors in both the private and public sectors at 
various levels of government as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with 
their objectives.
Sabatier, 1986: 39
Sabatier was thus concerned with understanding the role played by the economic and 
other structural conditions that constrain and shape implementation. However, he also 
advocated understanding practitioners’ attempts to manipulate the processes of 
implementation to achieve their own preferences, as well as examining practitioners’ 
efforts to improve their understanding of a policy or programme as they learn from 
experience and how implementation changes over time as a result.
Goggin and colleagues (1990) developed a model that attempted to integrate elements 
of top-down and bottom-up concerns into a methodological framework. In their book, 
Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation, (1990) Goggin et 
al. (1990) described a dynamic ‘communication model’ which is concerned primarily 
with understanding how patterns of implementation differ between areas (in their case 
American states) based on the discretion that local areas have to make choices about 
how to implement a policy. They argued that implementation is shaped by 
inducements and constraints from the top (in their case federal) level and these 
include the nature and the clarity of the policy, the extent of agreement about the 
policy and the resources made available to implement it (top-down features).
However, they contended that the local context also plays a role in shaping 
implementation (bottom-up features). They argued that practitioners interpret the 
messages about policies or programmes which are communicated from the top and 
there is scope for distortion of those messages. They argued that there was great 
variation in the local contexts in which policies are implemented because political and 
interest groups and practitioners vary between areas. Because of these variations it 
can be expected that policies will be received, interpreted and implemented differently 
in different areas. The concern of this model is primarily focused on understanding 
communication between layers of government (and is especially relevant to the US) 
as such, the model does not have universally applicable explanatory or descriptive 
power (Hill and Hupe, 2002).
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More recently, Matland (1995) developed a model which attempted to set out what 
patterns of implementation might look like in accounting for differences in the nature 
of the policy and the organisational setting. Matland (1995) set out four types of 
implementation which, he argued, would be determined by the level of ambiguity 
about the policy and conflict, between those responsible for implementing it. First, 
where there is low ambiguity and low conflict assuming that there are the necessary 
resources to implement it, the outcome desired by policy makers or managers is likely 
to be achieved. Second, where there is low policy ambiguity but high conflict about 
the policy, the nature of implementation will be determined by practitioners locally as 
it is renegotiated on the basis of power relations and hence likely to vary between 
areas. Third, where there is high policy ambiguity but low policy conflict, 
implementation will largely depend on the contextual conditions locally and again is 
likely to vary between areas. Fourth, where there is high policy ambiguity and high 
policy conflict the nature of implementation will be determined by local level, 
coalitions and particularly by the strength of professional values and allegiances and 
again will vary. This approach is considered to be potentially useful and points to how 
the nature of implementation is influenced by the nature of the policy or programme. 
However, the simplicity of the categorisation of types of policy has been questioned 
as has whether it is indeed possible to label policies in such a way (Hill and Hupe, 
2002).
Synthesis thus comprises a series of attempts to bring features of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches together. Some have gone further and pointed to how the 
nature of a policy decision and the local context give indications about whether top- 
down or bottom-up approaches to implementation would be most advisable. This 
discussion of approaches to synthesis would seem to be useful in orienting this study. 
Whilst there is no dominant means of synthesising the two, weaknesses in 
approaching implementation wholly in terms of one or the other strongly points to 
value in drawing together aspects of both top-down and bottom-up approaches.
Drawing on this literature review, the following sections set out the rationale for the 
study and the link to methodological approach.
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This study: linking theory with methods
It has been argued that there are weaknesses in the existing literature examining the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing. The existing literature has tended to 
start from the point of view of what management was trying to achieve and on 
identifying the extent to which patterns of implementation realised in practice differed 
from Goldstein’s vision. Whilst perhaps not explicitly so, existing studies of problem- 
oriented policing have then been framed in a top-down conceptualisation of 
implementation. Corresponding explanations of the observed differences between the 
ideal of problem-oriented policing and what was delivered in practice have 
overwhelmingly focused on the technological and organisational features that are 
considered to influence the implementation of problem-oriented projects. Existing 
studies have tended to neglect the impact that practitioner behaviour, action and 
interaction has on implementation or the possible interaction between the 
organisational and technical features and those behavioural ones.
This study seeks to examine the following two hypotheses.
1. That top-down approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are 
sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated with 
the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.
2. That bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation 
are sufficient to explain the observed implementation problems associated 
with the implementation of problem-oriented projects in the UK.
Recognising the weaknesses of utilising one or the other, this study seeks to examine 
the implementation of problem-oriented policing projects through drawing on both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches, to compare the extent to which they can explain 
patterns of implementation and to understand the potential interaction of the two. A 
between method case-study design has been chosen for examining the hypotheses. 
These case studies focus on the detailed analysis of the implementation of two 
problem-oriented projects: one based in Cambridge and the other in Manchester. As 
will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, case study designs enable social
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life to be studied in a naturalistic setting and they preserve its complexity and context 
(Punch, 1998). This approach was chosen because it enables the examination of the 
implementation of the two projects in their entireties and so facilitates examination of 
both top-down and bottom-up concerns. It facilitates an examination of any difference 
between what the project management originally planned to achieve in terms of their 
stated aims and objectives and what was actually achieved in terms of project outputs 
and outcomes and so addresses top-down concerns. However, case study designs are 
also sensitive enough to capture the interaction and social relationships between 
organisations and individuals within them, thereby facilitating a bottom-up 
understanding of project implementation. This kind of approach to understanding 
implementation was expressly recommended by the bottom-up approaches of Hjem 
and Porter (1981) and Barrett and Fudge (1981).
Drawing on a top-down approach, the study will then examine what the two problem- 
oriented projects aimed to achieve and identify the extent to which the interventions 
that were delivered in practice deviated from what was planned. It will seek to 
examine the role played by the top-down concerns of setting objectives, guidance and 
systems of management and accountability in orienting implementation and 
explaining any deviation from project plans or implementation problems. The study 
will also draw on bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding 
implementation. It will examine patterns of implementation from the point of view of 
the practitioners and will look at the role those practitioners and groups of 
practitioners played in explaining the delivery of interventions. It will examine how 
practitioners negotiate project aims, the role of their routines and values and conflict 
in shaping patterns of implementation.
The relationship between the theoretical orientation and research design is shown 
diagrammatically in Box 3.4.
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Box 3.4: Theory orientation and research design
Theoretical Descriptive concern
orientation
Top-down Difference between
what policy intended 
and subsequent 
outcomes
Organisational and 
technical factors that 
oriented staff
Bottom-up Renegotiation of aims
Interaction of 
practitioners
Day-to-day routines
Discretion
Case study 
design
To preserve 
wholeness, 
complexity and 
context of 
project 
implementation
The detailed design for this and the specific methodologies employed are described in 
detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter four
Research design and methodology 
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the development and implementation of the research 
design to meet the study’s aims. The previous chapter set out how the theoretical 
approaches driving this study link to the research design. This chapter begins by 
examining the rationale for the research design in detail. In doing so it discusses the 
justification for the case study design, the role of qualitative research and of 
triangulation in the social sciences, the reasons why they were used to meet the 
study’s aims and the limitations of the approach.
It goes on to describe the basis for the methods employed, namely interviews, 
document analysis and observation. It then sets out the practicalities of implementing 
the research design in terms of gaining access to the cases, ethics and researcher roles 
and the practical arrangements for the collection and analysis of the interviews, 
observations and documents. The chapter ends with a review of the link between the 
project aims and the research design employed to address them and sets out the 
framework for the following results chapters.
The case study as a research design
A ‘case’ is a basic unit of analysis. Almost anything could be a case, from an 
individual to a programme or an agency or organisation; it could be an event or a 
decision or a process (Punch, 1998). Feagin et al. (1991) described the case study as 
an in depth, multi-faceted investigation, using qualitative research methods o f a 
single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on 
the use o f several data sources' (Feagin et al., 1991: 2).
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The case study design is commonly used in qualitative research and this study 
consists of two case studies of the implementation of problem-oriented projects. One 
which aimed to reduce the problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge and the other which 
aimed to reduce the specific problem of gang-related violence in Manchester.
The aim is to understand a case in detail in its natural setting, recognising its 
complexity and context (Punch, 1998). The great variation associated with case study 
research make it difficult to define. Nevertheless Punch (1998) described four broad 
characteristics of the case study. First, each case should have tight ‘boundaries’ that 
are precisely described in the research. Second, the cases should be clearly identified 
to give clarity and focus to the research. Third, attempts should be made to preserve 
the wholeness of the cases (though focus is specified in the aims). Lastly, a 
triangulation of data collection techniques should be applied.
These features have been replicated in this study. First, the boundaries of the cases are 
defined as two specific projects tackling specific crime problems. Second, they are 
cases of problem-oriented policing projects. Third, attempts have been made to 
analyse the projects in their entirety over time. Fourth, they make sure of multiple 
data sources (interviews, observation and documentary analysis).
These are summarised in box 4.1, below:
Box 4.1: Characteristics of the case study
Characteristic Definition of 
characteristic
Characteristic as it applies to this study
Bounded
system
The boundaries of the 
cases should be clearly 
identified and 
described
• The implementation of a problem- 
oriented policing programme 
designed to reduce bicycle theft in 
Cambridge
• The implementation of a problem- 
oriented policing programme 
designed to reduce gun related 
violence in Manchester
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Case of what? What specifically, are 
the cases of?
• The implementation of a problem- 
oriented policing projects
Holistic The wholeness of the 
cases should be 
preserved within the 
focus of specified aims
• The implementation of the whole 
project has been studied
Triangulation Multiple sources of 
data should be used
• Interviews
• Observation
• Documentary analysis
Adapted from Punch, 1998
Case studies are useful because they generate large quantities of rich and valid 
information about particular social processes and produce comprehensive 
understanding of the groups under study (Becker, 1970). They are particularly useful 
for understanding phenomena in depth when there is access to rich information to 
facilitate this (Patton, 1987). The particular advantages depend on the conditions 
under which the research is conducted and the research questions themselves (Yin, 
2003). Yin (2003) argued that they are particularly useful when studies are looking to 
address ‘how ’ or ‘why ’ type questions. These questions are likely to be explanatory in 
nature and case studies are useful in these circumstances because they can deal with 
the operational links that need to be traced over time (Yin, 2003). Case studies are 
also particularly useful where the researcher does not have any control over events 
(for example, when it would not be possible to conduct experiments) and where 
events are contemporary rather than historical as case study research requires direct 
observation of events and interviews with people who were involved.
Feagin et al. (1991) pointed to a range of main advantages of using case studies. Like 
Becker (1970) and Yin (2003), Feagin et al (1991) argued that they tend to produce 
valid data, as typically individuals are studied in their natural settings. This brings the 
benefit of being able to observe action and interaction as it actually occurred, rather 
than relying on a second hand interpretation of it. Case studies facilitate an 
understanding of the motives of individuals in enacting specific decisions and events. 
They allow the examination of social action in its most complete form. In addition
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one can examine complex decision making over time. This is in contrast to, say, a 
quantitative survey which would normally examine a situation at one point in time.
Case studies can then help examine the ebb and flow of social life over time as they 
allow a historical dimension to the study. Feagin et al (1991) also argued that case 
studies facilitate theoretical generation and generalisation. They suggested that this 
involves proposing new interpretations and concepts or re-examining earlier ones in 
major or innovative ways. Punch (1998) concluded that case study research plays an 
important role in the social sciences in the following ways. First, we can learn from 
them in their own right, especially where knowledge is fragmented. Second, a case 
study may be important in understanding a new or persistently problematic area. 
Third, cases can be important where they accompany other methods; they could, for 
example, add flesh to the bones of the results of a survey.
In this research, a case study design was used for a number of reasons. First, because 
case studies produce valid data which are rich in detail. As has been described, this 
study seeks to investigate whether using top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
analysing and understanding project implementation can help to explain the recurrent 
problems identified in the delivery of problem-oriented projects. To achieve this, 
detailed information was required about the behaviour and actions of practitioners and 
their motivations. It was also important to understand how the practitioners 
themselves sought to understand the projects and how they were implemented, and to 
understand the context and circumstances into which the two projects were being 
implemented. This richness of detail would have been difficult to achieve using other 
research designs, such as a survey or a social experiment. Examining and explaining 
human interaction are hard to achieve without using qualitative methods. In particular, 
it would be difficult to achieve the detail and depth required for examining the nature 
of implementation over time using other methods, as already suggested, surveys, for 
example, tend to describe a situation at a particular point in time.
Second, the area of study is persistently problematic. The literature examined in 
chapter two clearly showed that problems are commonly experienced in the 
implementation of problem-oriented projects and there are weaknesses in existing 
explanations of the causes of these. As such, it is necessary to go beyond describing
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implementation problems and to look at events in depth to examine the patterns of 
implementation. This is facilitated by the detail that can be gained from case study 
research.
Third, there were practical reasons for using a case study approach. There was 
relatively easy access to the information rich cases (access is discussed in further 
detail in subsequent sections). It was possible to implement this research design 
within the time available as the projects were being funded for approximately two 
years making it fit neatly into the time period for this study.
The selection of the cases
As has been seen, this study makes use of two case studies of the implementation of 
problem-oriented projects. One aimed at reducing the specific problem of bicycle 
theft in Cambridge and another aimed at tackling the problem of gang-related 
violence in Manchester. Yin (1984) described the particular advantages and 
disadvantages of multiple case studies compared to single ones. Single cases can be 
useful as ‘critical’ cases when testing a well-developed theory or in order to 
challenge, expand or confirm that theory; one case may be enough. A single case 
might also be used where that case is thought to be particularly extreme or unique, for 
example, where an event or phenomenon was so rare it was considered to be of 
interest in itself. Conversely, where a case is thought to be representative of all cases 
one might be enough. In contrast, the evidence generated from multiple cases is often 
considered to be more compelling than that generated by a single one. It also enables 
the researcher to make comparisons between them. The disadvantage is that it is 
clearly more time-consuming to examine multiple cases.
Box 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of single vs. multiple cases
Advantages Disadvantages
Single cases
• Particularly useful as ‘critical’ cases
• Where the case is extreme or unique
• Where one case is thought to be 
representative
• Limited ability to generalise
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Multiple cases
• Evidence considered to be more 
compelling
• Improved reliability of the research
• Can make comparisons
• Time-consuming
Adapted from Yin, 1984
The two projects were partly selected as case studies for this study because of their 
contrasting qualities. First, they were tackling very different kinds of problem types: 
bicycle theft and gang related crime respectively. Second, the two projects were 
structurally very different. As will be described fully in chapter five, the Manchester 
project brought together a wide range of practitioners from different agencies to 
implement the project interventions in a new setting. The Cambridge project involved 
only one project manager who facilitated implementation primarily through 
negotiating with other agencies to deliver interventions. Third, the two were seeking 
to implement very different types of interventions. It will be shown that the 
Manchester project consisted of wide-ranging social and rehabilitative interventions 
with young people. The Cambridge project was, in the main, a situational crime 
reduction project looking primarily to reduce the vulnerability of bicycles.
There were also pragmatic reasons for selecting these cases. The projects were being 
evaluated for the Home Office primarily to assess their crime reduction outcomes. 
They were part of a wider Crime Reduction Programme which funded, under similar 
criteria, a series of projects to increase the evidence base about what works in crime 
reduction (described in more detail in chapter five). I (with colleagues) was 
responsible for the evaluation of area of this work (the Targeted Policing Initiative). 
However, the programme and the two projects generated vast quantities of data, most 
of it beyond the immediate interest of the Home Office sponsor of the programme, 
who was primarily interested in crime reduction outcomes.
That the projects formed part of a wider programme of grant funding (the Crime 
Reduction Programme) is not inappropriate in the context of this study. Problem-
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oriented projects are often reliant on grant funding because police budgets tend to be 
set some time in advance and it can be difficult to release funding for unanticipated 
demands (Scott, 2006). Thus, that these two projects were funded from a specific pool 
of grant funding is not considered to be unusual in the field of problem-oriented 
policing generally. There are important questions to be asked about the role the 
central grant programmes play in facilitating (or otherwise) the planning and delivery 
of local problem-oriented projects, but they are not the focus of this study. The 
reasons for using a case study design are summarised in Box 4.3.
Box 4.3: Summary of reasons for selecting a multiple case study design
Reason Explanation
Produces rich and valid 
data
• The necessary detail and depth looking at
implementation over time would be hard to achieve 
using other methods
Area of study 
persistently problematic
• Implementation failure is a commonly documented 
problem but not enough is known about why it happens
‘Why’ and ‘how’ 
questions
• Aim to try to understand how problem-oriented policing
a*
is implemented and how it could be improved
Little researcher control 
over the environment
• Little that could be done to influence what was 
implemented
Contemporary events • Improving ability to collect detailed information
Practical concerns • Possible within tight time constraints
• Easy access to information-rich cases
Multiple studies more 
compelling
• Greater reliability
• Can make comparisons
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Qualitative social research
Qualitative research draws on the interpretative paradigm (ethnomethodology, 
symbolic interactionism, and phenomenology) in sociology and is concerned with 
how human beings experience and understand the social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000). Qualitative analysis involves an interpretative and naturalistic approach to 
examining the social world. This involves, then, conducting research in the setting in 
which social life occurs and attempting to make sense of it or interpret it in terms of 
the meanings that those individuals bring to it (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The aim is 
to describe people’s routines and the meanings that they bring to them. In particular it 
is concerned with analysing peoples’ points of view, the constraints of everyday life 
and in securing a rich description of the ebb and flow of social life (Becker, 1986). In 
contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research is concerned with the quality of 
processes rather than in quantifying them; the stress is on how social experience is 
created and the aim is to give it meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
Qualitative analysis draws on an epistemology that requires research to be flexible 
and sensitive to the social contexts in which action and processes are produced. 
Relatively unstructured qualitative techniques are compatible with the aims of this 
study because they preserve the complexities of social life, focusing on social 
interaction and processes by grounding observations in a natural setting. This was 
important because this study aims (in part) to understand implementation from the 
point of view of the practitioners and groups of practitioners. Relatively unstructured 
qualitative techniques facilitated understanding this because through detailed 
questioning and probing it is possible to generate greater understanding of how 
practitioners experienced implementation than would be possible with quantitative 
techniques.
Using qualitative research methods is not without problems. Historically, qualitative 
research has been seen to suffer from problems about reliability. Reliability is usually 
taken to mean the ability to replicate the study with the same methods and get the 
same results. All research requires some interpretation of data but in quantitative 
research, efforts are made to minimise the extent to which the researcher interprets 
data through maximising the use of standardised data collection techniques and
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statistical analysis. In contrast, most qualitative research requires researchers to 
interpret data and to make judgements. In qualitative research the roles of 
interpretation and judgement make results less likely to be replicated than would be 
the case in a quantitative study. The implication being that if the data collected were 
analysed by another researcher, it is more likely that they would interpret them 
differently.
In this study the aim was not to maximise the reliability of findings but to better 
understand patterns of project implementation. Qualitative research designs are more 
likely than quantitative ones to produce valid results but this in turn is dependent on 
how qualitative research studies are operationalised and implemented. Attempts to 
maximise the validity of the results were made through the development of 
appropriate and meaningful research tools. For example, interview schedules were 
based in part on the literature review that set out the top-down and bottom-up 
concerns. They were also based in part on observations of the implementation of 
projects in practice which had been conducted to attempt to ground the interview 
schedules in terms of how the practitioners experienced implementation of the 
projects. The unstructured interview approach also allowed the interviewer to probe 
answers to questions fully, allow the interviewee to clarify the meaning of questions 
should they not understand and also to comment more freely if issues that they think 
were important were not raised within the interview schedule. All of these facilitated 
the development of valid data for the study. There are also practical ways of guarding 
against the dangers related to researcher ‘biases’ that can help to maximise the 
reliability of qualitative data. One can make use of more than one researcher as more 
than one interpretation of the same data might help to confirm interpretation of the 
data. One can also assemble a range of data about the same happenings from a range 
of sources. This triangulation of data sources enables some cross-checking of data to 
validate the claims of qualitative findings (Denzin, 1970). The use of a triangulation 
of methods is discussed in the following sections.
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Triangulation of Methods
Denzin (1970) proposed four main types of triangulation.
• Data triangulation: the collection of data at different times, at different locations 
and from a range of people.
• Investigator triangulation: the use of more than one researcher.
• Theory triangulation: the use of more than one kind of approach to generate 
categories of analysis.
• Methodological triangulation: the use of either two types a) within methods (e.g. 
using an interview schedule with open and close questions) and b) between 
methods (employing more then one type of method) .
A triangulation of methodological techniques was used in this study in order to 
develop a meaningful approach to understanding patterns of project implementation. 
Triangulation has a long history in the social sciences and can be used for a variety of 
purposes. Between method triangulation was employed in this study partly because 
research questions can be approached from a number of angles and can be 
conceptualised in different ways. Different methods capture different aspects of social 
life and triangulation offered the opportunity to explore research questions from 
different angles, facilitating greater depth of analysis. This was considered to be 
important for building up a picture of the implementation of the projects from the 
varying perspectives of those people involved in their delivery. Different types of data 
capture different forms of phenomena. For example, examination of documentary 
evidence, particularly in the form of minutes of meetings and strategy documents, was 
useful for revealing the official version of project plans, events and decision making. 
In contrast observational data revealed the sometimes informal nature of decision 
making in the projects. Interview data had the advantage of being able to tease out the 
differences in how practitioners experienced the projects. These differences would 
have been harder to capture using one method alone. There are also practical reasons 
for triangulating data sources. Stake (1995) argued that we should constantly be 
asking ourselves if ‘we have this right?’ That is, we should be concerned about 
whether we are interpreting data in the right way. The use of a number of methods 
enables one effectively to check interpretation of data and improve reliability.
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In this study, a range of methods were used and the reasons for including them are 
discussed in the following sections under the following three headings interviews, 
observations and documents.
Interviews
Depth interviewing is an important source of data in qualitative research. Interviews 
are useful for probing beneath the service of answers to questions, maximising the 
level of detail obtained and to facilitate holistic understanding of behaviour (Patton, 
1987). Interviews help to facilitate understanding and can provide greater meaning for 
other forms of observations.
There are a range of good reasons for including interviews in a case study. 
Researchers cannot observe everything in person but other people have experienced 
much of what we cannot observe for ourselves (Stake, 1995). Researchers cannot 
directly observe opinions and feelings about project implementation and interviewing 
those practitioners involved in implementing projects offers a way of accessing that 
kind of information. In addition to this, not everyone involved in a project will see its 
delivery in the same way. Conducting a number of interviews with a range of people 
can help to illuminate the different experiences of and opinions about a case (Stake, 
1995).
Interviews are widely used in social research and come in a variety of forms. Put 
simply, the characteristics of interviews can be understood in terms of the degree of 
structure and standardisation employed (Fielding, 1995). Interviews can be highly 
structured: everyone is asked the same pre-determined questions in the same way. 
These are associated with quantitative tradition in social research and will typically 
produce results with greater reliability. At the other extreme of the spectrum are 
unstructured interviews, for which there is no pre-determined script and respondents 
are prompted to speak freely. These are associated with qualitative research and tend 
to produce more valid results. The choice of interview employed is important in the 
research design as it influences the nature of the data collected. The advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the degree of standardisation of interviews are shown 
in Box 4.4 below:
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Box 4.4: Interview types, features, advantages and disadvantages
Type Features Advantages and 
disadvantages
Informal
conversational
interview
• This relies on spontaneous 
generation of questions and 
nothing is prepared in advance
• The data gathered from each 
interview will be different
• Time-consuming
• Interviewer needs to be 
very skilled
• Individualised, 
contextualised and in- 
depth
General
interview guide
• Guide is produced to ensure that 
essentially the same topics are 
covered for each interview -  a 
kind of checklist
• Interviewer still free to probe 
and questions can be asked in 
any order etc.
• Makes good use of 
available time
Standardised
open-ended
interview
• Carefully worded, standardised 
questions
• All asked in the same way
• Little room for manoeuvre
• Minimises interviewer 
effects and variation 
between interviews
• No room for flexibility 
or probing interesting 
responses
In practice, interviews usually fall somewhere between the two extremes described 
above. In this study, interviews were conducted using a general interview guide. This 
was to avoid the limitations associated with fully standardised scripts. There were also 
practical concerns about using a fully non-standardised script. Utilising an interview 
guide is useful to be sure that the topics of interest were covered in all the interviews 
and to maximise the use of available time, as often interviewees can only stay for a 
limited period of time.
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Interviews can be administered in a number of ways, for example, face-to-face, on the 
telephone or via group discussions and there are advantages and disadvantages 
associated with these different approaches. In these cases the interviews were 
administered face-to-face. The benefits of this over using the telephone are that it is 
better for building up rapport, probing answers and observing the manner in which 
people answer questions. It is also possible to build up rapport and probe less 
confident people who may be more willing to engage. Interviews were preferred to 
focus groups because it was felt that the practitioners would be more forthcoming 
about their experiences and opinions away from their colleagues (although in a small 
number of cases practitioners requested to be interviewed in pairs and these requests 
were facilitated, see Annex one for details).
Observation
This study makes use of covert and overt observational data in the Manchester case 
study. Observations were not conducted in the Cambridge project because (as will be 
set out in detail in chapter five) it was considerably smaller in size and scope than the 
Manchester project and time consuming observations could not be justified.
The point of observational research is to observe phenomena in their natural state 
neither manipulating nor stimulating those people being studied (Punch, 1998). 
Observation data are highly unstructured as they are made in a natural setting and 
behaviour recorded as it happens. The researcher relies less on prior 
conceptualisations of action (as would be the case in interview guides or 
questionnaires) and interprets action more inductively.
Observation methods were used in this study for a number of reasons. First, 
observational data are very useful to help to describe a programme or project (Patton, 
1987). Clearly understanding how projects are implemented is a key concern of this 
study and being able to observe some aspects of project implementation first hand 
aids understanding of what is happening in practice and enables one to make more 
sense of it. Similarly, observing behaviour directly also allows the researcher to see 
what an interviewee may be unwilling or unable to disclose in an interview which 
enables the study to move beyond the opinions and perceptions of other people to a 
more comprehensive understanding of what is actually going on in practice. Second,
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this study is interested in understanding project implementation from the point of 
view of those people who were responsible for delivering it on a day-to-day basis, and 
observing project implementation in the natural setting in which it occurred allows 
one to examine practitioner patterns of behaviour in practice. Third, there were 
practical reasons for conducting some observations. As has been noted already, 
observations of implementation in practice facilitates the development of meaningful 
interview guides and other data collection tools because they can be based more 
closely on what was seen to be going on in practice rather on a researcher’s 
preconceptions of what is important.
The problems with observation as a technique in social research are that it can be time 
consuming, difficult to set up and there are many situations that a researcher cannot 
realistically attend. The greatest problem, however, is probably the risk that the 
presence of the researcher can influence the behaviour of the group that are being 
studied. The extent to which it was a problem in this study will be covered later in this 
chapter which discusses the practical arrangements for data collection.
The role of documents
Documents are objects that can be read (though they increasingly include television 
and other visual documents) and which relate in some way to the area of study 
(Macdonald and Tipton, 1995). Documents can be a rich source of data in social 
science (Punch, 1998). A great range of documents are available to social scientists 
including government records and reports, letters, diaries and institutional records. 
They can be used in a variety of ways, examined on their own or, as in this study, as 
one of a number of methods.
Three main forms of documents were used in this study.
1. Project and programme strategic and planning documents: those documents 
created by the project staff a) to describe what that project aimed to do and b) to 
lay out how the project planned to meet its aims. These documents were used to 
examine what was planned, and how the project was developed over time and 
were particularly useful for showing the official view of what the project aimed to 
achieve and its main outputs.
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2. Minutes of meetings: minutes of meeting were examined to help develop a record 
of official project decision-making and project outputs over the course of the 
implementation of the projects.
3. Activity logs: in the Manchester project, an attempt was made to encourage the 
practitioners to keep weekly records of their activities. In the long term this 
proved impossible as the practitioners resisted this form of record keeping as time- 
consuming and intrusive.
The inclusion of documents in the research design had a number of advantages. Many 
of them provided information about what the projects aimed to achieve and others 
served as a record of project decision-making and outputs. Care does, however, have 
to be taken with the use of documentary evidence. Macdonald and Tipton (1995) 
argued that the following are of particular importance. First, it is important to assess 
whether the document is authentic as it is possible that the document has been 
falsified for its author’s self-interest. Second, an assessment needs to be made about 
the document’s credibility and the extent to which it is likely to be free from 
distortion or error. Third, a decision has to be made about whether the document is 
representative and whether the documents being analysed constitute a representative 
sample of all those documents of its type. Fourth, efforts need to be made to examine 
what the document actually means, for example, does the document reveal surface or 
literal meaning? These issues and how they relate to this study are returned to in later 
sections of this chapter.
Limitations of research design and the nature of generalisations
There has been a long debate about the status of case studies in social research with 
many authors arguing that because studies are only based on one (or a few) cases, one 
cannot generalise to wider social life. This is a serious criticism of case study research 
designs and one that needs addressing here.
Case study research is not undertaken with the primary aim of making generalisations 
about social life but to understand in detail that case or those cases being studied.
Case study research is undertaken with the aim of understanding the case in its 
entirety and within its context (Punch, 1998). This is especially true of a case when it
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is considered to be important and worthy of study in its own right or where is a 
negative or deviant case (something marked from general patterns that are worthy of 
explanation). In this study, it certainly cannot be assumed that the patterns of 
implementation observed here will be repeated in other contexts -  far from it. 
However, replicating the results was not the main aim of the study. Instead, this study 
is primarily interested in understanding the complexity of implementation in these 
cases to develop greater understanding of patterns of implementation of problem- 
oriented projects. In addition it has been argued that it can be possible to make 
generalised statements from case studies. Punch (1998), for example, describes a 
number of ways in which a case can produce results from which one can generalise. A 
case study can then go beyond description of results to develop wider concepts which 
can be used to help to explain observed phenomena more widely. This moves analysis 
above descriptions and enables case studies to develop potentially generalisable 
statements. Similarly, case studies can be used to develop propositions or hypotheses, 
which could subsequently be applied to other studies and tested. Indeed, as will be 
seen, these case studies ultimately have been used to help develop new ways of 
looking at implementation which might help shed light on the nature of the 
implementation of problem-oriented projects more widely.
Implementation of the research design
The following sections examine practical issues associated with the implementation of 
the research design including access, ethics and researcher roles and the practical 
arrangements for the collection and analysing of the interviews, observations and 
documents.
Access, ethics and researcher roles
Gaining access to the two case studies was not a problem in this study. As mentioned 
in earlier sections, the cases were selected because I was already evaluating them as 
part of my job as a government researcher. The projects were funded by a central 
government programme and required agreement to facilitate evaluation. This was 
fortunate as gaining access to cases can be time consuming and tricky. That said, a 
number of issues remained. Perhaps most importantly, there was the issue of gaining 
informed consent of those being studied. Stake (1995) pointed out that gaining
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permission from senior staff to study a case is not enough. Those involved need to 
understand what research is trying to achieve and to give their informed consent to 
participate in it. Similarly, the British Society of Criminology states that researchers 
should:
Base research, so far as possible, on the freely given, informed consent of those 
studied. This implies a responsibility on the part of the researchers to explain as fully 
as possible, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who 
is undertaking and financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how any research 
findings are to be disseminated. Researchers should also make clear that participants 
have the right to refuse permission whenever and for whatever reason they wish. 
Research participants should be informed about how far they will be afforded 
anonymity and confidentiality.
www.britsoccrim.org/ethics.htm
Therefore whilst the senior members of staff who applied for the grant funding were 
required to facilitate the research it was important that the practitioners working on 
the projects knew about the study, its aims and what it might entail for them in a 
practical sense. Early on in the research, efforts were made to explain to project staff 
the nature of the research and what might be expected of them. Care was also taken to 
ensure that at meetings attended, everyone knew that there was a researcher present 
and what the role of that researcher was. This issue was probably most important for 
interviews. At the beginning of interviews the research was explained and assurance 
given about confidentiality both in terms of the record of that interview and in any 
written report.
Related to this is the somewhat tricky area of researcher roles. Studies have pointed to 
the range of roles (and the associated pitfalls) that researchers have played when 
evaluating projects (Matassa and Newbum, 2003). These include distinguishing 
between whether the researcher should observe patterns of implementation 
independently or play a greater, action research role, in shaping decisions about 
project interventions. In this study, after the projects were set up, efforts were made 
independently to observe the implementation of these cases as much as possible and 
not to influence project events. I (with a colleague) was responsible for the early
problem analysis and definition in Manchester. We were then responsible for the 
process and outcome measurement of the project. In the Cambridge project we were 
responsible only for a process and outcome assessment. However, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is quite clear that I played a number of roles other than researcher whilst 
conducting the research. Probably the most obvious role was that of my status as 
representative of the financial sponsor of the projects. The research department of the 
Home Office has historically been somewhat separate from the policy and funding 
departments but that would not necessarily have been clear to the project staff. There 
is no doubt that my status as potential ‘project spy’ caused some concern in the early 
days. This is important because one would imagine that individuals might be less 
candid as a result. In the long run, as people got used to me, I do not think my Home 
Office status made any difference at all.
A further problematic issue for researchers is how to feed back and disseminate the 
results to those working on the project. Findings are clearly not always going to be 
positive and this can be difficult for those running and managing projects to accept 
(Weisburg, 1994). This was important for both the Manchester and Cambridge 
projects, though was much more of an issue in the Manchester case where interviews 
were conducted with staff throughout the duration of the project and senior staff 
requested feedback on themes and issues that arose from them. There is something of 
a conflict between observing patterns of implementation independently and providing 
interim feedback about project processes, outputs and outcomes and this might 
influence the future direction of a project. In practice it is very difficult not to provide 
feedback or advice when a project team asks for it; they are, after all, facilitating the 
research and (in this case) spending large amounts of public money. In the event, the 
research in Cambridge was conducted largely independently of the project but formal 
feedback was given to the Manchester project twice: 29 January 2002 (presentation to 
board) and 18 July 2002 (memo to project chair).
Interviews
Non-standardised interviews were the main data collected for this study and the 
justification for doing so has been described above. In all, 59 were conducted. The
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following sections examine technical considerations in detail in respect to the 
interviews conducted.
Interview design
As described earlier, general guides for focusing interviews were prepared (all of 
these are provided in Annex two). This was basically to ensure that the same topics 
were covered in all the interviews and also to best use available time. It is important 
to have an advance plan for interviewing as it is easy to ask questions that do not 
illicit the information that is required to address stated aims (Stake, 1995). Therefore 
much consideration was given to what questions to ask. Again the bounded system of 
the cases and the research aims largely set the framework for questions to ask. This 
study aimed to account for patterns of implementation of problem-oriented policing 
drawing on both top-down and bottom-up frameworks. Therefore, especially 
important to this study was to understand how practitioners interpreted the project 
aims and procedures and to understand what the range of practitioners did day-to-day 
in relation to the project and their perceptions of that. A key aim was also to identify 
practitioner views on the implementation of the programme and the problems 
encountered. Therefore, questioning took two main forms: firstly, factual questioning 
related to the practitioners’ roles and their day-to-day experiences working in the 
project, and secondly, attitudinal questions to elicit their views and opinions about the 
project.
In the Cambridge case, eight interviews were conducted with nine individuals in 
spring 2002 as follows:
• one with the project manager;
• three with Cambridgeshire Constabulary civilian staff;
• two with police officers who had managerial responsibility for the project;
• one with a planner working for Cambridgeshire County Council; and,
• one with a member of the advisory group.
In Manchester, 51 interviews with 57 individuals were conducted at intervals between 
2001 and 2003. Interviews were conducted with practitioners and their managers and 
with the steering group members. Many respondents were interviewed a number of
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times. This is fairly typical in case study research where respondents are interviewed 
before, during and after an experience, to get an understanding of how 
implementation proceeded over time.
Box 4.5 shows the basic breakdown of the interviews in Manchester (more detail is 
provided in Annex one).
Box 4.5: Manchester Interviews
Approximate
date
Numbers Role
Autumn 2001 10 interviews with 12 
individuals
Board members and 
implementation team
Winter 2001 12 interviews with 14 
individuals
Practitioners, managers and 
implementation team
Spring 2002 10 interviews with 12 
individuals
Practitioners, managers and 
implementation team
Winter/spring
2003
19 interviews with 19 
individuals
Practitioners, managers, board 
members and implementation 
team
Clearly many more interviews were conducted in the more complex Manchester 
project than in Cambridge because the Manchester project was very much larger and 
hence necessitated a larger research study. As will be set out in the following chapter, 
about seven full-time members of staff were employed to work on the Manchester 
project at any one time compared to one in the Cambridge project. The projects also 
consisted of rather different interventions which were implemented in rather different 
circumstances (also elaborated in chapter five). The Cambridge project predominately 
consisted of situational measures (such as target hardening) whereas the Manchester 
project consisted of a range of social and preventative interventions. Quantifying the 
situational measures such as numbers of secure bicycle stands delivered was easier 
than quantifying the nature of social interventions such as hours of mentoring or 
outreach work. This meant that much more effort was required to understand the
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implementation of the Manchester project. For both the Cambridge and Manchester 
cases, a detailed breakdown of the interviews, including those interviewed and when, 
their role in the project and how the interview was recorded can be seen in Annex 
one.
Interview sampling
Researchers cannot be everywhere, studying everything, even when only a limited 
number of cases are being studied and, as such, important decisions have to be made 
about whom to interview (Punch, 1998). Again, the boundaries of the cases being 
studied set useful parameters. Clearly of particular interest were those practitioners 
and managers who were involved in decision making in relation to the projects and 
those who actively delivered it on a day-to-day basis. As such, a ‘purposeful’ sample 
of respondents who had information about the implementation of the projects were 
sought and interviewed. The aim was not to identify a random sample of interviewees 
to maximise the statistical power of results but purposefully to select respondents who 
had information about the cases. These respondents included:
• those responsible for designing and setting up the projects;
• those responsible for management of the projects; and,
• those responsible for day-to-day implementation and their managers.
Some ‘snowball’ sampling was also employed. The logic of snowball sampling is to 
locate information-rich respondents by asking people involved in the project who has 
useful information; other respondents basically recommend respondents. This was 
especially the case for the Cambridge project, where the project manager was asked to 
nominate information-rich individuals for interview.
Non-response
All those known who met the criteria described above were invited to interview.
There are many reasons why people may or may not decide to be interviewed. Box 
4.6 (below) gives some examples and how they might have applied to this study.
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Box 4.6: Examining non-response to interview
Sources of non 
response
Risk to
this
study
Explanation
Interest in subject 
matter
Low All interviewees were working on the projects or 
associated with it
Perceived 
importance of 
study
Low Research contributing to the knowledge base about 
what reduces crime is perceived to be important but 
not as important as doing the job itself
Legitimacy of 
research (who is 
conducting it and 
how)
Low The research was conducted by government 
researchers who were well known to the respondents 
and had done nothing to make them distrust the 
research
Skill and 
persistence of 
researcher
Low Efforts were made to facilitate interviews including 
meeting for interview where it suited the respondent, 
following up initial letters inviting people to interview 
and so on
Area and cultural 
differences in 
willingness to be 
interviewed
Low This should not have been an issue -  as all possible 
respondents were similar in that they were 
professionals working on the project. But there was a 
possibility of this
Adapted from Arber, 1995
The box indicates that response rates to interview requests should have been high. All 
the interviewees were working in the field, with a clear vested interest in the projects 
and the research. Legitimacy was high as researchers were from central government 
(response rates are normally high for government research). In terms of persistence, 
every effort was made to facilitate an interview, in terms of following up requests for 
interviewees, meeting when and where it was convenient for the interviewee, and 
explaining the purpose of the interview. Where interviews were not attended it was 
normally because of urgent or unexpected work commitments and normally could be 
rearranged. Whilst some interviews were rearranged, no one refused to be 
interviewed.
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Minimising bias
The interviewer’s performance can influence the interview data because it can 
introduce biases (Oppenheim, 1992). This can occur in a variety of ways and attempts 
were made to minimise it. The main forms of possible interview bias highlighted by 
Oppenheim (1992) and the risk that they posed to the study attempts to deal with it are 
summarised in box 4.7 below:
Box 4.7: Minimising interview bias
Sources of bias Risk to
this
study
Explanation
Building too 
much or too little 
rapport
Low • The interviewers were known to the interviewees 
which facilitated rapport with the respondents 
and, probably, facilitated truthful answers
• Interviewers were not so well known to the 
interviewees that there was a risk of being seen as 
a friend or colleague
Selective 
recording of 
answers to probes
Medium • Care to record what interviewee said when noting 
the answers to probes
• In other cases interviews were recorded which 
facilitated accurate recording
Digressing from 
question order
Low • Care taken to ensure that all interviewees have 
had the chance to answer all questions
Language
misunderstanding
Low • Care to ensure that the interview schedules 
reflected practitioners experiences
• Unstructured techniques allowed 
misunderstandings to be clarified if required
‘Problem’
respondents
Medium • There was potential for ‘incriminating’ answers to 
questions, e.g. lack of knowledge about the 
project or limited outputs or activities in relation 
to the project
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• Interviewers had to be careful not to show surprise 
at answers
Situational
problems
Low • Interviews were conducted individually except 
where they requested to be interviewed in pairs to 
minimise the impact of the presence of others who 
may influence how they responded
As Box 4.7 indicates there was potential for some forms to bias to enter into the 
interviews. It is not possible to entirely guard against some of these forms of bias but 
efforts were made to identify and minimise them if it was thought that they posed a 
risk. The main forms of biases identified as problematic here were the recording of 
probes and ‘problematic’ interviewees. As Oppenheim (1992) pointed out, 
interviewers sometimes have ideas about how they would like or expect certain 
respondents to respond to questions. Probing questions are a particularly common 
source of this bias and interviewers may be inclined to record what they want or 
expect to hear rather than what was actually said. The best way to avoid this is to tape 
record the interviews; where this was not possible, care was taken to ensure that 
answers were recorded accurately so that answers could be checked. The other 
potential source of bias highlighted in Box 4.7 is so called ‘problem’ respondents. In 
this study there was potential for this as respondents might have felt that they were 
giving ‘wrong’ answers to questions. The main way of guarding against this was to 
build rapport to try and facilitate truthful answers but also to avoid reacting 
(expressing surprise etc.) to respondents’ answers.
Recording the data
Devising a way of recording interviews is important. Making notes or tape recording 
are the most common ways. Tape-recording clearly has the advantage of offering a 
full record of everything that a respondent says. However, an accurate record of the 
words of each person is less important than capturing the meaning, so recording is not 
always necessary and since tapes are time-consuming to transcribe, taking notes can 
be useful (Stake, 1995). Some of the interviews were taped and some were recorded 
in this study. Annex one sets out the details. The reasons for choosing the method of 
recording were largely pragmatic. When interviews were conducted alone, a tape
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recorder was used and the tapes transcribed later. When two people were 
interviewing, notes were made.
Analysing the interview data
The form of analysis of qualitative interviews depends on the purpose of the research 
and there are no right or wrong ways (Patton, 1998). In this study the means of 
analysing interview data were essentially inductive but bounded by the aims of the 
study. Focus in the analysis of the interview data came from the literature review and 
corresponding aims of the study and the questions that were asked. Care was, 
however, taken to ensure that themes and issues were also developed from the data 
themselves. The aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that either top-down 
or bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation are 
sufficient to explain patterns of implementation in problem-oriented projects. The 
data analysis was thus framed by the concerns of the top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives that were identified in the literature review such as the role of leadership, 
resources, project theory, objectives and guidance, management and accountability. It 
was also concerned with identifying themes and issues related to practitioner 
negotiation of aims, routines and values and conflict in explaining patterns of 
implementation.
The analysis of the interview data was conducted using the following framework 
developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). The approach has three main constituents. 
First, it involves data reduction; that is editing, segmenting and summarising the data. 
This involves coding, finding themes and patterns recurrent in the data. In later stages 
it also involves developing abstract concepts from the data. Second, it involves 
organising, assembling and displaying data. Third, it involves using the preceding 
stages to develop propositions which seek to explain the data. This involves three 
over-lapping cyclical processes, which are described in the sections below.
Analysis of the interview data started with coding. Codes are labels and coding of 
interview data involved labelling pieces of data. The point of putting the labels on 
data is to describe them and also record them to make it easier to work with and 
retrieve them. After basic labelling of the data, the second stage of data analysis 
involved labelling and categorising interview data at a higher level of abstraction. The
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aim of this was to describe patterns seen in the data and to make inferences from 
them. This level of analysis focused on developing patterns from the codes: making 
inferences from those initial codes in order to make sense of it. It also involved 
comparing different indicators which helped to develop more abstract concepts from 
the indicators in the data. The second stage of data analysis was to make memos: this 
involved recording ideas that emerge whilst data are being sorted and coded. The idea 
is that the memos provide deeper concepts than those already developed from the 
coding. They move the analysis of interview data on by developing concepts and how 
they might relate to one another. Memos also record theoretical and more substantive 
ideas that are not merely describing data but seeking to explain and make sense of it. 
The memos are used to bring the data together in a meaningful and coherent picture 
and to develop conclusions from the data.
Observation
This section examines the practical arrangements for the observational element of the 
study. Observations were only conducted in the Manchester case study. Observation 
research can be either overt or covert. The primary advantage of the covert approach 
is that it is less likely that the presence of the researcher would have an impact on the 
behaviour of the group being studied. It is, however, not straightforward as a means of 
collecting data as it is time-consuming and access can be hard to negotiate.
In overt observations, the group knows that they are part of a research study and this 
raises the possibility that they will alter their behaviour because they know that they 
are being studied. Whilst it is generally a more practical form of conducting 
observational research, the presence of the researcher might affect the behaviour of 
the group being studied.
Covert observations of the project set up stages were possible in the Manchester 
project. As already mentioned a colleague and I were responsible for the early 
problem definition for this project (see Bullock and Tilley, 2002). The problem 
definition was developed drawing on:
• calls for service data;
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• recordable crime data;
• data held in the force intelligence bureau about crime events and individuals;
• the Armed Crime Unit database; and.
• data from GMPICs (the Greater Manchester Police intelligence system) on 
individuals who were associated with gangs, believed responsible for shootings, or 
who were victims of shootings.
This was supplemented with information from post-conviction interviews with gang 
members and attempts were made to gather data and other information from non­
police agencies including the probation service, various local authority departments, 
schools, and hospitals. It was therefore possible to observe first-hand and keep records 
on the data collection and analysis stage of this project.
In this study it was not possible, for practical reasons, to undertake covert observation 
of the project as it was being actually being implemented. Because of my role in the 
analysis stage of this project I was well known to the project team and so observing 
covertly was not possible. There was clearly a risk that behaviour was affected by my 
presence. It is of course hard to know what the impact of this was. My sense was that 
it was minimal as those observed got used to me being there. In any case triangulation 
of data sources meant that data could be collected via other means should my 
presence have been having an impact on their behaviour and activities.
It has been noted that the aim of observation methods is neither to manipulate nor 
stimulate the behaviour of those people who are being studied (Punch, 1998). Despite 
the unstructured nature of observation research, there are practical considerations that 
need to be addressed. The first is how to gain access and the second is how to keep 
records and analyse data. In this study gaining access to the meetings and other 
project activities was not a problem, mostly because of the grant specification 
requiring co-operation with evaluators which was described more fully earlier. 
Decisions did have to be made about what to observe and how often. It was simply 
not possible to observe everything, not least because I was based in London and the 
case was based some 200 miles away in Manchester. Overall, eight practitioner 
meetings and ten steering group board meetings were attended and observed. The
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board meetings were held fairly irregularly, every two to three months, and so it was 
possible to attend most of those. Observing these meetings was useful especially for 
examining how the senior managers came to make decisions. It would not be possible 
to access similar information from a different method. The line-level practitioner 
group for this project met regularly (usually weekly) and so it was not possible to 
attend all the meetings. Those held at what were thought to be likely key times (for 
example, when the project was set up and when staff changed) were attended. A two- 
day training event held from 24 to 26 October 2001 was also observed.
Decisions also had to be made about how to record the observations. There are two 
extremes in terms of recording observations. Structured approaches to observation 
involve the use of detailed pre-developed pro-formas for recording data. Unstructured 
analysis is the opposite, observing without a predetermined structure for recording 
actions. The logic of the latter is that themes and categories would emerge later during 
the analysis (Punch 1998). In unstructured observations, the data could be categorised 
in order to develop aggregates of coded data or they could be used to facilitate greater 
description of the case (Stake, 1995). In this study an unstructured approach was used. 
The data were not categorised but used, as State (1995) described, to illustrate points. 
Observation reports do need to be sufficiently detailed in order to enable examination 
of what has happened and how (Patton, 1987). Therefore quite detailed notes were 
kept, although selective recording of observation was inevitable. Notes were taken on:
• the setting in which activity was taking place;
• participants activities;
• the behaviour of individuals;
• interaction between individuals;
• unplanned events; and,
• non-verbal communication (e.g. what body language appeared to be saying).
Observation data were analysed in a similar manner to the interview data described 
above. Themes were drawn out of the data but these themes were framed in terms of 
the project aims and so focused on those issues identified by the concerns of both top- 
down and bottom-up analysts. However, because observations, by nature, capture 
behaviour and interaction in a naturalistic setting, they were especially useful for
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facilitating understanding of bottom-up concerns regarding patterns of action and 
interaction in the project setting. As mentioned earlier, the data were also used to 
illustrate points, to facilitate a more holistic understanding of the project and to 
develop interview guides.
Documents and records
A range of project records were examined to look at the development of the projects, 
decision making and actions undertaken. These are summarised in Box 4.8, below:
Box 4.8: Documents included for analysis
Document
Minutes of meetings • Minutes of 44 practitioner group meetings held 
between October 2001 and March 2003 in 
Manchester
• Minutes of the 14 board meetings held between 
March 2001 and March 2003 in Manchester
• Minutes of 14 steering group meetings held between 
September 2000 and September 2002 in Cambridge
Strategic documents and 
project records
• Strategic and day-to-day project documents and 
records
The documents were used in a range of overlapping ways to help examine the patterns 
of implementation of the two projects. The strategic documents, planning documents 
and minutes of meetings all contributed to an overall documentation of and 
understanding of the history of the implementation of the projects. Timelines of the 
implementation of the two projects drawing on the minutes and other project 
documents are provided in Annexes five and six.
The same documents were also used to help develop classifications of the extent to 
which planned interventions were actually implemented. A scheme, which was
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developed and described by Crawley and Hope (2003), was used to classify how 
planned interventions had been implemented (Box 4.9).
Box 4.9: Classification scheme for implementation of planned interventions
Status Explanation
N Planned but not implemented
S Stalled
P Partially implemented
c Completed and ongoing
F Finished
NI Not planned but implemented
AI Awaiting implementation
Crawley and Hope (2003) point out that classifying project interventions and outputs 
can be difficult. For example, it is hard to know how to deal with changes in the status 
of an intervention. Also, the distinctions between the classifications can be rather 
vague especially between ‘partially implemented’ and ‘implemented and ongoing’. 
The classification of the status of the projects’ interventions (which can be seen in the 
following chapter) is not an exact process and judgements have had to be made. 
However, drawing on a range of data sources (including the interviews and the 
observations) helped inform judgements regarding the status of the implementation of 
an intervention.
Assessing the credibility of documents
Documents can be analysed in a number of ways. As mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, there are a number of issues that have to be considered when assessing the 
credibility of documents (set out in Box 4.10 below).
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Box 4.10: Assessing the credibility of documents
Issue Extent to which 
it is a problem 
in this study
Reason why How to account for 
problem
Authenticity Low Known that the 
documents were 
used by all 
implementing the 
project
N/A
Credibility Medium/high Documents likely 
to be distorted as 
the ‘official’ 
version of events
Use more than one 
source of data
Representativeness Low All documents of 
their type were 
analysed
N/A
Meaning Medium/high Documents likely 
to be distorted as 
the ‘official’ 
version of events
Use more than one 
source of data
Drawing on the assessment in Box 4.10, of particular importance for this study were 
issues related to the credibility and meaning of the documents. In this study it is 
considered that the documents were authentic because project staff made use of them 
and they were circulated widely to all those working on the project as well to 
researchers. Representativeness was not considered to be an issue here because all the 
project documents were available and examined. In respect to credibility and meaning 
of the documents, in this study the particular risk of the documents was related to the 
extent to which they represented an official version of project aims and project 
outputs rather than a record of what was going on in practice. Some of the project 
documents examined were those likely to be shared with the project steering groups, 
the general public, elected members and those at the Home Office who funded the 
project. This especially related to those documents regarding applications for funding,
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strategy documents, and project timetables and so on. As such these were considered 
much more likely to show an official account of the project’s aims, objectives and 
what was being achieved in practice than what the practitioners working on the 
project thought it was aiming to achieve and what was actually happening on the 
ground. Project-planning records then, were potentially limited to an official version 
of what the practitioners were supposed to do and what the project was supposed to be 
achieving rather than what practitioners actually did do.
It was also important to be careful about interpreting minutes of meetings. Meeting 
minutes probably only capture broad areas of discussion, the range of agreed 
decisions and actions and as such do not represent a full report of how a group came 
to a decision and the behaviour of staff during meetings. There was also evidence that 
the minutes were carefully sanitised before they were circulated in the Manchester 
project (see particularly chapter seven for discussion of this). It was therefore 
important to be careful when using these documents as a record of decision making.
Linking research questions to methods
To round off this chapter, box 4.11 is a summary of the link between this aims of the 
study and the data sources and methods chosen to address them.
Box 4.11: Linking research questions to methods
Research questions Data sources Justification
Top-down approaches to 
analysing and understanding 
implementation are 
sufficient to explain the 
observed implementation 
problems associated with the 
implementation of problem- 
oriented approaches
Interviews
Documents
• To set out project outputs, as 
described by practitioners
• To examine how respondents 
understood the factors that 
shaped implementation
• To examine the official 
version of project strategy and 
record of decision making 
(minutes of meetings)
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• To examine project outputs, 
as recorded in administrative 
data
Bottom-up approaches to 
analysing and understanding 
implementation are 
sufficient to explain the 
observed implementation 
problems associated with the 
implementation of problem- 
oriented approaches
Interviews
Observation
• To examine how respondents 
saw the factors that shaped 
implementation
• To examine day-to-day 
behaviour and routines of the 
practitioners implementing 
the project
• To examine interaction and 
interaction between 
practitioners
• To examine the behaviour 
practitioners were unwilling 
or unable to express
• To capture the informal nature 
of decision making
Adapted from Mason (1996)
The following chapter charts the implementation of the two projects. It examines what 
they planned to do, the structures and processes that were put in place to implement 
them, the outputs and outcomes of the two projects and the difference between what 
was planned and what was implemented.
In chapter six patterns of implementation of the two projects are examined in terms of 
their top-down features. These focus on the role played by project leadership and 
communication, resources, project theory and objectives, guidance and accountability 
and management. In chapter seven the role of bottom-up concerns in explaining 
patterns of implementation are discussed. These included how practitioners come to
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understand and negotiate project aims, the role of agency routines and values and 
conflict.
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Chapter five
Implementation in Cambridge and Manchester: processes, 
structures, outputs and outcomes
Introduction
The aim of this first results chapter is to describe planned the interventions in the 
Cambridge and Manchester projects, the processes through which these were 
delivered and the outputs and outcomes that the projects finally managed to deliver. It 
examines the difference between what the two projects planned to achieve and what 
was ultimately implemented. In doing so this chapter will provide the basis for the 
subsequent chapters which use top-down and bottom-up principles to examine 
patterns of implementation in the two projects. To this end, the chapter begins by 
describing the features of the programme from which the two projects were funded. It 
then sets out the profile of the problems that the two projects were trying to tackle 
through examining the crime and other data which were used to analyse and 
understand problems. The staffing and management arrangements that were set in 
place in order to implement them are discussed. The development of the responses in 
the two projects over time is then charted.
The Crime Reduction Programme and the Targeted Policing Initiative
The Cambridge and Manchester projects were funded from the government’s Crime 
Reduction Programme which was launched in 1999 and ran initially for three years. 
The Programme was an ambitious effort to reduce crime and improve the evidence 
base about what works in crime reduction (Laycock and Webb, 2003; Homel et a l , 
2005). The programme was established following the New Labour Government’s 
1997 comprehensive spending review and was based on a review of the literature on 
what works in reducing crime (Goldblatt and Lewis, 1998). The Programme had three 
main aims (Homel et al., 2005):
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• the sustained reduction of crime through implementing interventions that are 
known to work and through promoting innovative practice in mainstream crime 
reduction activity;
• the generation of improvements in the knowledge base about what works in 
reducing crime; and,
• the delivery of cost savings through the reduction of crime and improved 
efficiency.
Some £400 million was granted to fund initiatives and a programme of research and 
development. Police services and their partners could apply for money to support 
locally based crime reduction initiatives via a centrally managed competitive grant 
system. The Crime Reduction Programme was set up as a series of initiatives, some of 
which focused on a specific crime type for example: burglary, violence against 
women and prostitution, and others had a broader crime reduction agenda such as; 
designing out crime, early interventions with young people, CCTV, and the Targeted 
Policing Initiative (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Ten per cent of the overall Crime 
Reduction Programme was set aside for evaluation of projects, reflecting the focus on 
improving the knowledge base on what works in reducing crime. The evaluation was 
managed centrally by the Research Development and Statistics Directorate at the 
Home Office, though a large proportion of the evaluation was contracted out to 
external academics and private consultants.
The Cambridge and Manchester projects were part of the Targeted Policing Initiative. 
The Initiative was one of the larger funding streams in the Crime Reduction 
Programme with a budget of about £30 million to fund projects, development and 
research. The stated aims of the Targeted Policing Initiative were actually fairly loose 
and the money was aimed very generally at providing an incentive to implement 
problem-oriented processes in police services. The release of funds for the Crime 
Reduction Programme coincided with increasing interest in problem-oriented policing 
nationally and this facilitated the release of this substantial amount of money to 
support its implementation. Reflecting the difficulties that had been seen in 
implementing problem-oriented policing in the past, the Targeted Policing Initiative 
aimed to provide the necessary financial support to facilitate the implementation of
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the problem-oriented projects (Laycock and Webb, 2003). Those who designed the 
Initiative assumed that the availability of additional funding would provide the 
incentive for police services and their partner organisations to implement problem- 
oriented solutions to specific issues (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Thus, the intention 
was that the release of this money would provide the conditions to test the impact of 
problem-oriented policing as the police service would be equipped with the funds and 
wherewithal to implement projects locally (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Laycock and 
Webb, 2003).
Over three years, the Targeted Policing Initiative spent around £30 million on fifty- 
nine projects and evaluation. Police services (and their partners) could apply for 
money in a number of ways. As mentioned above many locally based initiatives were 
selected by competitive bidding. In the Targeted Policing Initiative, the majority (two- 
thirds) of the projects were selected through two rounds of competitive bidding. The 
first round was held in early 1999 and funded eleven projects. A second round was 
held in 2000 and funded twenty-seven projects. The two competitive rounds were 
managed slightly differently but in both police officers and their partner agencies had 
to complete an application form that set out on the size and nature of the problem that 
was to be addressed and the details of the proposed responses to tackle it. The 
information that was required for the applications was based around the main 
processes of problem-oriented policing. Additional information was required for the 
management of the programme as a whole (for example, information about the 
resources required and timetables).
Box 5.1 (below) outlines the requirements for the two rounds.
Box 5.1: Application requirements of round one and round two proposals
Round one application requirements Round two application requirements
• To provide a description of the 
problem that they sought money to 
tackle
• To indicate how the problem related 
to the findings from local crime and
• An outline of the size and the nature 
of the problem
• A description of why the problem was 
worth tackling
• An explanation of why the problem
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disorder audits and strategies
• To show how the problem related to 
the local policing plan
• To spell out how the problem would 
be tackled, specifying in particular 
whether the project would make use 
of:
-  structured crime/incident data
-  new structures/arrangements
-  innovative tactics
-  to show what crime reduction targets 
could be achieved
• To note related initiatives
• To list other factors affecting the area
• To indicate what resources would be 
required
was amendable to a problem-oriented 
approach
• Objectives/targets for dealing with the 
problem
• Possible interventions to tackle the 
problem
• An outline of funding required
• Details of planned or ongoing 
initiatives
• A timetable
In both competitive rounds the police services had about a month to complete the 
applications. A team of Home Office researchers, policy officials and an external 
assessor reviewed and marked all the proposals and made recommendations for 
funding. Bullock et al. (2002) described the decision making process in relation to 
funding projects. A scoring system was devised and the scores used to make decisions 
about which projects to fund to introduce consistency and fairness in decision making 
and the proposals were selected on the extent to which they met a range of criteria. 
These criteria were related to quality of data collection and analysis, the identification 
and formulation of targeted policing responses, feasibility, expected outcome, and the 
plans for project sustainability. The total score accrued by a bid according to the 
various criteria was considered alongside a written qualitative assessment of a bid’s 
overall potential contribution to crime reduction and likelihood of success (Bullock et 
al, 2002). In both of the competitive rounds short development visits from academics 
and Home Office staff were undertaken to short-listed projects in order to help them 
improve their proposals.
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The Cambridge project was funded from round two of the competitive grant funding 
scheme. In this case, Read and Tilley (both then from the Home Office Research 
Development and Statistics Directorate) visited Cambridge Constabulary on 7 June 
2000 to discuss the bid that had been made to the Targeted Policing Initiative. 
Following this, the Cambridge project officially received £167, 000 from the Home 
Office in September 2000. In addition, Cambridge Constabulary committed to 
allocate two constables from existing police resources for the duration of the project 
(estimated cost £120,000).
The Manchester project was funded somewhat differently. The then head of the 
community safety department at Greater Manchester Police and the then borough 
commander for South Manchester approached the then head of policing research at 
the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate informally for 
funding for a project to tackle gang violence in South Manchester. As well as the 
competitive grant funding, the Targeted Policing Initiative funded some projects 
selected on a less systematic case-by-case basis. These tended to reflect very topical 
issues or problems that were of national interest (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). There 
was no particular application format for these projects and they were considered on an 
individual basis. They were not expected to fill in the same project profiles as those 
projects bidding for funding from the competitive rounds but they were supposed to 
be problem-oriented projects in nature. Examples included, among others, research on 
the police use of stop and search, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Crimestoppers scheme and an evaluation of the pilot of the National Intelligence 
Model.
Following a period of analysis of the problem of gang-related violence in Manchester 
by central Home Office researchers (see sections below) Targeted Policing Initiative 
funding for a £500,000 project to tackle gang related violence in South Manchester 
was formally agreed on 25 May 2001. In keeping with the evidence based nature of 
the Crime Reduction Programme, many of the projects were evaluated. Both the 
Cambridge and Manchester cases were evaluated by central Home Office research 
staff (Bullock and Tilley).
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The following sections examine problem analysis and understanding in the two 
projects, their management and staffing arrangements, development of responses and 
the main project outputs and outcomes.
Problem analysis and understanding
Cambridge
The Cambridge project aimed to apply problem-oriented principles to cycle theft: a 
high volume, relatively low impact crime problem. The problem analysis was 
produced by the then head of the community safety department for the city of 
Cambridge along with an analyst from Cambridgeshire County Council.
An examination of the original project proposal showed that the problem definition 
predominately used recorded police data. Data were available for the overall numbers 
of cycle thefts for two years (1998/1999,1999/2000) and broken down by place (the 
postcodes and streets where the thefts occurred); time (months of the year in which 
the thefts occurred); and, victim attributes (the age and gender of the victims).
Non-crime data were however also utilised for the analysis of the problem of bicycle 
theft. These included:
• Cambridge Cycling Campaign (a pressure group seeking better provision for 
cyclists in the city): counts of cycle parking usage for three months of one year, 
1999 (the numbers of spaces by area, style of stand and whether the bicycles were 
securely fixed and by what locking mechanism);
• Cambridgeshire County Council traffic monitoring information which provided 
counts of the number of cycle trips in a 12-hour period in March 1999; and,
• the estimated cost of a bicycle theft and rates of bicycle recovery.
These data (along with some observations that were not evidence based) were used to 
analyse and explain cycle theft in Cambridge in terms of the location in which they 
occurred and attributes of the victims of cycle thefts and the detected offenders. The 
results are described in the following sections.
i l l
Overall the project’s problem analysis demonstrated that cycle theft was a large and 
persistent crime problem in Cambridge. In the year 1999-2000 cycle theft accounted 
for 20 per cent of all recorded crime in Cambridge, 50 per cent of which occurred in 
the city centre. There were 2,932 recorded cycle thefts in the year 1999/2000, which 
represented a five per cent increase on the year 1998/1999.
The proposal authors estimated that recorded cycle crime cost £832,000 in the 
calendar year 1999 (3,200 cycles). This was based on a conservative estimate of £160 
per cycle and an additional £100 of police officer time. However, the proposal also 
noted that cycle theft tends to be under-recorded, possibly by as much as 80 per cent 
and as such the problem could have been costing as much as £4,100,000 per year.
Using the 1999/2000 recorded cycle theft data, the proposal identified seven 
geographic hotspot areas for cycle crime within the city of Cambridge, which are 
shown in box 5.1 (below):
Box 5.2: Cycle crime hotspots in Cambridge as demonstrated by the project 
proposal
Place Post code Number of offences
Grafton shopping centre CB1IPS 126
Cambridge train station CB1 2JW 102
Drummer Street bus 
station
CB1 1NQ 46
Addenbrookes hospital CB22QQ 43
Mill Road CB1 2BD 40
Market Square CB1 3QJ 37
The YMCA CB1 1ND 30
(Taken from the proposal document)
The proposal contained detailed information about each of the seven hotspot areas. 
This included the total number of offences, the number of offences by month and the 
ages and genders of the victims of cycle theft in these areas. An indicative example of 
this is shown in Box 5.3 below:
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Box 5.3: Example of hotspot analysis in Cambridge
Hotspot location for cycle theft: Grafton shopping centre
There were a total of 126 cycle offences in and around the Grafton shopping centre, 
postcode CB1 IPS, in 1999/2000; this represented an increase from 71 recorded thefts 
in the same place in the financial year 1998/1999.
Of the 126 offences in 1999/2000, 86 were recorded as having taken place between 
the hours of 9am and 5pm, only seven offences were reported as having occurred after 
9pm.
Data were also recorded about the month of the year in which the thefts from the 
Grafton Centre occurred:
1999/2000 Number of offences
April 7
May 8
June 3
July 20
August 15
September 25
October 30
November 8
December 1
January 5
February 2
March 2
Information was recorded about the age and gender of 95 of the victims of cycle theft 
in 1999/2000. Of these, 43 were male and 52 were female. This was broken down as 
follows.
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Age group Number
10-14 14
15-19 30
20-24 16
25-29 11
30-34 13
35-39 2
404- 9
(Adapted from the bid document)
The proposal then provided fairly detailed temporal information about when the thefts 
occurred including the time of year and time of day. Generally, the levels of cycle 
theft were higher in the summer than the rest of the year, peaking in October and they 
were most often reported as stolen during the daytime. The proposal also provided 
some details about the victims of cycle theft. Victims were predominately young 
(aged from 15 to 24). The analysis showed that 41 per cent of victims were in this age 
group in 1999/2000. There were slightly more male victims, for example, 1,362 male 
victims compared with 1,073 female victims in the year 1999/2000.
As well as providing quantitative data about the size of the cycle theft problem, its 
location and some victim attributes the proposal made efforts to understand why cycle 
theft was such a sizeable problem in Cambridge. The proposal noted that cycling is a 
major form of transport in Cambridge and the volume of cycles partly accounts for the 
high numbers of cycle thefts. Indeed the Cambridgeshire County Council traffic 
monitoring report counted 18,460 cycle trips across bridges over the River Cam in a 
12-hour period in March 1999. The proposal pointed out that the high volume of 
cycles in Cambridge city centre increased demand on the available secure cycle 
parking places. Cambridge Cycling Campaign counts of cycle parking usage for three 
months of one year (1999) showed the level of secure parking was inadequate. Their 
research noted that only 35 per cent of bicycles were secured properly to cycle stands. 
In addition to that, the project proposal highlighted that some stands were 
inadequately designed and some were not properly installed. For example, older style 
‘butterfly’ stands (in which only the front bicycle wheel can be secured with a lock)
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were too small to fit the wheels of modem bicycles and some of the stands had been 
placed too closely together for modem cycles which tend to have wider handlebars 
than older models.
In commenting on the age of victims of cycle theft, the proposal pointed to the large 
numbers of university students who use bicycles as their main form of transport in the 
city. The proposal considered that young people generally are more likely to be 
victims of theft because they had a relaxed attitude towards securing their 
possessions. Additionally, the proposal described a tolerance of cycle theft in the city 
of Cambridge where it is considered to be a part of life. No data were provided in 
support of these observations.
The proposal suggested that there were three types of offenders who were responsible 
for thefts in Cambridge but again no evidence for these observations was provided. 
The first category of offender was thought to be ‘joy riders’. These were people who 
take a bicycle without the owner’s consent for a short journey within Cambridge and 
subsequently leave it in Cambridge. The second were offenders who were stealing 
bicycles opportunistically to then sell to fund problematic dmg habits. The third were 
thought to be offenders who stole large volumes of bicycles, possibly to order, and 
who were possibly transporting them out of Cambridge to sell elsewhere.
Manchester
In contrast to Cambridge, the Manchester project aimed to apply problem-oriented 
policing principles to a very serious low volume crime problem: that of gang related 
shootings. The project was originally conceived along the lines of the seemingly very 
successful initiative in Boston, Massachusetts (the Boston Gun Project) which was 
associated with a rapid decline in numbers of fatalities caused by the use of guns and 
knives (Kennedy et al., 1996; Braga, et a l , 1999). The reports of the project by the 
Harvard research team (who participated in that project’s development and evaluated 
its impact) give an account of the work of the Boston project and provide compelling 
evidence of its effectiveness. Projects can never be fully described or fully replicated 
(Tilley, 1996) but the basic idea was to follow the principles of the Boston project in 
Manchester. This was to gather data about the nature of the problem and to formulate 
responses on the basis of this. The Boston project aimed to produce a quick decline in
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firearms related injuries. It was not primarily focused on the underlying causes or the 
wider social conditions that caused shootings but on the more immediate 
circumstances in which shootings occurred to produce results in the short term. 
Following this, in Manchester the original aim was to look to affect reductions in the 
levels of shootings through attention to the proximate causes of shootings.
As in Cambridge, it was not incumbent on the police service to conduct the problem 
analysis of the crime problem themselves. Following the Boston model (which used 
Harvard researchers to conduct the problem analysis) Tilley and Bullock undertook an 
analysis of gang-related violence in Manchester. They were assisted in data collection 
by two civilian staff that were employed by Greater Manchester Police (in August and 
September 2000) and paid for from project funds. This research stage was known 
locally within the police service as Operation Chrome and was overseen by the then 
Chief Superintendent for South Manchester and a small group of Greater Manchester 
Police senior police officers, mainly Assistant Chief Constables.
For the analysis stage of the Manchester project attempts were made to extract and to 
gather information from the following.
• Calls for service data: these are records that are made every time someone calls 
the police.
• Recorded crime data: Home Office statistical returns representing the official 
picture of crime.
• Data held in the Force Intelligence Bureau about crime events and individuals: 
these are the records that CID keep.
• The Armed Crime Unit database: similar to the above and recorded if that crime 
involved a firearm.
• Data from GMPICs on individuals, who were associated with gangs, were 
believed responsible for shootings, or who were victims of shootings: GMPICs 
was Greater Manchester Police’s crime management system and the day-to-day 
means of recording intelligence on individuals and crimes.
These data were supplemented with information from interviews with incarcerated 
gang members and through canvassing the informed opinion from practitioners within
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the police service and other agencies. Efforts were also made to elicit systematic data 
from non-police agencies that may have had additional information relevant to serious 
youth violence. These included the probation service, social services, the Youth 
Offending Team (YOT), schools and hospitals. Ultimately two special databases were 
constructed, one containing details of all verifiable shootings in Manchester from 
January 1997 to 2000 and another containing information on all individuals aged 
under 25 with known gang involvement.
The main findings of the analysis were as follows (Bullock and Tilley, 2002).
• Violence in general, gun violence in particular and fatal shootings most 
specifically were concentrated in some specific small areas of South Manchester.
• Victims of gun violence in Manchester were mainly young, Black or mixed race 
males, who have criminal records.
• Suspected perpetrators of serious gun violence in Manchester tended to have 
similar attributes to victims.
• Those who were victims of shootings were at increased risk of repeat incidents.
• The total annual cost of firearms-related violence in South Manchester was 
estimated as £5 million.
• Young Black (and mixed race) male victims of shootings in South Manchester 
were generally known to have been involved in gangs.
• There were differences in the make-up, origins, activities, and organisation of the 
four main South Manchester gangs, though members of all were involved in a 
wide range of criminal behaviour.
• Gang-membership comprised a mix of similar-age local friendship groups, blood 
relatives and recruits.
• Gang-related criminal behaviour included drug-related offences, but only as one
element of a patchwork of violent and non-violent crime.
• Rates of arrest for gang-members tended to fall as they age.
• Gangs in South Manchester were loosely area-based.
• Alliances were sometimes formed between some South Manchester gangs, but 
conflict was endemic and easily triggered.
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• Intelligence records suggested that carrying firearms by gang members was at 
least partly protective, partly symbolic and partly instrumental for the commission 
of violent crime.
• There were strong norms of non-co-operation to police enquiries into gang-related 
shootings, in particular in giving evidence and this had undermined successful 
prosecution of offenders.
These findings were presented to the Operation Chrome steering group along with a 
broad strategy for tackling gang-related violence based on the Boston Gun Project (set 
out in later sections of this chapter) held on 13 March 2001.
Management, structure and staffing of the projects
The Targeted Policing Initiative did not set out specific instructions about how the 
projects should be managed locally and arrangements for day-to-day oversight and 
management were left to the discretion of local managers. Arrangements for 
monitoring the grant were devolved from the central Home Office to the appropriate 
regionally based government office (East of England and the North West). In practice, 
other than monitoring whether the grant was being spent, the regional offices had little 
involvement in the delivery of either of the projects. The following sections discuss 
the local management and staffing arrangements for the two projects.
Cambridge
The Cambridge project commenced in September 2000 and was officially due to be 
completed in March 2002. The project was awarded £167,000 for this period from the 
Home Office Targeted Policing Initiative. In the event, a small amount of additional 
money was made available beyond March 2002 and the project manager was funded 
full-time until September 2002.
A full-time project manager was employed to implement the Cambridge project. The 
project manager was recruited by the police service on a short-term contract following 
an advertisement placed in the Cambridge Evening News on 26 July 2000. His job 
description can be seen in Annex eight. The council community safety manager for
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Cambridge Southern Division and the police Chief Superintendent for Cambridge city 
centre had day-to-day management responsibility for the project manager. The project 
manager was based in the community safety department at the city police station and 
supported by the central research team at the County Council. A steering group was 
set up to monitor and oversee the implementation of the project. This consisted of 
representatives from the police service (two individuals), the University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge City Council (two individuals) and Cambridge Cycling 
Campaign (two individuals) and a representative from Anglia Polytechnic University.
Manchester
The structures for project implementation were much more complicated in 
Manchester than they were in Cambridge and so they will be described here in more 
detail. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the research and development phase of 
the project (Operation Chrome) was originally overseen by a small group of senior 
police officers. By the end of the research phase there had been some key personnel 
changes in south Manchester and the Chief Superintendent for South Manchester was 
replaced. On 29 March 2001 the newly appointed Chief Superintendent for South 
Manchester (also the new Chair of the Manchester project steering group) decided to 
reduce the police involvement in the subsequent stages of the project and increase the 
involvement of other agencies. From the end of March 2001 the project was overseen 
by a steering group of senior representatives of the agencies, set out in box 5.4, plus a 
headmaster from a local school, who was invited to attend permanently on 24 April 
2001 .
A full-time project manager, a police inspector, was appointed in May 2001 to co­
ordinate the implementation of the Manchester project. The project manager was 
recruited following an internal Greater Manchester Police recruitment exercise. The 
roles of the two civilian staff formally employed on the research stage of Operation 
Chrome were amended, so that they became the ‘implementation manager’ and 
‘information manager’ on 22 May 2001. The project office was based at Longsight 
police station in the South Manchester division. Practitioners were seconded from 
agencies or employed on short-term contracts as shown in Box 5.4.
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Box 5.4: Staff appointed to the project
Agency Number of posts TPI funded Seconded
Youth Offending Team 2 2 Yes
Housing 1.5 1 Yes
Probation 1 1 Yes
Social services 1 1 Yes
Education
• Youth service
• Education and welfare
2 2 Yes
Outreach workers 2 2 No
Detailed job descriptions for all the staff can be seen in Annex seven.
This group normally met weekly on Wednesday mornings to discuss and co-ordinate 
project interventions. On a day-to-day level this was directly overseen and facilitated 
by the police officer project manager and the two civilian posts (implementation and 
information managers). Home agency managers retained residual responsibility for 
their seconded staff. Initially, there were further meetings of a group for the line 
managers of seconded staff, though this group was disbanded early on.
Box 5.5 (below) shows the structure of the project whilst the manager’s group met. 
The same structure subsequently operated in the absence of the manager’s group. As 
in Cambridge, the evaluation of the project was ongoing largely independently of the 
project but formal feedback was given to the board twice (other than the initial 
presentation of 13 March 2001): 29 January 2002 (presentation to board) and 18 July 
2002 (memo to project chair).
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Box 5.5: Manchester project structure
Research
Police inspector project 
manager
Implementation manager 
Information manager
Implementation team
Housing
Education
Youth Offending Team 
Social services 
Probation service
Managers group
Housing
Probation service 
Education
Youth Offending Team 
Social services
Practitioners group
Chair: police chief
Superintendent
Housing
Probation
City Council
Education
Social services
Youth Offending Team
Steering group
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Response development
Cambridge
The Cambridge project manager came into his post with the aims of the project 
clearly articulated and the timetable for implementation of key initiatives documented 
in the project documents. The proposal stated that the aims of the Cambridge cycle 
theft reduction project were:
• to reduce the number of cycle thefts in Cambridge city centre by five to ten per 
cent (using a 1998/1999 base line);
• to reduce the number of cycle thefts from students in Cambridge city centre by 20 
per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line); and,
• to increase the number of detections in Cambridge city centre by ten per cent 
(using a 1998/1999 base line).
The response was based on providing additional security for cycles, targeting 
offenders and reducing the risk-taking activities of cyclists. The specific stated 
objectives of this project were:
• to trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to determine which were the 
most user-friendly and secure, and appropriate for different locations in 
Cambridge;
• to provide a secure cycle park in the basement of Park Street car park;
• to determine additional locations throughout the city for installing secure cycle
racking;
• to install extra racks and replace inadequate existing racking;
• to set up a comprehensive and consistent university wide cycle registration
scheme and include publicity about racks;
• to use a black and fluorescent ‘police warning’ campaign to warn cyclists of theft 
problems;
• to set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively to target prolific 
offenders;
• to measure the change in the number of securely parked cycles in a pre-defined 
city centre location;
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• to determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft in Cambridge city; 
and,
• To work out what measures effectively reduce cycle crime.
The full project timetable is provided in Annex three. The key project milestones are
set out in box 5.6 below:
Box 5.6: Key milestones of the Cambridge project
Milestone
1. Submission of revised project plan to the Home Office End August 2000
2. Employ a project manager to carry out the research on October 2000
the project
3. Two police constables to start work on the cycle theft November 2000
reduction project
4. Research rack types and locations for pilot December 2000
5. Work with university to determine registration scheme March 2001
for use in colleges
6. Develop registration scheme for implementation in July 2001
October 2001
7. Equip colleges to start registration scheme September 2001
8. Start the registration scheme October 2001
9. Trial the racks and identify type of rack and location July 2001
10. Design alteration of Park Street secure cycle park July 2001
11. Install cycle racking at Park Street and locations in December 2001
Cambridge city
12. Start registration scheme at Anglia Polytechnic September 2002
University, 6th form colleges and schools
Manchester
The response development stage was longer and more complicated in Manchester 
than it was in Cambridge. The Home Office agreed funding for the project in May 
2001 from the Targeted Policing Initiative. Formally the funding (£500,000) was to 
run from July 2001 to September 2002. As with the Boston project the main focus
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was to reduce shootings and serious violence. A broad strategy was laid out by 
Bullock and Tilley. The first three elements were based on the Boston project whilst 
the second three were suggested in light of the more distinctive conditions in 
Manchester.
1. To apply co-ordinated leverage to gangs through highly publicised multi­
agency targeted crackdowns, aimed at gangs using firearms, possessing 
firearms or taking part in serious assaults.
2. To enhance community relations, to ensure that the community supported the 
strategy and to avoid the crackdown backfiring.
3. To engage with gang members to elicit information, to transmit consistent 
messages about targeted crackdowns, and to provide diversionary services.
4. To develop inter-gang mediation services, to head off and defuse tensions that 
risk leading to serious incidents of violence, including shootings.
5. To increase protection for victims and repeat victims.
6. To sensitise agencies to the implications of their actions for gangs and the 
risks to their members, especially in the light of the provisions of Section 17 
of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998).
These six broad elements of the project were agreed by the steering group on 13 
March 2001. Box 5.7 shows the overall strategy as envisaged at the meeting of 13 
March.
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Box 5.7: The logic of the original Manchester project
crackdowns in response to shootings with victim
protection, and mediation if opportunity arose
Effect highly publicised, rapid multi-agency
A halt in the shootings to allow other interventions
to be implemented
Create fire-break
Create context for successful crackdowns, with
community support and gang engagement
ups, relocation, etc.
services, business start
gang lifestyle with
alternative educational
services, employment
Facilitate exiting from
via early identification of
mobilise family and
community control, and
Inhibit recruitment to gangs
children and youths at risk,
agency intervention
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In the original strategy, suggestions were set out for developing a referral scheme for 
young people at risk of becoming involved in firearms and for developing a model of 
improving community relations, as shown in Box 5.8 below.
Box 5.8: Referral and community relations schemes
Scheme Details
Referral scheme A scheme in which:
• where a young person came to the attention of the 
police for crime or anti-social behaviour and there was 
evidence of gang involvement, the young person would 
be referred to the project, and a letter would be sent to 
parents;
• if the behaviour continued, a further letter would be sent 
to parents and to school; and,
• if it still persisted, a multi-agency case conference 
would be called and enforcement action might then be 
taken.
Developing community 
relations
A cyclical scheme whereby:
• the project liaises with beat and housing officers who 
report signs of gang-related crime and disorder to the 
project;
• the project collates data on gangs and guns in the target 
area;
• The project liaises with relevant agencies to resolve 
problems and feeds back to the community what is 
done; and,
• the community is consulted to identify areas of concern.
In contrast to Cambridge where the project manager had no input in the response 
development, detailed tactical planning in Manchester was left to the implementation 
team. The implementation team subsequently produced a number of sizeable
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documents, which presented large numbers of recommendations about how to 
proceed with the implementation of the project. The first detailed draft strategy 
document dated 6 April 2001 ran to some 41 pages and contained well over one 
hundred recommendations. Recommendations were divided under two headings: 
‘enforcement’ and ‘prevention.’ These were further divided into a range of proposed 
activities.
Boxes 5.9 and 5.10 (below) give some examples.
Box 5.9: Indicative examples of law enforcement recommendations
• Brief the head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and key prosecutors 
based on the findings of the research
• Conduct regular sessions with Clerks to the keep the Courts updated on 
developments within the gang landscape, the wider context of gangs and 
impact on the community
• Ensure a detailed multi-agency assessment is carried out on all gang-involved 
youth and adults before the courts
• Develop a procedure whereby marginally involved youths can be released 
under licence or bailed to intensive supervision by the Youth Offending 
Team (YOT) and probation also involving individuals from other agencies
• In order to make deterrence work, adopt the pulling levers strategy in police 
crackdowns
• Initiate practices in probation that allow for increased frequency of home 
visits during non-traditional hours
• Address the needs of YOT relating to concerns about staff security/safety
• Rigorously enforce tenancy compliance, injunctions, evictions and [re] 
possession
• Partner agencies considering pursuing an Anti-social Behaviour Order inform 
other partners regarding who the target is for discussion
• Establish a combined law enforcement/criminal justice agency gang unit with 
the aim of setting a precedent for a multi-agency task force on gangs and 
gang violence.
127
Box 5.10: Indicative examples of prevention recommendations
• Interventions must address the multiple factors which condition youth 
towards serious youth offending behaviour
• Establish a multi-agency database containing basic information on gang 
involved youth
• Chronically affected areas be subject to the full range of interventions. Those 
with emerging gang problems be subject to a more limited set of 
interventions, e.g. a primary emphasis on work in the schools, outreach on 
the streets and increased police patrols at potential hotspots
• Greater Manchester Police exchange information about known gang 
members with neighbouring police forces
• Monitor the impact of gangs on non-gang offenders
• Monitor problems or obstacles that youth and family members may 
encounter as each tailored intervention plan unfolds; agencies must be 
flexible in this respect
• Encourage partners and community-based grass roots groups to collaborate in 
supervising youth whilst in school and immediately after the school day ends
• Establish information routes so that data on gang-involved children and. 
children vulnerable to gang influences get to appropriate school staff
• Provide a mix of day/evening/weekend classes, crash courses and tutoring in 
the home and at youth centres, colleges and other centres: an ‘alternative high 
school’
• Provide simultaneous education/skills development and training to youth and 
youth's parent[s] and other family members.
• Identify signs of impending disputes and carry out timely mediation in 
schools
• Ensure that Sure Start is aware of any history of gang involvement of young 
parents they work with
• Identify non-statutory community-based groups to act as first point of 
contact/intervention in support of families with gang-involved youth
• Prior to release of an incarcerated gang-involved youth, identify and work
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with other community members who may have latent antagonisms or 
disputes with the youth
• Directly approach youth in the streets, parks and other public 24 hours a day
• Intervene at early stages of a dispute
• Develop closer links with non-statutory groups
• Develop models for risk assessment related to different categories of youth
• Help to build relations between gang-involved youth and the wider civil 
society
• Develop a jobs bank to provide work as an alternative to gang involvement
• Practitioners conduct regular briefings for senior managers of partner 
agencies to ensure they are familiar with the changing dynamics of the gang 
landscape.
• Develop regular workshop for practitioners from different agencies who deal 
with, or have dealt with, gang involved youth and/or their families
• Police officers to get out of cars and onto the streets more often to become 
visible ‘same cop same neighbourhood’ officers
• Gang Involved Youth Service Providers Network to act as outreach 
organisation and as an interface between gang-involved youth and existing 
statutory agencies
• Raise health professionals’ awareness of gangs and impact of gang culture on 
youth
• Visits of partner practitioners to project units/offices to elicit feedback from 
project staff and those in receipt of services from the project
At a meeting held on 24 April 2001, the steering group decided it was not realistic to 
try to implement all the measures proposed by the implementation team. Each agency 
represented on the project was asked to select a smaller number of interventions, 
using an abridged template of options based on the document described in box 5.10, 
which were appropriate to their agency and which they agreed to implement. 
Interventions were considered by the individual agencies on the basis of desirability, 
viability, priority, and means of implementation. Agencies were also asked to 
consider naming individuals who would be responsible for implementing the 
interventions, and also to provide estimates of how much it would cost.
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At the steering group meeting of 22 May 2001, thirty-one interventions were agreed 
by the group as detailed in Box 5.11 below.
Box 5.11: The thirty-one elements of the Manchester project
Project intervention Lead and other main agency
• Conduct regular home visits and 
identify the changing needs of youth 
and family
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Develop a jobs bank • Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Direct conflict mediation in all 
environments affected by gangs
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Directly intervene with youth gang 
members if there is a likelihood of tit 
for tat reprisal
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Encourage local businesses to support 
specific projects
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Ensure employment for youth and 
family members in regeneration 
projects
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Establish outreach worker pilot project 
to conduct street level outreach
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Provide mediation between youth, 
residents and local businesses
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Develop education programmes for 
gang involved adults and parents
• Education department
• Liaise directly with schools to develop 
'early warning mechanisms’
• Education department
• Assist schools in tackling gang 
problems
• Education department
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
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• Facilitate meetings between parents of 
gang members
• Education
• Outreach Workers
• Establish a ‘virtual transition school' 
for gang-involved youth who have 
been excluded
• Education
• Y outh Offending T earn
• Establish regular information 
exchange between all agencies
• Greater Manchester Police
• Initiate a ‘same cop same 
neighbourhood’ process
• Greater Manchester Police
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service 
and Clerks of Court and establish 
‘Community Prosecution’
• Greater Manchester Police
• All agencies
• Engage grass roots groups • Greater Manchester Police
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Raise awareness of gangs and gang 
dynamics among all agencies and 
schools
• Greater Manchester Police
• Education
• Enhance responsiveness to community 
concerns
• Greater Manchester Police
• Housing
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ 
strategy
• Greater Manchester Police
• Housing
• Probation
• Youth Offending Team
• Develop a risk assessment model • Greater Manchester Police
• Youth Offending Team
• Probation
• Utilise Anti-social Behaviour Orders 
and tenancy compliance
• Housing
• All agencies
• Develop links with agencies in other 
cities to ensure continued support for 
relocated youth and families
• Social services
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• Provide intensive ‘wrap around’ 
support for youth and family
• Social services
• Help youth and families access 
services
• Social services
• Manchester City Council Chief 
Executive’s Department
• Assist gang-involved youth to leave 
disorganised and/or destructive family 
situations
• Social services
• Housing
• Ensure security of young women 
victimised by gang members
• Social services
• Housing
• Provide independent and/or supported 
living accommodation in areas not 
affected by gangs
• Social services
• Housing
• Police/probation/YOT partnership for 
‘Operation Nightlight’ with youth 
offenders
• Youth Offending Tearn
• Greater Manchester Police
• Probation
• Monitor the impact of gangs on non­
gang offenders
• Youth Offending Team
• Greater Manchester Police
• Probation
• Work with incarcerated gang members 
and their families
• Youth Offending Team
• Probation
• Outreach workers
At the steering group meeting held on 20 June 2001 a new name for the project, The 
Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy (MMAGS) and a general mission statement 
were agreed. The stated mission was:
• to enforce the law through multi agency targeted crackdowns;
• to deter young people from entering into a gang / gun culture and divert them 
towards alternatives;
• to provide support to young people and families who are most vulnerable;
• to secure the conviction and/or rehabilitation of gang involved offenders;
132
• to reduce the incidence of death and injury to young people and the wider impact 
of gangs on the community; and,
• to create an environment for commercial investment.
Main project outputs: Cambridge
The outputs of the Cambridge cycle theft project fell into three main categories: 
provision of secure parking; bicycle registration schemes and publicity; and, targeting 
of prolific offenders. These are discussed in turn in the following sections:
Provision of secure parking
A secure cycle parking experiment was undertaken between September 2000 and 
August 2001 largely in accordance with the original project proposals. Eight varieties 
of racks were ultimately selected from over 120 designs considered by local cycling 
groups, planning officers, engineers and a disability consultative panel. Stands were 
selected on the basis of a range of factors. First, that it was possible to secure the 
frame of cycle to the stand. Second, that they should be easy to use. Third, that they 
should look attractive given the historic nature of Cambridge city centre. Fourth, that 
they met the needs of a variety of different shapes and sizes of bicycle. And lastly, 
that the finish was durable. Ninety-two were originally installed as part of the 
experiment. Pictures of the type of rack can be seen below in Box 5.12.
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Box 5.12: Styles of rack used in the experiment
Fin
Scissors
Triangle A Triangle
n
Chunky
f t
Inverted 
with crossbar
SF Austrian
Following the pilot, secure parking was rolled out around the city centre. Overall, by 
the end of the project 277 additional racks had been installed providing 560 secure 
parking spaces. Box 5.13 shows a breakdown of the implementation of the secure 
parking.
Box 5.13: bicycle stand implementation information
Date Location Spaces Racks
Removed Installed Net
change
Removed Installed Total
Dec-00 Milton Road School 0 32 32 0 16 16
May-01 Market Hill 28 38 10 28 19 -9
May-01 Guildhall -Peas Hill 
Side
18 20 2 9 10 1
May-01 Market Hill end of 
Peas Hill
0 12 12 0 6 6
May-01 Guildhall - Petty 
Cury Side
12 12 0 12 6 -6
May-01 Peas Hill 0 9 9 0 9 9
May-01 St. George's House 10 16 6 10 10 0
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May-01 Fisher Square 0 26 26 0 13 13
May-01 Christ's Pieces 0 12 12 0 6 6
May-01 Drummer Street 0 10 10 0 5 5
May-01 Parker's Piece 0 10 10 0 8 8
Jul-01 Police Station 0 12 12 6 6
Mar-02 Park Street 4 271 267 175 175
Mar-02 Lion Yard 8 12 4 8 6 -2
Mar-02 St. Edward's 
Passage
21 20 -1 21 20 -1
Mar-02 St. Mary's Passage 61 76 15 61 38 -23
Mar-02 Trumpington Street 0 30 30 0 15 15
Apr-02 Police Station 12 16 4 6 8 2
Apr-02 Department of 
Mathematics and 
Applied Physics
0 12 12 6 6
May-02 Cherry Hinton Hall 0 16 16 8 8
May-02 Football Ground 
(Cambridge United)
0 20 20 10 10
May-02 Kings Hedges 
School
0 20 20 10 10
Jun-02 SF racks 0 12 12 12 12
Jun-02 Rounded As 0 20 20 10 10
Total 174 734 560 155 432 277
An indoor secure cycle park (Park Street cycle park) was the biggest single financial 
investment of the Cambridge project. Park Street car park is close to the centre of the 
city of Cambridge and following the introduction of measures to control motor 
vehicle access to the city it was rarely full. This created the opportunity to site a large 
capacity cycle park. The building was provided at no cost by Cambridge city council 
who agreed to maintain it over the long term. The basement of the car park was 
converted to a secured cycle park, at a cost of £75,000. The facility provides secure 
cycle parking for 285 bicycles. It is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week and is 
covered by CCTV. It features:
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• 218 free cycle parking spaces;
• 53 cycle lockers that can be hired for £10 per month;
• easy to use cycle racks suitable for securing a wide range of cycle types; and,
• special racks for tandems, bicycles with trailers and recumbent cycles.
The cycle park was completed in March 2002 and opened in July 2002. This was 
coming up for six months later than was originally planned.
Property marking, registration and publicity
Cycle marking involves fixing a unique identifier to a bicycle frame. A record of the 
code, a description of the bicycle and the owner’s details can be kept in a register and 
in the event that a cycle is lost an accurate description of the missing bicycle is 
available from the register and it can be recorded as lost or stolen. Any recovered 
bicycles can then be cross-checked with the register to return them to their owners. 
Marks on cycles can be overt or covert or a mixture of both. Box 5.14 shows the 
attributes of overt and covert marking.
Box 5.14: Covert and overt cycle marking
Covert Overt
• Bright mark
• May also include the code 
number and who to 
contact to check the 
register.
• Hard to find
• In some cases may only be read with 
special equipment
• Usually easy to remove • Normally very hard to remove
• Usually cheap • Can be high tech and quite expensive
In registration schemes, information about the bicycles is recorded centrally (usually 
by a registration company rather than by the police or other public body) and this 
company would normally assume responsibility for keeping the information on cycles 
up to date. The project proposal stated that before the start of the project there had 
been no systematic attempt by the police service to encourage Cambridge cyclists to 
register their bicycles with one of the registration schemes available. The university
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college porters operated their own rather crude registration system which involved 
numbering bicycles with paint and keeping a paper record of those numbers and the 
contact details of the bicycle owners. The Cambridge project sought to encourage 
cyclists to register their bicycles more systematically.
The cycle theft reduction project used four different commercial registration 
companies for the property-making elements of the project (shown in Box 5.15).
Box 5.15: Cycle marking systems used in the Cambridge project
Kit Marking Technology
Retainagroup • Bright holographic sticker with code number punched 
through
• Two covert stickers
Alpha Dot • Microdots painted onto the bicycle frame.
• Presence of dot picked up by ultraviolet light
• Code has to be read by a magnifier
Bikeregister.
com
• Coded stickers
• Electronic transponder (trackers) inside the seat tube
Datalog • Coded stickers
• Electronic transponders (trackers)
The university college porters preferred to keep the registration of cycles within the 
colleges and so the project manager also produced a special pack for the colleges to 
register their students’ cycles themselves. This contained:
• pens to mark bicycles with;
• a booklet in which to record information about the bicycle, its owner and its code 
to be retained by whoever was maintaining the scheme; and,
• a booklet giving bicycle security information for the cycle owner.
The project manager distributed many thousands of packs to the colleges but it was 
not clear from project records exactly how many additional cycles were registered as 
a direct result. However, the project manager sent a questionnaire to the colleges in an 
attempt to quantify the numbers of cycles that were registered. This showed that of
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the 16 colleges (out of 31) that replied, the overall number of coded cycles increased 
from 682 cycles in the academic year 2000/01 to 1,290 in 2001/02.
In addition, about 25 other cycle registration events were held where several hundred 
bicycles were marked with the kits described in Box 5.15. Box 5.16 (below) shows 
the details (where available) of the larger events.
Box 5.16: Cycle registration events
Venue Date Type of registration and marking
St Johns College October 2000 Digital phone records made
Cambridge Festival of 
Cycling: Dr Bike event
June 2001 60+ Retainagroup kits applied
Cambridge Festival of 
Cycling: Cycle try out 
show
June 2001 40+ Bikeregister.com kits applied
Perse School October 2001 60 bicycles marked with a school code
Cherry Hinton September 2001 Small number of Retainagroup kits 
applied
Addenbrooks hospital November 2001 36 special Addenbrooks marks applied
Parkside police station December 2001 125 bicycles marked
Parkside police station February 2002 11 staff bicycles marked
Cambridge railway 
station
March 2002 30 bicycles marked
Cambridge railway 
station
March 2002 20 bicycles marked
Morley Memorial School June 2002 49 bicycles marked with 
Bikeregister.com
Shire Hall June 2002 20 Bikeregister.com
Shire Hall June 2002 • 4 marked with 
Bikeregister.com
• 20 marked with Alpha Dot
• 1 Datalog
Dr Bike (bicycle fixing June 2002 • 8 Bikeregister.com
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service) • 18 Alpha Dot
• 6 Retainagroup
Park Street cycle park July 2002 Data missing
Barton School July 2002 Data missing
Big Day Out -  Parkers 
Piece
July 2002 Small number of bicycles marked
Cambridge railway 
station -  start of regular 
monthly marking
August 2002 7 Retainagroup kits
ASDA supermarket August 2002 20 Alpha Dot kits
Railway station monthly 
marking
September 2002 20 Retainagroup kits
Guildhall Cambridge September 2002 • 23 Datalog
• 9 Alpha Dot
Railway station monthly 
marking
October 2002 11 Datalog
Park Street cycle park October 2002 64 Bikeregister.com kits
As set out in the objectives, the project aimed to implement a high visibility ‘police 
warning’ campaign to alert cyclists to high risk areas. In the event, the project team 
decided that highlighting specific high risk areas might be counterproductive and so 
they decided not to conduct this kind of publicity.
Targeting of prolific offenders
It has been seen that a key objective of the Cambridge project was to provide a 
dedicated squad of two police officers. The police officers were to:
• disrupt the activities of prolific offenders using suitable methods, including the 
cycle trap;
• identify offenders through intelligence gathering;
• link offenders to hot spot areas; and,
• monitor displacement or cessation of offences.
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In the event, Cambridgeshire Constabulary were unable to provide two officers for 
this aspect of the project.
Box 5.17 (below) lists planned measures for the Cambridge project and summarises 
the extent of their implementation.
Box 5.17: Summary of implementation of planned measures of the Cambridge
project
Planned measure Implementation
status
• To trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to 
determine which were the most user-friendly and secure and 
appropriate for different locations in Cambridge
Implemented
• To provide a secure car park in the basement of Park Street car 
park
Implemented
• To measure the change in securely parked cycles in a pre­
defined city centre location
Implemented
• To use black and fluorescent ‘police warning’ campaign to 
warn cyclists of theft problems
Not implemented
• To set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively 
target prolific offenders
Not implemented
• To set up a comprehensive and consistent university-wide 
cycle registration scheme and include publicity about racks
Implemented and 
ongoing
• To determine additional locations throughout the city for 
installing secure cycle racking. Install extra racks and replace 
inadequate existing racking
Implemented and 
ongoing
• To determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft 
in Cambridge city and to work out what measures effectively 
reduce cycle crime
Implemented and 
ongoing
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To summarise, the Cambridge bicycle theft project successfully implemented the 
secure bicycle parking aspects of the project albeit its biggest financial investment, 
the establishment of the indoor cycle park, was implemented about six months later 
than originally planned. It had partial success in setting up a comprehensive 
university-wide cycle registration scheme which, at the end of the evaluation period, 
was ongoing. It did not manage to implement the cycle squad to proactively target 
offenders.
Main project outputs: Manchester
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the outputs of this project were harder to 
quantify than the Cambridge project due to its scope and size and the varied and broad 
nature of the interventions that they ultimately sought to implement. These tended to 
be focused either on addressing a perceived root cause of problems (for example 
addressing poor attendance at school or addressing a family’s housing needs) or 
through attempting to divert young people away from crime by providing other 
activities to occupy their time. This (along with the reluctance to fill in activity logs) 
makes quantification of the outputs harder than it was in the Cambridge project. 
Nevertheless, the following is a description of the main observed outputs of the 
Manchester project broken down into the following sections:
• the target list;
• Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT scheme);
• community Relations;
• awareness raising; and,
• crackdown.
The target list
The practitioners employed on the Manchester case study spent most of their time 
engaged in the development of actions for individuals on a list who were selected for 
targeted interventions co-ordinated by the multi-agency team. The aim was to provide 
‘wrap around’ interventions to support an individual who was assessed as being at
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risk of joining a gang or who was known to be a gang member. In this project ‘wrap 
around’ meant that a range of services would be offered to support the various 
elements of a young person’s life that were thought to make him or her vulnerable to 
gang membership and crime. This could have included a wide range of interventions 
as felt appropriate by the project team and included: supporting a young person’s 
educational or training needs; helping a person find employment; attending to a young 
person’s and their family’s housing needs; linking into mental health or drug or 
alcohol misuse services; or, providing diversionary schemes. It could also be extended 
to members of the young person’s immediate family, if elements of a person’s family 
life were thought to be contributing to their vulnerability. The project steering group 
had stated that the project should seek to work with 85 gang-involved individuals at 
least to begin with.
At the end of March 2003,172 individuals were on the list and some aggregate 
information about those individuals was available. Of the 172 individuals 150 were 
male. The average age was 19; the youngest being 12 and the oldest was in the mid- 
40s. Sixty-five per cent lived in south Manchester. The individuals on the target list 
had varied criminal histories. The police had obtained the criminal records of 55 of 
the 172 individuals (the others had no criminal record). Between them, this 55 had 
records of 852 offences, which is a mean of 15 offences per individual. However, this 
average masked a large range in offending history. One individual had 66 offences to 
his name. Others had only come to the attention of the police once.
As has been seen, the practitioners were unwilling to complete logs outlining the work 
that they were doing with the young people. This made it difficult to quantify the 
nature of agreed actions in respect to their interventions with the target list. 
Nevertheless, information about the nature of the project outputs were gleaned from 
other data sources. The minutes of meetings were examined for information relating 
to actions for the individuals on the target list. Two hundred and thirty-three actions, 
based on about 100 of the individuals that the group had worked with, were examined. 
There were problems using the minutes to quantify the project outputs: they probably 
underestimate activity in relation to the targeted individuals; they do not indicate 
whether interventions were merely planned or actually implemented; they give no
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indication about the actual amount of time spent on activities; and, they do not 
indicate whether they were successful in the longer term. Thus they only give an 
indicative flavour of the sorts of intervention measures that were planned. The nature 
of the interventions were in fact very varied but have been classified for clarity. Box 
5.18 shows some examples and the whole table can be seen in Annex four.
Box 5.18: Types of planned interventions for target individuals
Action type Examples Percentage of 
overall activity
Planning activity • Development of action plans for the 
young people
• Assessments of needs
• Risk assessments
• Locating and contacting individuals
28
Meetings • Arranging meetings
• Home visits to individuals
• Visits to individuals in prison
• Introductions to the project
21
Link to existing 
provision
• Link with key workers in various 
agencies
• Link with other agencies
12
Specific
interventions
• Childcare
• Providing diversionary activities 
(often Go-Karting)
• Enforcement options
11
Education • Securing appropriate education 
provision
• Supporting existing education 
provision
6
Monitoring • Monitoring individuals
• Updating meeting about individuals
5
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Housing options • Re-housing
• Secure accommodation
• Supported housing
6
Other 11
11=233
Gang Resistance Education and Training scheme
The Gang Resistance Education and Training scheme programme was actually not 
one of the 31 original interventions (it was officially added as an intervention on 28 
January 2003). Nevertheless it was developed by the education officers working on 
the project along with the project implementation manager and consumed most of the 
education officers’ time. The GREAT scheme was basically an attempt to teach 
young people and their parents the skills to avoid gang pressure and youth violence. 
The Manchester scheme included sessions on awareness of gangs, the consequences 
of gang life, conflict resolution activities and problem solving. By the end of Home 
Office funding the GREAT scheme was still in the stages of development and 
piloting.
Community relations
The community relations element of the strategy in practice basically involved 
meetings and discussions with community groups and representatives. It proved hard 
to quantify the exact number of such meetings because of unwillingness to fill in 
activity logs, but a good estimate was around 80 formal presentations and numerous 
informal discussions.
Awareness raising
A number of meetings (formal and informal) were held by the practitioners with 
members of their home agencies to try and raise awareness of gang-related problems 
and raise the profile of the project. Upwards of 50 formal meetings were held between 
October 2001 and March 2003 as well as numerous informal discussions.
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Co-ordinated crackdown on gang-related shootings
The co-ordinated, gaiig-focused multi-agency crackdown, which was to follow 
explicitly stated and well-specified targeted behaviours, was not implemented as 
envisaged in any of the strategy documents.
In all around one-third of the 31 agreed lines of work agreed were not implemented in 
any form. Practitioner time was primarily spent on developing support and diversion 
for individuals on the target list; developing the GREAT programme; and, making 
presentations about gangs to community groups and agency staff.
Box 5.19 below shows which initiatives were not implemented along the lines 
envisaged in the implementation plans.
Box 5.19: Elements of the Manchester project not implemented in any form 
Strategy element
• Initiate a ‘same cop same neighbourhood’ process
• Establish a ‘virtual transition school’ for gang involved youths who have 
been excluded
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
• Liaise directly with schools to develop early warning mechanisms
• Directly intervene with youth-gang members if there is a likelihood of tit 
for tat reprisal
• Provide mediation between youth and residents and local businesses
• Direct conflict mediation in all environments affected by gangs
• Ensure employment for youth and family members in regeneration 
projects
• Develop a jobs bank
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• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects
Box 5.20 shows those elements that had been implemented and were ongoing at the 
conclusion of Home Office support through the Targeted Policing Initiative.
Box 5.20: Elements of the Manchester gun project being implemented at the end 
of Home Office funding
• Assistance to schools in tackling gang problems
• Raising awareness of gangs and gang dynamics among all agencies and 
schools
• Utilisation of Anti-social Behaviour Orders and tenancy compliance
• Provision of independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not 
affected by gangs
• Provision of intensive wrap around support for youth and family
• Help to youth and families in access to services
• Assistance to gang-involved youth in leaving disorganised and/or destructive 
family situations
• Improvements to the security of young women victimised by gang members
• Development of links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support 
for relocated youth and families
• Establishment of pilot project to conduct street-level outreach work with 
gang-involved youth
• Work with incarcerated gang members and family
• Engagement with grass roots groups
• Facilitation of meetings between parents of gang members
• Enhancement of responsiveness to community concerns
• Regular home visits to identify the changing needs of youth and family
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Box 5.21 shows those elements of the project that were still being developed 
following the conclusion of Home Office funding.
Box 5.21: Elements of the Manchester project still being developed at the end of 
Home Office funding
Strategy element with ongoing development
• Establishment of regular information exchange between all agencies
• Development of a risk assessment model
• Police/Probation/Youth Offending Team partnership for Operation Nightlight 
with youth offenders
• Engagement with Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court to establish 
‘community prosecution’
• Monitoring of the impact of gangs on non-gang offenders
Project outcomes
The project outcomes were evaluated and published by Bullock and Tilley (2003). 
The crime outcomes of the projects were not of primary importance to this study but 
are reproduced below:
Cambridge
Bicycle theft fell in Cambridge. Box 5.22 shows numbers of bicycle thefts between 
April 1998 and April 2002 in the Cambridge city (reproduced from Bullock and 
Tilley, 2003).
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Box 5.22: Outcome data Cambridge
Note: The first drop line shows the arrest of a known, highly prolific bicycle thief in possession of bolt 
croppers for ‘going equipped’. The second drop line shows the conviction of the same prolific offender 
for theft of eight cycles with many other offences taken into consideration. The third drop line shows 
the start of the Cambridge project.
As Box 5.22 shows, the fall in mid to late 1999 preceded the start o f the project and 
followed the apprehension, conviction and incarceration o f a very prolific bicycle 
thief. The thief was sent to jail for four years in July 2000. He was known to be 
associated with around 16 per cent (164 offences) o f all bicycle thefts in Cambridge in 
1998/1999. In the 20 months prior to his charge for bicycle thefts in late November 
1999 there were an average o f 101 thefts o f cycles per month in the city centre. This 
went down to 67 for the 29 months after his charge. In the ten months between the 
charge of the prolific offender and the start of the Cambridge project there were an 
average o f 66 thefts o f cycles per month, and in the following 19 months the average 
was 67 per month.
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Thus, whilst bicycle theft fell in Cambridge, it is not possible convincingly to 
associate this with the project. There are a number of related issues that probably 
explain why the project was not associated with reductions in cycle theft in 
Cambridge at the end of the evaluation period. The first is to do with the timing and 
‘dosage’ of the implementation of the security aspects of the project. The new stands 
were installed over a period of time and the largest investment in secure parking (the 
cycle park) was not open until very late on in the project. It may be the case that not 
enough time had elapsed for cyclists to change their behaviour and reduce their risk of 
cycle theft and perhaps the additional secure parking could be expected to have more 
of an impact over time. In addition, whilst evidently there were greater numbers of 
secure bicycle racks as a result of the project they may not have been enough given 
the sheer volume of cycles in the city. The second issue that might help explain the 
outcome is the failure to implement the offender interventions. Despite the fairly 
detailed analysis of the problem of cycle crime the original project proposal did not 
provide much information about motivation to steal cycles. Given the impact that the 
incarceration of one prolific offender (described above) had on the overall levels of 
cycle crime in the city, perhaps more effort to tackle prolific offenders would have 
been appropriate. Whilst it cannot be stated with certainty, failure to implement the 
offender element of this project might have been important in explaining the eventual 
project outcomes.
Manchester
Box 5.23 shows the overall number of verifiable shootings in the two targeted South 
Manchester divisions (reproduced from Bullock and Tilley, 2003).
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Box 5.23: Outcome data Manchester: all verifiable shootings in Manchester
Note: The first drop down line refers to the approximate start of the research phase (June 2000). The 
second line refers to when the board agreed the strategy (13 March 2001). The third line refers to the 
start of the implementation phase (October 2001 was when most of the implementation staff were in 
place) and the final one to the ‘formal’ launch of the project 14 October 2002.
There was no decline in the number o f shootings. The Manchester project was 
tackling entrenched social and economic conditions associated with parts o f  South 
Manchester that were considered to cause the gang-related problems. As such, in the 
short term it was unlikely that this project would have an observable impact on the 
overall numbers o f shootings. Coupled with this, although South Manchester had high 
levels o f shootings compared to other areas in the country, the overall numbers were 
nevertheless low. These small numbers make it difficult (if  not impossible) to make 
inferences about any changes in the short term. It certainly was never likely that this 
project would be associated with the sort o f reductions in the numbers seen in the 
Boston project because the problem in Boston was on a much greater scale than that 
in Manchester. In addition, the preceding sections o f this chapter show that key 
elements o f the strategy were not implemented at all. In these circumstances it was 
unlikely that the project could have been expected to have had an impact. Indeed,
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overall the numbers of gang-related shootings in South Manchester did not reduce 
following the introduction of the project (Bullock and Tilley 2003).
Summary of chapter five
The aim of this chapter was to chart the implementation processes of the two projects 
and to describe the difference between what was planned and what was ultimately 
implemented. In both projects, some of the planned interventions were implemented, 
some were partially implemented and some were not implemented at all. In 
Cambridge, the project was largely implemented along the lines of the originally 
agreed project plans although some elements were late. The main exception to this 
was the implementation of the targeted proactive cycle squad of two officers which 
was not implemented. It has been seen that in Manchester the situation was somewhat 
different. The initiatives implemented in Manchester bore little resemblance to the 
original strategy described by Bullock and Tilley. In Manchester the size and scope of 
the project grew as the strategy was developed by the implementation team in the 
early stages. The Manchester project was occupied primarily with developing 
interventions for individuals on the list of gang members, associates and those at risk 
of becoming involved in gangs. At least a third of 31 planned interventions were not 
implemented in any form and the targeted multi-agency crackdown, the major focus 
of the original strategy, was not implemented in any form.
Returning now back to the aims of the study, the following chapters examine how 
top-down and bottom-up factors help to account for the patterns observed in the 
implementation of the two case studies.
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Chapter Six
Top-down explanations of the implementation of the 
Cambridge and Manchester projects
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with those top-down factors that were observed to have 
influenced the patterns of implementation of the Manchester and the Cambridge 
projects. The literature review identified the focus of top-down approaches to 
analysing and understanding project implementation. For top-downers, patterns of 
implementation are conceived in terms of the extent to which management can set 
clear objectives based on clear cause and effect mechanisms, release appropriate 
resources, motivate practitioners to follow guidance, set up accounting mechanisms 
and hold those practitioners to account for implementing the project plans. The factors 
that helped shape implementation in Manchester and Cambridge that follow in this 
chapter were identified in the primary data but framed in terms of those factors that 
top-down analysts argue are important for implementing projects. These were 
identified in the literature review and include: the role of leadership and 
communication; resources; project theory and objectives; project guidance; and, 
accountability and management.
Project leadership and communication
In the Cambridge project a range of senior level individuals were represented on the 
steering group, including representatives of the universities, pressure groups, the city 
and county council and the police service. The steering group members were of 
sufficient seniority to provide the leverage to access resources for the project.
The senior city council representatives on the steering group were considered to be 
especially important in facilitating the implementation of the secure parking elements 
of the project because of their access to the engineers and planners whose expertise 
was not available inside the police service. One steering group member stated in
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Spring 2002‘ ... it is important to ensure that the right personnel are working on the 
project. It is also important to involve representatives from parties such as the cycling 
groups we have in Cambridge. It is vital to have a representative from the senior 
levels o f the local authority.’
High level senior commitment from the city council was evident and this facilitated 
the implementation of the situational measures. Senior level police officers, in 
contrast, withdrew their original commitment to the Cambridge project and this meant 
that enforcement aspects of the project were not implemented. As has been seen, 
cycle theft constituted a significant volume crime problem in Cambridge but senior 
police officers did not consider it to be of sufficient priority to attend project meetings 
and ultimately to release resources for the project enforcement interventions. As one 
member of the cycle theft task force remarked in April 2002 '...the enforcement side 
has not happened. The police said that they would provide two dedicated officers but 
have not done so Another member of the cycle task force remarked '... obstacles to 
progress included the strain felt by the police force. There was more police 
involvement in the project in the beginning. As bike theft fell so did the amount o f time 
that the police spent on the project. ’ As this quote indicates, over the duration of the 
project, the senior police representatives stopped attending the project’s steering 
group meetings and the enforcement interventions were not implemented as a result.
The police service management explained this in terms of general shortages of police 
officers at the time coupled with competing demand for police resources. The 
borough commander for Cambridge city police stated in Spring 2002, for example, ‘
... we are unable to provide the officers because o f chronic shortage o f officers 
caused by increased public order duties and general recruitment problems '. The 
police management certainly stated that they would have liked to have been able to 
dedicate the police officer resource to the project. However, in the circumstances 
where there were competing demands for a finite number of police officers, the senior 
management chose to focus those resources on the crimes types that they were being 
measured as central performance indicators and targets.
This did not go unnoticed by others working on the project. The cycle crime project’s 
steering group minutes stated on 23 January 2001 that '...concerns were raised that
153
the police are not pulling their weight on the policing commitment to the project'. 
Later in the year, the minutes of the meeting held on 7 November 2001 noted that the 
police service was going to be formally reminded by the steering group that it was not 
meeting the commitments that it made to this project. Similar concerns were also 
raised by practitioners in interviews. For example, the head of planning services for 
Cambridge City Council stated that ‘ ...there could have been better communication o f 
the intentions o f the police regarding their involvement in the project and resources.'
In Manchester, strong support, enthusiasm and a general high level of commitment to 
the project aims facilitated the implementation of the project, at least to begin with. 
High level commitment was especially evident from the police chief superintendent 
and from the council’s deputy chief executive. This was important for setting the 
project up, dealing with problems as they arose and maintaining momentum for the 
project in the early days. The headmaster on the steering group, for example, stated in 
March 2003 that ‘ ... i f  [the deputy chief executive and the chief superintendent] 
hadn’t been behind it, the whole thing would have died a death. Whenever there was a 
crisis those two would make sure it got back on board.' The chief superintendent 
project chair in particular was associated with ensuring commitment to the project 
from the senior staff of other agencies. The project information manager stated in 
February 2003 for example that ‘.. .in the early days probation and housing were 
looking to withdraw from MMAGS completely and would have done so had it not 
been for [the Chair’s] persistence ’.
However, after initially facilitating the set-up of the project, the role that senior 
management played in shaping the implementation of the project changed. The 
attendance of senior representatives at the steering group meetings became more 
variable. The deputy chief executive, for example, commented in March 2003 ‘.. .1 
think it is fair to say that attendance hasn’t been as strong as it should be and I  
include myself it that'. The original senior level commitment to the project aims and 
inter-agency working appeared to sway as the realities of implementing the project 
became apparent. For example, the education manager remarked in September 2001 
that the move to implementation has tested the willingness o f the agencies to 
engage and highlighted problems o f governance o f the scheme ’.
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The practitioners working on the project certainly thought that the steering group was 
important for facilitating implementation of the project over-time and they felt that 
communication between the steering group members and the practitioner team was 
poor. They were concerned that implementation problems were not being resolved 
and the steering group was not setting the project agenda as a result. This is indicated 
by the following quotes:
The manager’s group hasn’t happened at all. The problem has been that there is three 
competing groups of opinion. There’s policy making decisions at the top, the steering 
group, there’s the day to day management decisions that are being made by the 
manager’s group, there’s the practice issues with the practitioner’s group. All three 
conflict. While you can get a certain amount of balance between the steering group 
and the practitioners group, as soon as you bring in the managers group you create a 
three way argument.
Information manager, February 2003
There always has been the issue where they [the steering group] are over there and we 
are over here. And I think the information is fed down instead of being fed up. 
Education practitioner, October 2002
They [the board] are just there in terms of structural sense. They attend one or two 
meetings. Maybe that’s unfair but it’s what I think.
Probation service practitioner, February 2003
What’s important is that there is a strong connection between the practitioners group 
and the steering group... I think that it would have benefited if my group [the steering 
group] and that group met from time to time on a formal basis 
Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council, March 2003
Resources
It has been seen that for top-down analysts, resources available to fund a new 
programme or project are important in analysing and understanding the 
implementation of new programmes and projects (Mountjoy and O’Toole, 1979; 
Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Project resources are actually conceived in a fairly wide
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sense. Top-down analysis of implementation is concerned with resources in a wider 
sense than the availability of money. They are referring to capacity to implement new 
programmes and projects. As well as funds, especially important are the availability 
and ability of staff and appropriate equipment. In the context of problem-oriented 
policing the analytic capacity to understand problems is also important. The role that 
these issues played in shaping the implementation of the Cambridge and Manchester 
projects are discussed in the next sections.
Financial capacity to implement the projects
In general terms, the grant funds from the Crime Reduction Programme facilitated the 
implementation of both of the projects. As Scott (2006) pointed out it is common for 
problem-oriented projects to be reliant on grant funding as mainstream resources are 
often already allocated. If it had not been for the grant funding it is unlikely that these 
two projects would have been implemented at all. The main issue concerning the role 
that financial resources played in the implementation of the two projects was the 
match between the project scope, the timescales and proposed resources which is a 
particular concern of top-down analysts (e.g. Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
In the Cambridge project there was a match between the project scope and the 
resources available. The Cambridge project received £167,000 in September 2000. 
This was sufficient to cover the costs of the proposed situation measures, the 
registration schemes and the project manager’s salary for the period. The costs of the 
enforcement interventions were being covered by the police service.
In Manchester there was not a match between the plans, timescales and resources 
available, limiting what could realistically be achieved. The Manchester project 
received £500,000 in May 2001 which had to be spent by September 2002. The 
money was spent wholly on the wages of the seconded staff. Chapter five 
demonstrates that the Manchester project had transformed into a highly ambitious 
programme, with 31 broad interventions planned, many of which aimed to tackle 
difficult social and economic issues. Many of the practitioners working on the project 
discussed the project in terms of a ten-to fifteen-year strategy. However, funding had 
been secured for 18 months only and long-term mainstreaming plans had not been 
agreed. As this quote from an interview with the project manager in March 2003
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indicates, ‘ ...everyone is happy to say that it’s a ten to fifteen year strategy but the 
reality is that there is still no long-term financial plan for it’. Later in the same 
interview the project manager noted that the project was over-ambitious for its time- 
scale and available resources:
[Named individual] is responsible for Communities Against Drugs and 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund money and he said that there are two classic errors 
that people make in projects. Firstly, people always underestimate the length of time 
it will take to achieve their objectives, they always overestimate how much they will 
achieve in a given time. He was right in relation to MMAGS on both counts. My 
expectations in future would be different.
Indeed, by the end of the study, there was general feeling that the plans were too 
ambitious for the money available. One of the education board members, for example, 
stated in March 2003 ‘. . .I  think the work plan was over ambitious in the first place. 
There was an awful lot o f things that people were committed to doing’.
Capacity of staff
The availability, ability and suitability of staff influenced the implementation of both 
of the projects. The previous chapter detailed the staffing arrangements for the 
Cambridge project. The Cambridge project recruited one full-time member staff who 
took up the post in September 2000. Interviews showed that the project manager in 
Cambridge was widely considered to have some of the skills and experience to 
facilitate the implementation of this project but not all. His general enthusiasm and 
contacts within the cycling community in Cambridge were considered to be very 
useful for implementing the project ‘...the project manager’s knowledge and contacts 
were extremely usefuV (police officer, spring 2002).
However, as was set out in chapter five, although the building elements of the project 
were implemented in the Cambridge project, they were implemented late. The 
delivery of the indoor high security cycle park was especially late. The main reason 
for this was the project manager’s lack of experience of contracting work and 
overseeing building work in the context of a local authority. A member of the council 
for example, noted that:
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It would have been better to have had someone who was experienced in working in a 
local authority setting to speed things up. [The project manager] did not know the 
procedures or who to speak to.
Head of planning services for Cambridge City Council, spring 2002
The project manager had no experience of the processes and procedures that needed 
to be followed to get permission for contract building works in Cambridge. In 
particular, he did not understand the need for and had no experience of implementing 
the processes of competitive tendering for building works. As a result this was not 
attended to until quite late in the project’s timetable and led to the delays that that 
have been described. The procurement manager from Cambridge Council for 
example, noted in spring 2002 that '... early involvement [of procurement] is vital to 
avoid delays to the project, especially i f  they involve large sums o f money’.
As with the Cambridge project, the capacity of the staff was considered to have an 
impact on the delivery of the Manchester project. Two project managers were 
employed over the duration of the Manchester project. Concerns were raised that the 
first Manchester project manager did not have the appropriate management skills to 
orient the staff to deliver the project interventions. As was set out in chapter five, 
Greater Manchester Police recruited the original project manager in May 2001. He 
was of chief inspector rank and was recruited from open competition within the police 
service. Generally, his approach was to attempt to facilitate the implementation of the 
project through allowing the practitioners time to find their feet in the new 
environment that they were working in, to try to develop a common culture and 
understanding of project aims and to generally bond as a team. The original project 
manager stated in December 2001 ‘...perhaps we could have imposed more o f a 
structure on the group but at the same time I  wanted to give them ownership to 
develop their own id e a s This approach to the management of the group was certainly 
welcomed by some of the members of the practitioner team. For example, one of the 
education practitioners stated in February 2003, ‘ .. .[the original project manager] 
recognised that each agency worked in a particular way, which we ve all had to do. 
He tried to make sure everything was done in a multi-agency way and to take on 
board different perspectives'.
158
However, as the project unfolded the original project manager was considered not to 
have some of the management skills necessary to keep the disparate team together, to 
hold practitioners to account and to implement the project interventions. The 
following quote from the deputy chief executive of Manchester City Council in March 
2003 demonstrates:
We’ve had difficulties ... there were difficulties moving from the research phase to 
the delivery phase. There were difficulties between GMP and [the project 
implementation manager]. [The original project manager] didn’t tackle the issues. We 
now have someone in [the second project manager] who has more about him in terms 
of management experience.
In contrast to the Cambridge project, the Manchester project involved a fairly large 
number of staff from different agencies (set out in chapter five). Following the 
recruitment of the project manager, these agencies seconded members of staff to the 
project and their salaries were paid for from project funds. This inter-agency 
arrangement was clearly considered by those working on the project to have 
facilitated the implementation of the project in some respects. The project was able to 
access resources more quickly than would otherwise have been the case and could 
provide a range of specialisms that would not have been immediately available to one 
agency alone. The probation officer remarked in June 2002, for example, ‘[an 
advantage of the project was] access to multi-agency resources -  that would 
otherwise have taken a long time. ’
However, the seconded staff arrangement created a number of significant problems 
related to the capacity of staff to work in an inter-agency setting, their motivation to 
do so and their ability to effectively implement interventions and these all shaped 
patterns of implementation. One early issue was the identification of capable staff by 
the home agencies. There was some feeling amongst the project implementation team 
that some agencies had used the secondments as an opportunity to move problematic 
staff members and that these staff did not have the appropriate skills to work 
effectively on this project. The project information manager in February 2003 for 
example, stated that ‘... other agencies appear to have palmed off onto us people they
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didn’t want working with them at the time \ And the project manager in June 2002 
stated that ‘...some appointments were less than ideal. [The youth worker] was 
appointed by [the youth offending team] but not really part o f it, [the probation 
worker] was offloaded by probation! ’
The implementation of the Manchester project also appeared to be influenced by the 
motivation of some of the staff. Concerns were raised that the project might have 
attracted people motivated by their own agendas rather than by commitment to the 
project aims. Some individuals saw the Manchester project as a means to further their 
careers, probably because it was addressing such an exciting, high profile and 
important problem. One of the education managers, for example, stated in February 
2003 thati ...by definition you are going to get interesting characters in a project like 
this. You are not going to attract run o f the mill types. You are going to attract people 
who are into rocking boats \ This resonated with comments from some of the 
practitioners as well:
They want to be associated with it because of what it is, rather than being committed 
to putting in the work to make it work for young people. MMAGS is quite high 
profile, sounds good, is a bit glamorous in some ways. But the bottom line is that 
there is a lot of work to be done in the community with the youngsters. But whether 
you would find this out at interview I don’t know. You don’t know until someone is 
working.
Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003
I think [the project implementation manager] sees the project as a spring board for his 
next job. I think he is going to try and use it to get to co-ordinate all this kind of work 
in Manchester permanently.
Youth services practitioner, January 2002
The implementation of the project was influenced by the ability and suitability of a 
number of members of staff recruited onto the project. In particular, the project 
implementation manager was widely perceived to have been the cause of time- 
consuming problems. Through his behaviour and his approach to working with others, 
the project implementation manager upset key individuals within agencies whose
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support was required to implement elements of the project. This had an impact on 
their willingness to engage with the project and on their views of it. For example, the 
probation manager discussed some of the problems that his behaviour caused the 
probation service:
My relationship with [the police chief superintendent and the deputy chief executive] 
is the only reason why we remained involved in the project following the behaviour 
of [the project implementation manager]. It tainted how I thought about how the 
project would go. I have to convince myself that it was worth staying involved 
despite the involvement of [the project implementation manager] I have to fight 
against losing enthusiasm for the project.
Probation manager, August 2001
Those working on the project suggested in interview that, at times, the project 
implementation manager’s inappropriate behaviour was the result of not 
understanding how agencies worked and in particular not understanding the nature of 
working in an inter-agency environment and because he did not have the skills 
required for his role. A probation service manager remarking in January 2002 for 
example, ‘. . .[the project implementation manager] is a bad influence for the dynamics 
between the practitioners. He doesn't understand the niceties o f how professionals 
work. I  don't think that he accepts that [the probation officer] is the best person to 
judge how the probation angle o f the project is approached and implemented. I  think 
that i f  we have a project implementation manager it should come with a job spec and 
a person spec. '
Managers in the youth offending team in September 2001 noted that:
[The project implementation manager] has a habit of snapping at people’s heels 
which is not the way to behave in a multi-agency setting. He does not understand the 
concerns and considerations of the agencies and practitioners involved in the project.
Perhaps because of his lack of experience of working within this kind of multi-agency 
setting, the project implementation manager created difficult time-consuming 
distractions from the implementation of the project interventions. The project
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manager remarked in June 2002, for example, *... [the project implementation 
manager] was difficult to handle. We inherited him and he wasn’t ideal A lot o f time 
was spent checking up on him and making sure he didn’t do anything s tu p id More 
generally, concerns were raised about whether he had the skills and experience to do 
his job effectively. The Youth Offending Team managers stated in September 2001:
[The project implementation manager] has set the tone but there are serious concerns 
about his ability as implementation manager. This is a serious concern. I would like 
to see a person who is cool and objective when dealing with serious offenders but he 
seems to think it is all a bit of a game and gets over excited.
Staff turnover also had an impact on the nature of the implementation of the 
Manchester project. This was not evident in the Cambridge project. In December 
2001 one of the secondees was sacked in relation to an earlier criminal conviction 
that, whilst disclosed at the time of application, ultimately meant that he could not 
work for one of the multi-agency teams. There was a strong feeling amongst the 
practitioner group that this sacking was unfair and this influenced the delivery of the 
project as they felt that it went against the supportive and rehabilitative nature of the 
project:
A slap in the face for the idea of rehabilitation. The project is about re-engaging and 
rehabilitation, how does this fit? It is hypocritical and undermines the legitimacy of 
the project. How does it look to the young men with criminal records that we are 
trying to engage? It sends out the message that there is no point re-engaging with 
mainstream activity because once you have a record it is hard to get employment. 
That needs to be addressed urgently before it undermines the project.
Youth services practitioner, January 2002
There is a problem of reconciling sacking of [the seconded worker] with the aims of 
the project as it could have an impact on how the project is seen in the community. It 
has certainly has had an impact on the staff.
Probation manager, January 2002
As such, a lot of time was spent discussing this issue and it ultimately served to 
reinforce the move from the original enforcement focus of the project to the ultimate
162
rehabilitative and supportive focus of the project. This issue is discussed in more 
detail in chapter seven.
The decision not to renew the contract of the implementation manager was made at 
the steering group meeting held on 9 May 2002. Although this individual was the 
cause of ongoing concern there were some mixed feelings when he left. Concerns 
were raised that some of the work would not get done and that momentum for the 
project would be affected:
He was the engine of the car and when he went the car stopped and its chugging 
along very slowly now.
Education worker, March 2003
A key individual is [the project implementation manager] well, in as much as he was 
the one who had all the information. There was a lot of baggage with [the project 
implementation manager] that meant he couldn’t really feature in the next phase that 
went through though.
Head teacher, March 2003
The two original outreach workers left in June 2002 after the decision was made at the 
9 May 2002 board meeting to re-advertise their jobs. This impacted on the 
implementation of the project because it reduced the capacity of the practitioner team 
as stated by an education practitioner in February 2003 the problem was the 
outreach workers would have come and done that with me \
The original project manager left in August 2002 and was replaced in September 
2002. This replacement was associated with a change in the project management style 
‘... [the original project manager] is completely different to [the replacement]. [The 
original] was laid back and [the replacement] is structure' (Youth Offending Team 
practitioner, February 2003). There were mixed views about the change in the project 
manager and the impact that it had on the style of project management and the 
implementation of the project. This issue is discussed in more detail in the sections on 
project management.
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Capacity to understand problems
Capacity to understand problems is important for the development of problem- 
oriented responses. Capacity to understand problems is related to both the presence of 
staff with the ability and skills to analyse data and the availability of high quality data 
on which to base those analyses. As has been seen, in both the Manchester and 
Cambridge projects, problem analysis was conducted by professional researchers so 
the former was less of an issue. However, the latter issue remained, especially in 
Manchester, and, as has been set out in chapters two and three, the availability of high 
quality data is essential for the development of problem-oriented projects.
Analysis of the Cambridge project proposals showed that the data required to quantify 
the problem of cycle were available. As set out in chapter five, project documents 
show that police recorded crime data for a number of years were used to describe the 
size of the problem and to make estimates of its cost in Cambridge. These recorded 
crime data were used to provide detailed hotspot analysis (outlined in the previous 
chapter). Recorded crime data were also used to provide information about the 
victims of cycle crime although these were limited to information on age and gender. 
No quantifiable data were provided on the number of, or the characteristics of, 
offenders. In terms of development of understanding of the problem, the proposal 
drew on less evidence and inferred more. Quantifiable data were available on bicycle 
stand usage and security, though limited to one count in 1999. Data were also 
available on the numbers of bicycles being used in Cambridge over a specific period 
of time. It was also suggested that the high levels of cycle theft were related to the 
high numbers of students who used cycles as a primary form of transport although no 
evidence to corroborate this was provided. The proposal explained the vulnerability of 
particular victims in terms of the careless attitudes of young people towards their 
possessions and generally that cycle theft was part of life in Cambridge. Similarly 
suggestions were made about the types of bicycle thieves operating in Cambridge but 
again no evidence was provided to back up these observations. Box 6.1 below 
summarises the sources of data used and problem understanding in the Cambridge 
project.
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Box 6.1: Summary of data sources used and problem understanding in the 
Cambridge project
Problem
analysis
Quantifiable
evidence
provided
Evidence
Size of the 
problem
Yes • Proportion of cycle crime compared to all 
recorded crime in Cambridge
• Figures to show increase in cycle crime
• Estimates of costs
Location of the 
problem
Yes • Recorded crime data at basic command unit, 
postcode and street level for two years
Victim Yes • Age of victim over two years
• Gender of victims over two years
Offender No
Problem
understanding
Location of 
problem
Yes • Data on levels of bicycle usage from the city 
council
• Numbers of and use of secure cycle stands 
from the Cambridge cycling campaign
Victim
characteristics
No
Offender
characteristics
No
Box 6.1 then, shows that quantifiable data were available to describe the size of the 
problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge, the locations of the problem and details about 
the victims. Data were not available to quantifiably describe the offenders. In terms of 
developing understanding of the nature of the problem of cycle theft however, 
quantifiable data were only available in respect to the locations where the problems
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occurred (rather than in respect to the victims and offenders) although judgements 
were provided.
In contrast, in Manchester a lack of available data presented considerable difficulties 
for the problem analysis stage of the project although aspects of the problem were 
ultimately described. Many problems were observed in accessing data to conduct the 
problem analysis for the Manchester project.
First, delays were experienced gaining access to data for the problem analysis. Greater 
Manchester Police’s intelligence bureau for example, provided little information and 
provided it too late to make use of it. The IT department just did not appear to be able 
to make data sets available for problem analysis.
Second, data protection legislation, as it was interpreted by practitioners at the time, 
inhibited data sharing for the purpose of analysing problems. Data were only provided 
to the research team after extensive negotiations and with express agreement from the 
Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police. The only individual level data 
available from external agencies were those provided by the social services and from 
the Youth Offending Teams in Manchester. The local education authority promised 
to provide data but in the long run did not deliver and the probation service refused 
access to individual data stating that data protection legislation did not allow it, 
though they did offer to provide aggregate level data compiled by their own staff, if it 
was paid for. Data were neither promised nor received from the health authorities or 
trusts.
Third, Greater Manchester Police did not have the systems that allow information to 
be readily extracted and used for the purpose of crime analysis. It was not possible for 
varying data sources to be amalgamated readily and data could not be easily exported 
into flexible analytic packages such as Microsoft Excel or SPSS. Data could not 
therefore be readily extracted and analysed for the research stage of this project. 
GMPICs (Greater Manchester Police’s day-to-day system for recording detailed 
information on crimes and incidents) held large volumes of potentially useful 
information relating to individuals and events, but did not lend itself to aggregate 
extraction for systematic analysis. For example, GMPICs could not be used for
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aggregate analysis from user terminals. The prevalence of variable length fields stored 
in a non-tabular programme further diminished the possibility for data integration. 
Aggregate extraction could only be done by central IT staff who had access to the 
mainframe. Transfers of data could only be done manually because a cut-and-paste 
function was not available. The difficulties of manipulating GMPICs data for the 
purposes of the problem analysis stage of this project were considerable. In the event, 
the civilian research assistants in Manchester manually compiled two data sets from 
GMPICs. One contained information on 400 individuals and the other on 200 
shooting events. This was extremely time-consuming.
Fourth, looking for long term problems and patterns also requires data sets that are 
available over several years. Calls for service can be important in providing a measure 
of the volume and distribution of public demand on the police service. In Manchester 
it proved very difficult to produce such a data set. It was necessary to look to the 
training school for the data, which seemed to be the only place within Greater 
Manchester Police that kept historical data sets. In any case it proved possible only to 
go back to May 1998, and even here there were problems with the data including 
missing whole months and much coded to 1900: a problem that did not seem to be 
explicable by reference to millennium bugs. It became clear that problem analysis was 
not going to be possible using long-term incident data as this information was not 
readily available and where it was, errors had crept in.
Fifth, even when data were received there were problems with the quality of data 
entry. In the police-recorded crime data set, some data fields were completed patchily. 
For example, incident data for premises was completed in only 40 per cent of cases so 
it was not possible to know what kind of locations were generating problems. For 
crime in relation to the victim, no age estimate was given in a third of cases, no 
gender in a quarter and no ethnicity in over two-fifths. Of course, many of these 
would have been crimes for which no person would be identified as a victim (e.g. in 
many cases of shop theft). Nevertheless, in about one in eight of the cases where one 
attribute of a victim was stated (age, gender, ethnicity) one or more of the others was 
not. Additionally, in relation to age, the use of age bands made some types of analysis 
difficult. More generally, aggregate analysis requires that fields are entered 
consistently. There were many examples where this had not happened. Most
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conspicuously, time course analysis was inhibited through alterations in the categories 
used to classify events. Changes in Home Office counting rules appeared to have been 
one source of discontinuity but they might not have been the only one.
Lastly, it was not actually clear that data were used in practice to inform the responses 
in Manchester. As has been described, the original strategy was based on the Boston 
Gun Project model which was proposed by Bullock and Tilley but subsequently 
developed and altered by the project implementation team and the practitioners. It was 
much less clear that the original research (or indeed any other evidence) guided the 
changing shape of the project and in any case there were varying opinions amongst 
the practitioner team and the managers about the usefulness of the research in the 
subsequent development and implementation of the project:
I was a little disappointed with the research paper. I already knew the results and a lot
of people who worked in the area did.
Chief Superintendent, July 2001
The research didn’t provide anything more than could have been guessed.
Probation manager, August 2001
The research report gave the partners an idea of the project and what they could
contribute.
Project information manager, August 2001
Nick’s research gave the theoretical foundation.
Education board members, August 2001
The research phase was very interesting and important.
Youth Offending Team managers, September 2001
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Box 6.2: Summary of data difficulties in Manchester
Issue Examples
Data collection • Data fields patchily 
completed
• Missing data on key attributes 
of victims
• Premises type completed in 
40% of cases, makes it 
difficult to know what kinds 
of places are generating 
problems
• Age bands rather than actual 
ages
Data
transmission
• Data provided too late to be 
useful for the analysis within 
the time frame available
• Results in delays
Data recording • Inconsistency of data entry • In this case especially 
changes in the recording 
system
Data storage • Availability of data sets over 
a number of years
• Very difficult to reconstruct 
data bases
• Many inaccuracies
• Date of incidents wrong in 
many cases
Data extraction • Incompatibility of police 
databases with those used for 
standard analysis
• Could not extract from one 
system to another except 
manually
• Extremely time consuming
Data analysis • Focus on geographical 
information
• Analysis by victim type, 
location type, patterns of 
repeats, MO, goods stolen, 
distribution networks of 
stolen goods, routes to crime, 
locations of victims at times 
of crime etc., and 
combinations of attribute 
types appears to be rare
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Data sharing • Data protection problems
• Unwillingness to share data
• Willingness to share -  but did 
not actually provide the data
• General failure to engage 
others to give data
Organisational
issues
• Staff unavailable to provide 
data
• Much time and effort 
required to get data
Use of research • Mixed views about how 
useful the research was
• Not clear that it was used by 
the project to develop 
strategy
Project theory and objectives
It has been seen that for top-down analysts, a project or programme must be based on 
a valid theory of cause and effect to have a chance of being successful (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984). Key to understanding implementation is an assessment of whether the 
mechanisms through which the project was supposed to work were valid. Crime 
reduction projects and programmes typically contain latent assumptions about how 
they are supposed to exert change in practice and result in reductions in crime (Tilley, 
2005). Indeed, neither the Cambridge nor Manchester projects set out explicitly how 
the project was going to impact on crime. However, both contained implicit 
assumptions about how the project was going to exert change and reduce the targeted 
problems. The role played by the project theory and objectives in shaping the 
implementation of the projects are examined in the following sections.
In Cambridge, an examination of the project documents suggested that the proposed 
responses were grounded in the analysis of and explanations for the high levels of 
bicycle crime in the city. The analysis of the problem itself was set out around key 
elements of situational crime prevention theories. In particular, it focused around 
aspects of routine activity theory based on features of the victim, offender and 
location (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 1987). First, as set out in chapter five, 
analysis of patterns of bicycle theft showed that particular locations in Cambridge city 
centre were associated with high levels of thefts. These locations had high levels of
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bicycle usage, low levels of secure parking and high levels of cycle theft was the 
result. The proposed response was to attend to features of those locations that were 
considered to make them vulnerable: specifically the provision of more secure bicycle 
racks of appropriate quality. Second, the project proposals suggest that some people 
were at higher risk of victimisation than others, in particular students who were 
considered to be lax in their attitudes to security. Publicity, warnings and property 
marking schemes aimed to attend to this. Third, the proposal discussed three different 
types of offenders motivated by different factors. As such the project aimed to deter 
these differently motivated offenders. For example, it was planned that opportunistic 
offenders would be deterred through better security for cycles and prolific thieves 
would be tackled though the activity of a proactive policing squad. In Cambridge 
then, the proposed responses appeared to be relevant, based on analysis and linked to 
well-established situational crime reduction theory, which in turn is based on a strong 
empirical evidence base (Tilley and Laycock, 2002).
Whilst not explicitly set out, the crime prevention mechanisms of the project were to 
exert change as follows. First, enforcement-based interventions were to be established 
in the form of a small dedicated squad of officers who would target prolific offenders. 
This would work through either increasing the offender’s perceived risk of stealing 
cycles and deter him/her from doing so or would incapacitate bicycle thieves through 
arrest and detention. Second, victim focused interventions were conceived in terms of 
introducing a registration scheme and providing publicity about the risks of bicycle 
theft in order to reduce risky behaviour by a vulnerable group. Third, elements of the 
physical location that were contributing to cycle thefts would be attended to through 
the implementation of more and better quality bicycle stands, the replacement of older 
unsuitable ones and through the provision of a high security indoor cycle park. This 
would increase the risk of detection and the outcome would be reductions in crime.
The situation was somewhat different in the Manchester project. It has already been 
seen that the original strategy drawn up by Bullock and Tilley was based on the 
successful initiative implemented in Boston, Massachusetts. Whilst projects cannot be 
fully replicated, the idea in the Manchester project was to experiment with those ideas 
that had been shown to be successful in reducing shooting in Boston. In doing so the 
aim was to focus on reducing shootings through attending to the immediate situational
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context in which they occurred. However, in this project detailed tactical planning had 
been left for the project implementation team. The implementation team developed 
plans for responses which were focused much more generally on tackling gang 
membership as a means of reducing the shootings. Through doing so the project was 
removed from its roots in the successful Boston initiative. As set out in chapter five 
the Manchester project was conceived in terms of a wide range of social interventions 
aimed at tackling the ‘root causes’ of gang membership, as this quote from the project 
manager in September 2001 indicated:
[the aim of the project is] to look at the soeio-economic conditions disposing people 
to become involved and change the conditions so that they behave differently. Get 
them to see other choices and make them.
Ultimately, at the heart of the Manchester project was a series of wrap around services 
targeted at specific individuals perceived to be at risk of joining gangs or who were 
already in gangs. The project aimed to offer these individuals the support and services 
that the practitioners felt would divert them from joining gangs in the first place or 
facilitate their exit. In doing so, the numbers of shootings would be reduced.
The project theory shifted and this shift is important in explaining the nature of the 
patterns of implementation of this project. The Boston project had shown, counter­
intuitively, that it is not necessary to tackle the underlying causes of shootings (which 
are often deep-rooted social, economic and psychological problems) to effectively 
impact on the problem of shootings. It is not being suggested that the focus on social 
interventions as a means of addressing gang-related problems in Manchester was 
wrong or somehow misguided. However, it was much less clear how the cause and 
effect mechanisms were going to work in the amended project, especially in the short 
term. In addition, there was limited empirical evidence about effective means of 
dealing with gang-related problems which the project could draw on. Therefore, it 
was much less clear that the project theory was likely to be effective.
Related is the issue of project objectives. It has been seen that setting clear objectives 
is important for top-down approaches to implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973). Setting clear objectives is important because if they are not uniquely described
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then neither is the means through which they are to be achieved in practice. Chapter
five set out the Cambridge project aims, which were:
• to reduce the number of cycle thefts in Cambridge city centre by five to ten per 
cent (using a 1998/1999 base line);
• to reduce the number of cycle thefts from students by 20 per cent (using a 
1998/1999 base line); and,
• to increase the number of detections by 10 per cent (using a 1998/1999 base line).
In addition this project contained specific objectives:
• to trial different types of secure cycle parking racks to determine which were the 
most user-friendly and secure and appropriate for different locations in 
Cambridge;
• to provide a secure cycle park in the basement of Park Street car park;
• to determine additional locations throughout the city for installing secure cycle
racking;
• to install extra racks and replace inadequate existing racking;
• to set up a comprehensive and consistent university wide cycle registration
scheme and include publicity about racks;
• to use a black, fluorescent ‘police warning’ campaign to warn cyclists of theft 
problems;
• to set up a cycle squad of two police constables to proactively target prolific 
offenders;
• to measure the change in securely parked cycles in a pre-defined city centre 
location;
• to determine current figures of under reporting of cycle theft in Cambridge city; 
and,
• to work out what measures effectively reduce cycle crime.
These objectives are well stated and it is clear what the project was trying to achieve.
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In contrast the Manchester project ‘mission’ was broader and vaguer: to enforce the 
law through multi-agency targeted crackdowns; to deter young people from entering 
into a gang/gun culture and divert them towards alternatives; to provide support to 
young people and families who are most vulnerable; to secure the conviction and/or 
rehabilitation of gang-involved offenders; to reduce the incidence of death and injury 
to young people and the wider impact of gangs on the community; and, to create an 
environment for commercial investment. In addition, the thirty-one planned 
interventions set out in chapter five were extremely ambitious and wide-ranging. It 
has been seen that top-down analysts argue that it is common for project objectives to 
be vague and ambitious. This influences implementation because where objectives are 
not clearly defined it is less likely that guidance about how to meet those objectives 
will be well set out (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The role played by guidance in 
shaping the two projects is set out in the following sections.
Project guidance
Project guidance is different from project theory. Project theory is about the 
underlying mechanisms through which a project is supposed to work. The project 
guidance is about how to implement the various interventions that a project plans to 
deliver. It has been shown that for top-downers, the provision of adequate guidance is 
a key factor that explains the implementation (or otherwise) of projects (Mountjoy 
and O’Toole, 1981).
The provision of guidance played a role in shaping the nature of implementation of 
both of the projects. In the Cambridge project, detailed written guidance had already 
been developed by the community safety manager for the project manager to follow 
(see Annex three and the key mile stones were set out in the previous chapter). These 
were fairly straightforward and detailed and the project manager just completed the 
tasks that he was set to do. The project manager himself stated that ‘...Ijust followed 
the guidance...
In Manchester the issue of guidance shaped patterns of implementation in rather 
different ways. It has been seen that the main thrust of the Manchester project was the
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multi-agency group tasked to implement wrap around services for targeted individuals 
to offer the support to deter them from gang activity. However, how this was to be 
achieved in practice was not set out in detail in any strategy document. The project 
steering group had stated that the project should seek to work with 85 gang-involved 
individuals in the first instance but there was no guidance about how to identify those 
85 individuals. What compromised a ‘gang’ and ‘gang membership’ proved to be far 
from clear on the ground (as has been seen generally in much of the literature on this 
issue, see Bullock and Tilley, 2002). Determining those individuals who were in 
gangs or who were at risk of joining gangs, and hence suitable for preventative 
interventions, proved problematic in a practical sense in a number of ways and 
influenced how the project was delivered. These are discussed in the following 
sections.
First, the lack of specific guidance about how to target individuals for project 
resources meant that very many young people were considered to be at risk of joining 
a gang and therefore potentially in scope for project interventions. By the summer of 
2001, the implementation team had identified some 850 individuals deemed to be 
gang members, associates of gang members or at risk of becoming gang members in 
South Manchester. It was not going to be possible to work with all of those people 
who conceivably could have been in need of support from the project. As one of the 
board members stated in March 2003 '... my concern is that is you have a thousand 
kids, under the age o f 25, involved in gangs. To have a team, o f less than a dozen 
people working with them is just scratching the surface \
Second, there was a lack of guidance for taking referrals onto the project. Indeed, 
despite the steering group’s instruction that the project should work with 85 
individuals (at least to begin with) referrals to the project were taken fairly early on as 
awareness of the project increased amongst practitioners in Manchester more widely. 
A manager from the social services remarked in June 2002 that ‘...cases have not all 
been driven from the Wednesday meeting because people at work are realising 
MMAGS is around, they are getting in touch and asking for help'.
In some cases, young people were also effectively referring themselves to the scheme. 
For example, at a meeting observed on the 16 January 2002, a discussion was had
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about a young man called Andy. Andy clearly had strong associations with the 
Manchester gangs but had become scared of the violence and wanted to leave the 
gangs and apparently had asked a police officer whether there was help available. The 
group decided that in these circumstances it was not possible to refuse to help support 
this young man in his attempt to leave the gangs.
As has been seen, by the end of March 2003,172 individuals had been assessed for 
inclusion on the Manchester scheme. The problem was that it was far from clear how 
these increased numbers were going to be managed and the potential workload was 
spiralling:
There is no system of referral yet the project is taking referrals. If it continues in the 
same way the workers are going to be swamped with requests. As awareness is raised 
there will be more demand. We need to be clear about the aims and get the structure 
right
Probation service practitioner, June 2002
The project started off with a target list of 85. Now it is taking referrals. This has not 
been worked through. How are they going to cope with the numbers? It’s just ad hoc 
and woolly.
Social services manager, June 2002
Third, and perhaps most importantly, in the absence of specific guidance, the project 
implementation team selected individuals for interventions on variable levels of 
evidence of alleged involvement in firearm and gang-related activity. The 
implementation team themselves felt that the criteria were rather vague and that the 
process of identifying young people was not systematic. One of the project 
implementation team stated that the general guiding principles were that no one was 
to be over 26 years old, all had to be associated with South Manchester gangs and 
there was to be a mixture of young men and women.
The lack of guidance for how to target individuals caused disagreement in practice 
between practitioners about who should be included on the project. For example, 
practitioners’ meeting observed on 31 October 2001 a discussion was held about one
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young man, Martin, who was on the target list. Martin’s older brother, a well known 
gang member, was in prison at the time but was due for release. There was concern 
that on his release his influence might turn Martin towards the gangs. The education 
representative had evidence that Martin was disruptive at school but he had no 
criminal record and was not known to the police service. The outreach workers were 
adamant that Martin should not have been on the list because, they felt, he was very 
marginal to the gangs and his level of risk was no greater or less than anyone else who 
lived in the area. However, the implementation manager and the information manager 
argued that he should be included and eventually Martin was included for 
interventions on the basis of the potential disruptive influence of his brother despite 
little evidence of his increased risk levels.
The practitioners also expressed their concerns in interview regarding whether the 
right people were on the target list. A probation manager noted in January 2002 ‘...I 
am not confident that the right people are on the list’. Similarly, a practitioner from 
the housing department also in January 2002 ‘...there is some question about the 
names on the target list and whether they should be there or not, especially the girls'. 
Again from the housing practitioner in January 2002 ‘. . .I  think that they should have 
had categories o f people based on what they had been up to rather than the target 
list. ’ The outreach workers (who had once been gang members themselves) were 
particularly concerned about whether the right people were being selected for 
interventions from the project. This related especially to whether or not they were 
sufficiently involved in gangs to merit intervention:
The focus has been far too much on those on the periphery of the gangs but anyone 
who lives in [South Manchester] could be considered to be on the periphery of the 
gangs ... at the moment there are far too many people on the periphery of the gangs 
for this to be a sensible way of prioritising.
Outreach worker, November 2001
And later in the same interview:
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The focus has been on those on the periphery of the gangs ... we would prefer more 
time to be spent on those who are more involved. Targeting and strategising of the list 
is not well done.
Outreach worker, November 2001
As well as impacting on the capacity of the project and creating disagreements 
amongst the practitioners, the lack of guidance about how to target individuals for 
interventions was considered by some of the practitioners potentially to have 
implications for the young people themselves. Some project practitioners felt that it 
was important to target only those individuals who were known to be gang members 
or were at very serious risk of being involved. Their experience highlighted the stigma 
that could be associated with gang membership and possible resistance from parents 
who rejected that label being attached to their children:
Parents take a step backwards when you mention gangs. Parents deny and resist... 
because of stigma. There is greater stigma attached to gang membership than crime. 
Youth Offending Team practitioner, June 2002
There were also suggestions that the negative connotations associated with being 
labelled as a gang member could cause difficulties for young people when trying to 
access services for them from other agencies:
That’s where the project is detrimental. If you start mentioning anything to do with 
gangs then they [the schools] definitely won’t want them back. Unless they ask me 
specifics, I just say that they are at risk of being involved [in gangs] and just working 
around those issues and providing support.
Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003
Altogether then, the lack of specific guidance about how to implement the project 
interventions meant that determining who should fall within the compass of project 
intervention was contested and fraught with practical difficulties in the 
implementation of the Manchester project. This was not evident in the Cambridge 
project.
178
Compliance and project management
For top-down analysts the degree to which practitioners are marshalled to comply 
with project objectives is important in shaping the nature of implementation. It has 
been seen that top-down analysts do not deny that deviation from project aims occurs 
and that conflict plays a role in the implementation of projects but point to the need to 
control the stages of implementation to minimise deviation and conflict (Parsons, 
1999). Especially important in minimising deviation and preventing implementation 
problems is project management and setting up systems which monitor performance 
and hold practitioners to account. The following sections examine the role played by 
compliance and project management in shaping the delivery of the two projects.
Home Office management and compliance
As was seen in chapter five, the Targeted Policing Initiative did not set out specific 
instructions about how the projects should be managed locally. The central Home 
Office delegated the day-to-day management of the grants to the relevant Government 
Office for the Regions. In the event, the Regional Office played an active role in the 
delivery of neither project. The practitioners working on the project stated that the 
role of the Regional Office was limited to handling the accounting arrangements for 
the grant and receiving quarterly written updates from the project manager:
[Government office for the North West] have been helpful with the money. We just 
send a written report. They were helpful with the roll over of the money.
Project manager, Manchester, August 2001
We've not had much to do with [Government Office North West]. They came and 
visited me once. But mostly they deal with the money.
Police Chief Superintendent, Manchester, July 2001
[Government Office North West] has had nothing to do with the project and have no 
value for [the project] as far as I can see.
Deputy Chief Executive, Manchester City Council, August 2001
The government office was mostly interested in whether the money had been spent; 
they have not questioned what the money is spent on.
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fProject manager, Cambridge
Drawing on top-down conceptions of project implementation it is reasonable to infer 
that the limited checks that were placed on the projects played a role in shaping what 
was delivered. As has been seen, the Manchester project was awarded a grant to 
implement a Boston-style project aimed at reducing the situational determinants of 
shootings. The lack of external supervision and moderation enabled the practitioners 
to orient the project into something quite different from that which was originally 
agreed with the grant donor. Similarly, the Cambridge project was awarded a grant on 
the basis that the enforcement interventions would be funded locally. The lack of 
direct Home Office monitoring of the Cambridge project made it easier for the police 
management to renege on their agreement to provide resources in kind because they 
were not held to account. The lack of Home Office supervision, then, allowed the 
local managers and practitioners to alter the project interventions and priorities. This 
played a role in shaping what the projects delivered in two main ways. First, the 
interventions that the projects delivered looked different from the projects originally 
agreed; and second, not all the elements were delivered in the originally agreed time 
frame.
Arrangements for day-to-day oversight and management were left to the discretion of 
local managers. The following sections describe the role played by the local project 
management in shaping what the projects delivered.
Co-ordination, administration and accountability in the Cambridge project
As was set out in chapter five, the Cambridge project recruited one practitioner who 
was based at Cambridge city police station and managed by a police inspector within 
the community safety team. It has already been shown that as the project unfolded, the 
senior police management withdrew their support for the enforcement elements of this 
project and the remaining interventions were mainly situational in nature. With the 
benefit of hindsight it was generally felt by those working on the project that this 
management arrangement was not the most appropriate and this had an impact on the 
nature of the implementation of the project. In particular, it was felt that the delays 
that befell this project might have been avoided if the project manager had been
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housed within and managed by the council where expertise in building projects was to 
be found. The head of planning services for Cambridge City Council remarked ‘...if 
you want to build things it would be better to have someone with experience o f that... 
it was a mistake to leave things in the hands o f the police who are not experts in 
building. ’ Apart from this, however, as has been seen, the project manager followed 
the project guidance to implement the project in Cambridge in a largely 
unproblematic manner.
In the Manchester project the structure and management for the project was very 
much more complicated than in the Cambridge. Because of their complexity, these 
will be discussed in some detail in the sections below.
Co-ordination, administration and accountability in the Manchester project
Early co-ordination and administration of the Manchester project was considered to 
be poor and this caused frustration amongst the practitioner team:
Communication, administration and organisation have been poor and this has not 
been well received.
Project manager, June 2002
Information and particularly data are not being distributed by the implementation 
team and there is no explanation why not. I am chasing things up a lot.
Youth services practitioner, January 2002
The poor administration and co-ordination created time consuming delays and 
resulted in concerns about the accountability of the project. These problems were 
created by a number of interrelated problems.
First, there was no single standardised management system for documenting 
information about those individuals targeted for project interventions or co-ordinating 
and monitoring the delivery of interventions and the activities of practitioners in order 
to hold the practitioners and ultimately the project to account:
I
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When I started I found a project that was quite poorly run and it didn’t have systems 
in place to manage the workload of anybody. It didn’t have any systematic method of 
capturing the data needed to make an informed judgement on each individual.. ..there 
was no system at all in place to ensure that the work was being carried out, was the 
right work, at the right time and with the right people and was having the right sort of 
evaluation about its effectiveness.
Project manager, March 2003
This made it difficult for the project manager to monitor what had been implemented 
and its subsequent impact, if any. Second, there were no case files on those 
individuals that the project was working with which resulted in concerns about 
whether interventions with individuals and families were being properly implemented, 
followed through and reviewed. A housing practitioner commented in June 2002 that 
‘...the lack o f case flies is a problem. There is no feedback. For practitioners, it is 
really important that there are case files \ A similar concern was noted by a 
representative of the Youth Offending Team in June 2002 that '... it sometimes seems 
that things are done in an ad hoc way with no follow through. Cases get lost without 
tracking and then new cases crop up ’. This issue was also highlighted by the manager 
of the Youth Offending Team who thought that some of the problems regarding the 
case files might have resulted because the police service did not work with families in 
this way:
The actions aren’t based on ‘this is best practice.’ It’s based on ‘this is a problem, 
how do we fix it’. When it comes to assessment, review, planning, evaluation that’s 
what agencies like probation, social services and the [the youth offending team] do as 
our daily work. I don’t think that’s what the police do on a case-by-case basis. They 
do it in management and in terms of project management but they don’t do it with 
individuals and with families. When I see the minutes that’s what I see that’s missing. 
It’s that assessment, planning and reviewing and how you change the plans after a 
review, how you modify things and how you make your decisions around that.
Youth Offending Team manager, March 2003
This concern about lack of follow up and monitoring of the interventions was also 
evident in the meeting minutes. For example, on 6 February 2002 the minutes stated
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that ‘...concerns were raised about the lack o f continuity with cases and in particular, 
with [name of family] ’.
Third, there was no standardised project risk assessment criteria and so the 
practitioners all used the different ones that were provided by their home agencies. 
This caused practical concerns about the safety of the staff as quite clearly they were 
working with a difficult and potentially dangerous client group. In spring 2002 a 
practitioner noted the gaps in provision in this area ‘...there are gaps relating to 
confidentiality and health and safety risks. [We] still haven ’t got an assessment tool to 
do the job \ This was also illustrated by a comment made by the probation manager in 
January 2002:
I am not happy with MMAGS risk assessment. That’s not to say that they should use 
the probation one. But at the moment, the priority of the information is skewed. I’d 
hoped it would evolve over time but this has not happened. I am also concerned about 
how it is used practically. Why is the information not given out in advance? It should 
be compiled jointly and should be a living model. I am not sure that this is the case.
Fourth, monitoring and co-ordinating the disparate team was difficult and they were 
not physically located together. Whilst responsible for the day-to-day activities of the 
practitioner team, the activities of the practitioners were not directly visible to the 
project manager. This was compounded by a series of communication and IT 
problems. The practitioners had differential access to computers and email systems 
and, even where they had access, the systems were not always compatible. 
Observations of the meetings illustrated some of the problems that this was causing in 
practice. For example, at a board meeting observed on 1 March 2002 problems caused 
by differing IT systems were discussed. The steering group discussed the problems 
that were being caused when the communications sent out by the implementation 
team based at the police station by email could not be read by staff working in 
Manchester City Council because they used different and incompatible systems. This 
impacted on the implementation of the project because it made day-to-day 
administration much harder. For example, distributing the agendas for meetings and 
associated minutes, project documents and instructions and so on became time-
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consuming and led to practitioners becoming frustrated where they did not receive 
information about issues related to the project in a timely manner.
It was felt by some of those working on the project that these problems were 
aggravated because members of the practitioner group were not housed in the same 
place, especially in terms of identifying and addressing issues more quickly. The 
housing practitioner for example, stated in June 2002 that '... it would have been a 
good idea to have the practitioners together under one roof at least for some o f the 
time. ’ Similarly the project manager in December 2001 stated that:
Some of the issues have arisen because all the agencies are all in different places. It 
would be easier to manage if they were all together.. .Some issues would have been 
addressed more quickly if they were all housed in the same place. But there is a trade 
off because line management is being provided by the home agencies.
Fifth, there were a series of practical information sharing problems. As has been 
mentioned, the project had no joint system for sharing information that could be 
accessed by all those working on the project. This meant that information had to be 
extracted from different agency records and reproduced at the weekly meetings and 
discussed there. The process was time-consuming and considered by some working 
on the project to be wasteful. In interview in March 2003 the project manager 
highlighted the problems that it caused in the following quote:
The main problems have been in terms of information exchange, through the lack of a 
joined up system. We are totally reliant on people to come together for a three hour 
period each week, share a massive amount of information, having briefed themselves 
on what they are likely to be asked and then go away and do their bit... What we 
need is a joined up system whereby each individual can have access to one common 
data base which imports information from all those others held within those agencies. 
That’s the single biggest failure within this project. It’s frustrating for everybody 
involved.
The actual process of information sharing also had an impact on the nature of the 
implementation of the project. In particular, the different agencies had different 
approaches to sharing information about those individuals that the project was
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working with. Some of the agencies represented on the project were thought to be 
historically reluctant to share information with the police service ‘...the social 
services, education and probation do not typically share information with the police 
and are not happy to do so and would prefer not to know...'’ (Youth Offending Team 
managers, September 2001). On the other hand, the police service, which was widely 
considered to have access to important information on target individuals, was judged 
to be slow and unsystematic in their approach to sharing those data by some working 
on the project, as demonstrated in the following two quotes:
Information about individuals hasn’t been forthcoming. [We] can’t easily get much 
out of GMP. They don’t always record the relevant information. There have also 
been problems with information sharing. Where information is passed from the 
police, it is passed too slowly. There are also general problems with gleaning 
information. The neighbours don’t always know what is going on for example. [The 
information manager] knows a lot about people on the target list but doesn’t always 
write it down.
Housing practitioner, January 2002
GMP are not about sharing information. They are about gathering information. But 
when it comes to feeding back he [the project information manager] thinks just tell 
them on a need to know basis. It can be a bit disjointed.
Education practitioner, February 2003
Because of the lack of standardised information systems and poor administration of 
the meetings, the practitioners ultimately became concerned about sharing 
information in what some of them considered to be an unaccountable environment. 
This had an impact on the delivery of the project because, in practice, the practitioners 
became unwilling to share information about the targeted individuals, limiting what 
could be achieved. For example, at the meeting held on 23 October 2002, the minutes 
stated that '... [the implementation manager] raised concerns about confidentiality 
and the issue o f information transmitted to home computers' Such were the concerns 
about transmission of information to personal computers that by 6 November 2002 the 
social service representative refused to share information in that environment. The 
minutes of the meeting from that date stated that ‘. .. [the social worker] raised 
concerns that minutes were being sent to one member o f the teams email at a home
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address. [The social worker] made it clear that given such a position, he is not willing 
to continue to share information in the meetings, given the sensitive nature o f the 
information shared by the group, until this matter is resolved \
Many of these co-ordination and administration problems could have been considered 
to have been teething problems and efforts were made to attend to them. Indeed, some 
practitioners noted that managers missed early opportunities to implement good 
project management routines:
An opportunity was missed for setting ground rules, for example, no mobiles, a
record of minutes, confidentiality statements, no side meetings...ground rules would
have avoided mis-communication.
Housing practitioner, November 2001
The problem was that it took a long time to address the observed co-ordination and 
administration problems and created a distraction from implementing the project’s 
planned interventions. The minutes of the practitioner meeting held on 13 November 
2002, for example, showed that the issue of risk assessment still had not been dealt 
with. The biggest practical problem was perhaps the joint access to information 
systems, which was still unresolved in March 2003. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the co-ordination and administration problems led to real concerns amongst 
the practitioners about the accountability of the project. Generally, the lack of a 
monitoring system, poor recording of meetings and distribution of minutes and 
tasking made it difficult to monitor and review cases and subsequently to know what 
practitioners were supposed to be doing and to hold them to account.
Management in the Manchester project
The management arrangements for the individual practitioners working on the project 
also helped to frame the implementation of the Manchester project. It has already 
been seen that in the structure of the Manchester project (with the exception of the 
implementation team) line management responsibility continued to lie with their 
home agency. Many of the practitioners working on the project felt that this 
arrangement was appropriate in order to maintain the proper supervision and 
professional development of the seconded staff. The probation practitioner stating in
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June 2002 for example, ‘... supervision with probation is crucial so as to not lose the 
link about what is going on in probation \
Nevertheless, this line management arrangement impacted on the implementation of 
the project in a practical sense very early on. The police officer project manager was 
responsible for ensuring that elements of the strategy were executed but in this 
arrangement he had no direct control over performance management or discipline of
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the staff, which the home agency retained. Day-to-day management of the seconded 
staff soon became problematic for the project manager. As early as December 2001 
the original project manager stated that '...the relationship between theMMAGS 
management and line management in mother agencies caused some problems ’. This 
was also noted later in the project. In March 2003 the second project manager also 
noted problems related to line management '... the structure was alright but it fell 
down in terms o f line management. ' An education steering group member stated in 
March 2003 that ‘ ... key weaknesses were: not enough sharp management, 
particularly performance management at the individual level. ’
The practitioners too stated that there were problems with the arrangements. For 
example, the housing practitioner reported in November 2001 that '....the structure is 
a problem. Practitioners are reporting to line managers who have less understanding 
o f the project which allows poor communication to have an effect ’.
Both of the project managers struggled to co-ordinate the range of practitioners with 
very different professional specialisms and responsibilities that were outside of their 
sphere of expertise and who had different ways of monitoring and assessing 
performance. A fundamental problem was that the project manager did not have the 
authority to discipline members of staff working in his team. The information 
manager, for example, stated in February 2003 that:
There’s also the problem of not enough authority has been given to the project 
manager. I think [the project managers] should have been able, from the beginning, to 
be responsible for discipline issues and job development. They should have been 
responsible to [the project manager], and then to the steering group.
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The project managers struggled to co-ordinate the implementation of the interventions 
in this disparate environment:
It’s a bit difficult for [the project manager] being the strategy manager. We have our
own line managers. We are all working to our own timings or whatever. Yet he’s the
manager and some people don’t respect that.
Youth Offending Team practitioner, February 2003
Some posts had specific impacts on the nature of the implementation of the project. 
Replicating part of the Boston arrangements, the project recruited two former South 
Manchester gang members as outreach workers for the project. These appointments 
proved to be a management problem early on largely because the outreach workers 
had no experience of working within organisations. A Youth Offending Team 
manager stated in August 2001 that ‘. .. [the outreach workers] have no idea about 
how to work in organisations. For example, they ’11 ring up directors and start 
ordering them around’. And the implementation manager remarked in February 2002 
\.. the problem with the outreach workers is that they weren 7 trained in council 
etiquette and policy ’.
Probably because these posts were new, initially there were difficulties in determining 
appropriate management and support for them and as a result, at the start of the 
project, it was not clear what they were supposed to be doing in practice. For 
example, the project manager stated in August 2001 ‘ ... The street workers were 
always going to be a problem. Bold promises were made by [the deputy chief 
executive]. But then the reality o f supporting them was much harder’. Similarly, the 
social services manager in February 2003 that '... there were a few things at the start 
that were quite difficult. The outreach workers were very charming but doing their 
own things. They needed to be much more a part o f the project and doing what was 
expected o f them. ’
As mentioned in chapter five, the outreach workers were initially managed by the 
Youth Offending Team. It was noted by Youth Offending Team managers early on 
that there were risks to using the outreach workers and that they would need to be 
carefully managed to make sure that they were used properly:
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We have to be careful about how they [the outreach workers] are used. [The outreach 
workers] are the gateways into the gangs -  once the doors are open the other agencies 
have to provide the services. [The outreach workers] will not be able to do this. Also 
[the implementation manager] thinks that they are his resource. The role of [the 
outreach workers] needs to be narrowed and clearly specified.
Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001
Respondents felt that the arrangements for the employment of the outreach workers 
were not handled well by the implementation manager. The project implementation 
manager made bold informal promises to the outreach workers that raised their 
expectations in respect to their salaries and working conditions. In the event, it was 
not possible for the project management to keep these promises:
The first arrangements were very hard because [the implementation manager] had 
raised expectations. He promised them staff, £30,000 a year, cars and their own 
premises etc. They [the outreach workers] told me that [the implementation manager] 
said that if pushed, she would give them what they wanted. But [the outreach 
workers] need properly marked cars -  to give credibility in the community and for 
safety. For example, someone pointed a gun at their heads because they did not know 
who they were.
Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001
The informal relations with [the outreach workers] and [the implementation manager] 
have been a real problem. And he makes waves by not understanding the complexity 
of things. Need to be reigned in. There are positives to [the implementation manager] 
but there are problems when he gets involved in the practicalities of delivering 
solutions.
Project information manager, February 2003
The difficulties in the management and accountability arrangements were aggravated 
by a lack of clarity at middle management level. The role that individual line 
managers were expected to play in the management of the project was not clear. As 
set out in chapter five, the authority, direction and resources for the project lay with 
the high level project steering group. The project interventions themselves were
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implemented by the line level practitioner group. In between these two groups there 
were also line managers and other middle management, the role of whom did not 
appear to be clear. A housing officer in June 2002 stated that '... communication 
between the groups o f managers, practitioners and the board is poor. This is related 
to accountability and managers are being left out o f the loop \
Some of the host agencies seemed to be unclear about the level of management that 
they were supposed to be offering their seconded staff, presumably assuming that the 
MMAGS project manager would be responsible for day-to-day management of their 
staff. As a result, practitioners on the project received varying degrees of management 
support. Some practitioners considered that they received enough management 
support throughout the project. One housing practitioner remarked in June 2003 
‘...yeah, I've had loads [of support]. I've had really good support from my managers. ’ 
Other members of the practitioner team were more or less cut adrift from their home 
agencies. One of the education practitioners stated in February 2003 ‘... I  don't have a 
manager. I f  I  needed to discuss anything I  would speak now and again with [the 
implementation team].’ In effect no one was managing the outputs of these 
practitioners:
Where it didn’t work was where you had some staff more or less cast loose from their 
agency. There was an unwritten expectation that they would be fully managed by the 
project manager. My view is that it is not feasible to do it this way. Because if you 
want to manage people you have to understand their sickness and welfare systems, 
their discipline systems and their professional development needs. All of which 
requires the host agencies to have a hand.
Project manager, March 2003
The group has no direction. They choose their own direction and they could do what 
they wanted. Most of them didn’t seem to have much of an input either from there or 
here. It is quite clear some of the practitioners do not have managers allocated to 
them. There has been confusion and lack of understanding and direction and the work 
that they have got to do to achieve that.
Housing manager, March 2003
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Reflecting the continued link to the home agencies and the problems that the project 
manager faced managing the project, initially, there was a separate group for the line 
managers and project manager. However, for reasons that were unclear (interviewees 
were either unwilling or unable to explain) this group was disbanded very early on. 
Managers expressed differing views about whether this group performed a useful 
function. The probation manager stated in March 2003 ‘ ...I could do without more 
meetings but I  am very aware o f issues that have come up that would have been useful 
to have been discussed at manager level ’. Similarly one manager from the education 
service stated in March in 2003 '... The managers group would have been useful in 
relation to some o f the issues that have come up about staffing and the expectations 
about enforcement and the balance between enforcement and support. ’ A social 
services manager stated in February 2003 '...there are some things I  would have liked 
to have brought up at the managers meetings about things from the practitioners 
group that aren’t necessarily the business o f the steering group. The sorts o f things 
about agencies not recognising each others purpose and function and how that 
impacts on the practitioners group and how the decisions are made when everyone 
involved isn’t fully aware o f that.' Other managers did not think it was necessary.
The Youth Offending Team manager stating in March 2003, for example '...it’s 
useful that the managers ’ group doesn ’t meet any more because I  haven ’t missed it. I  
don’t have a view one way or the other but I  haven’t missed it. I  don’t liaise with the 
other managers a lot’.
Problems of authority were played out in practice in the management of the weekly 
practitioner team meetings. There were disagreements amongst the practitioners about 
what the focus of the project should have been (the causes of which are discussed 
more fully in the next chapter) and what they should be doing day-to-day. The 
meetings soon became very difficult to manage. Management of the group was 
considered by those working on the project to be a very serious problem in terms of 
controlling the behaviour of staff and the amount of work that was actually being 
achieved in that environment. The social services manager in February 2003, for 
example, stated that ' ...initially I  did feel as i f  there was some drift around. Because 
at the meetings all sorts o f practitioners had hobby horses they held forth and it was 
difficult to get the meeting back and moving on ’. It was noted by the practitioners 
themselves too. The Youth Offending Team practitioner, for example, stated in
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February 2003 that ‘... I  don’t go to the meetings. I  don’t go because they are 
dysfunctional. It was a bit rowdy and he [the project manager] just allowed that when 
he shouldn’t have done. It should have been more structured and then that culture 
carried on a bit.’
The rowdy nature of the group was created at least in part by the lack of guidance and 
the co-ordination problems described in the preceding sections, which gave the 
practitioners a high degree of scope to manoeuvre. It was felt by some that 
opportunities to set out ground rules had been lost in the early days of the 
implementation of the project. The housing practitioner remarked in January 2002 for 
example, ‘...to begin with, roles were not worked out smoothly. It was unclear about 
what people were supposed to be doing. ’ Similarly one of the Youth Offending Team 
managers stated in November 2001 ‘...I am concerned about the amount o f time that 
it is taking to get through the cases. People are confused about their roles but there is 
no need to be because the situation is the same as it would be in their own agencies -  
the difference is the specialist client group ’.
Generally, however, the unruly nature of the project team was blamed on the original 
police project manager who, it was considered by many, should have been more 
authoritative and taken a more proactive role in preparing the organisation of the 
project:
There is a need for strong leadership and organisation. I am concerned that the group 
becomes unruly and someone needs to sort that out. People need to be more 
disciplined. If leadership was improved, these problems would be reduced.
Housing practitioner, June 2002
The role of the implementation team needs to be clearer and needs to be stuck to. 
There is a role for a very experienced individual to pull all the people together and set 
better team understanding. The idea was that [the project manager] did that but so far 
he is not showing evidence of the skill required to bring together such a varied skill 
set.
Probation manager, August 2002
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Reflecting the widely held view that the poor functioning of the practitioner’s group 
was caused by the project manager’s lack of management and leadership skills, he 
was replaced. The new police inspector was selected purposefully by the chair of the 
steering group because it was felt that he had the right leadership skills to ensure that 
the practitioners implemented their elements of the strategy. The change in project 
manager was indeed associated with a change in the style of the management of the 
project. The social services manager, for example, remarked in February 2003 ‘...I  
know that he [the new project manager] manages the project in a very different way 
and he ’s very much more direct and directed in his approach. ’ The education 
manager stated in March 2003:
I think the agencies have worked better together since [the new manager] took on the 
leadership. I think that there is greater clarity. There’s certainly increased clarity in 
the paper work and I think that there’s a better level of trust and understanding than 
there was at the beginning.
There were actually very mixed views about the change in project manager amongst 
the practitioner team. As has been seen, some of the group in particular welcomed the 
flexibility that the original project manager had shown as the project was being set up 
and his sensitivity to the multiple concerns of the inter-agency group. Additionally, it 
was felt that the second project manager conceived the project to be predominately 
police led and was unsympathetic to the welfare perspective that much of the group 
were coming from:
I wouldn’t have had it led by an inspector from the police force but I thought [the 
original project manager] was alright. [The original project manager] would often say 
that from a bobby’s point of view we’d look at something like this but understanding 
the nature of this project, we’ve got to look at it like this. [The second project 
manager] doesn’t have the benefit of those ways of looking at things. He sees them 
from his own point of view. He struggles to understand the welfare issues and yet you 
have to think about things before you make decisions.
Education practitioner February 2003
More importantly, however, the change in project management and the shift to a more 
authoritative and directive style of management did not appear to solve the problems
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observed in the management of the group. One of the Youth Offending Team 
practitioners stated in February 2003 that:
It has got more formal. There is an agenda now which is good. It’s more structured 
now but it is still rowdy. I’m not saying it’s not productive but it could be more 
productive.
Towards the end of the project funding, there was a sense that changing the style of 
project management was not going to solve the problems that the project was 
experiencing. One of the education managers remarked in March 2003 ‘ ... the board 
took a long time to get to grips with it. Everyone wants to think these problems are 
solvable. Maybe they weren ’t anyway’. Similarly, the project information officer felt 
that both of the management styles caused problems and that the change in style 
didn’t seem to make a difference to how the practitioners behaved:
The two are at different extremes. [The original project manager] was very flexible 
and very free, perhaps too free. [The second project manager] is very strict, orthodox 
and both led to problems. In my opinion that group is in the exact same state as it was 
in March of last year. In the same way that [The original project managers’] 
flexibility allowed people to not address the issues they’ve had, [the second project 
manager], has brought these to a head in very damaging ways.
Project information officer, February 2003
By the end of the period of the study, it was widely agreed that the management and 
structural arrangements had not worked:
Well it [the structure] didn’t work. It’s clear that the manager’s group didn’t work.
It’s quite clear that the idea of having residual line management with the host 
organisation allowed difficulties within the team to be avoided, or rather not be 
tackled successfully. It didn’t work. There is no question that the management 
arrangements didn’t work which means that to some extent, the practitioners group 
didn’t work.
Education manager, March 2003
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We had a structure that wasn’t sufficiently thought through and as a board member I 
have to share responsibility for that. We made assumptions about the strength of the 
project team and just assumed that was where it was all going to get sorted out. In 
fact, actual direct project management was unable to sort it out.
Deputy chief executive Manchester City Council, March 2003
Summary
This chapter has examined those top-down factors that help to shape the nature of the 
implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects in terms of project 
leadership, resources, theory, guidance, and management and accountability. 
Leadership influenced the implementation of both of the projects albeit in different 
ways. In Cambridge non-attendance by senior police officers at project meetings 
indicated that they did not see the project as a high priority. Related to this, senior 
police management faced external pressures to meet centrally determined 
performance indicators coupled with a shortage of police officers. The police 
management did not see the bicycle theft project as sufficiently high priority and as 
such did not allocate police officer resources to the project. This meant that none of 
the enforcement interventions were implemented whereas senior City Council officers 
facilitated implementation of the situational measures. In contrast there was evidence 
of high level senior management support in the Manchester project which facilitated 
the establishment of the multi-agency practitioner team. However, over time the 
senior support wavered as implementation problems surfaced and poor 
communication between the practitioners and the steering group was evident.
The availability of resources played a role in shaping implementation in terms of 
finance, staffing and the availability of capable analysts to analyse problems. The 
grant funding facilitated implementation of both of the projects in general terms. The 
Manchester project was, however, ambitious for the available resources and the 
timetable. In contrast, the Cambridge project was feasible given its resources and 
timetable.
In terms of staff resources, in Cambridge, the project manager’s general enthusiasm 
and contacts facilitated the implementation of the project but lack of project
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management experience contributed to delays to building elements of the project. In 
Manchester, the complex secondment structure had a particular impact on the nature 
of the implementation of the project: identifying capable and suitable staff to work on 
the project was problematic and some agencies appeared to be sending unsuitable 
staff; there were concerns about the commitment of staff to the project, with some 
feeling that motivation was more to do with developing careers than commitment to 
project aims; and, some individuals created very difficult management problems.
Both projects had access to staff capable of analysing problems to develop the 
problem definition but the implementation of the projects was shaped by access to 
suitable data. In the Cambridge project, data were largely available to develop the 
problem definition. In Manchester, there was a range of problems that included 
difficulties accessing data sets and transmission of data, data sharing difficulties and 
poor quality data. In the longer term it was also not clear that the research that had 
been conducted or any other evidence was used in the subsequent development of the 
project strategy.
Project theory was not articulated explicitly in either of the projects but influenced 
the nature of the implementation of both of them. In Cambridge, the latent theory 
based on situational crime prevention techniques addressing aspects of the victim, 
location and offender appeared to facilitate the development of suitable interventions. 
In Manchester, the project theory was transformed from its basis in the seemingly 
successful Boston Gun Project and was ultimately conceived in terms of a range of 
social and preventative interventions for which the evidence base is weaker and the 
cause and effect mechanisms much wider and longer term.
Related availability of clear project guidance also had an impact on the nature of the 
implementation of the projects. In the Cambridge project clear and detailed guidance 
outlining the planned interventions and when they should be implemented were 
provided and followed by the project manager. In Manchester, guidance about how to 
implement the interventions was not specifically stated. In these circumstances the 
project staff struggled to assess who was at risk and suitable for project interventions 
as too many individuals were meeting the vague criteria given the resources 
available. There was no system set up for taking referrals which led to an increasing
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workload and individuals were selected for inclusion on the scheme on different 
levels of evidence.
The Home Office played a limited role in supervising the outputs of both projects, 
confining their role to monitoring the project accounts at the Regional Office level. 
This gave the projects scope to deviate from the agreements that they had made 
unchecked by the grant owner. The degree to which practitioners complied with 
project guidance had an impact on the implementation of both projects. In Cambridge 
the project manager followed the project guidance largely in a straightforward 
manner though some of the delays might have been avoided if the building 
interventions had been managed by the Council. The complex structure of the 
Manchester project created difficulties in managing the practitioners and led to 
concerns about project accountability. There was no standard way of documenting 
interventions and activities, which led to difficulties measuring outputs and holding 
practitioners to account. There were practical information sharing difficulties, which 
resulted in time-consuming delays and concerns about client confidentiality and there 
were differing risk assessment systems, which resulted in concerns about staff safety. 
The activities of the practitioners were not visible to the project manager day-to-day 
which caused a range of communication problems, which were aggravated by 
differential access to information technology. The seconded inter-agency structure 
created difficulties for the management of staff at the individual level. The project 
manager did not have control over the day-to-day activities of staff, which continued 
to lie with the home agencies. This was aggravated by a lack of clarity at line 
management, as some managers were not clear who was responsible for what. The 
result was that some practitioners received very little day-to-day management. There 
were concerns that the original project manager was not directive enough in his 
approach to manage the disparate team. That said, the change in project manager, 
which was associated with a change in management style, did not appear to have an 
impact on the behaviour of the practitioners.
The following chapter turns to those bottom-up factors which help explain patterns of 
implementation in the two projects.
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Chapter seven
Bottom-up explanations of project implementation 
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with those bottom-up factors that help to explain the 
implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects. As has been seen, 
bottom-up approaches to analysing and understanding implementation focus on 
how practitioners experience and understand implementation and the interaction 
between individuals and organisations. Again, framed by the literature review but 
grounded in evidence from the case studies this chapter focuses on those issues of 
particular concern to bottom-up analysts: how the practitioners negotiated project 
aims and came to understand, conceptualise and interpret the projects; the nature of 
inter-agency working; the role of routines and values; and, conflict.
Negotiation of project aims
In Manchester the aims and objectives of the project were renegotiated over time 
by the practitioners working on the project. This kind of project transformation 
was not evident in the Cambridge project.
The renegotiation of aims took two forms in the Manchester project. First, the 
preceding chapter showed how the Manchester project became detached from its 
roots in the Boston Gun Project and the situational determinants of shootings. It 
has been seen that over time the practitioners came to conceptualise the project in 
terms of the wider issue of gang membership and focused on addressing gang 
membership as a means of tackling the shootings. This transformation occurred 
because members of the project implementation team expanded the project scope 
during the early stages of its development to better suit their views about the nature 
of the problem. The project implementation team conceived the problem of 
shootings in terms of gang membership and renegotiated the project aims to better
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reflect this. The project implementation manager stated in August 2001, for 
example, ‘...we have to tackle gang culture to reduce firearms crime because the 
two are linked’. And later in the same interview he said that ‘...initially the project 
was very focused on firearms but we realised that the problem was the gangs. I f  
the gangs are still there the problem will come back’.
Second, as well as broadening its scope, the Manchester project also took on a 
meaning that was not present in the original strategy. In chapter five it was shown 
that the original project strategy was based on the Boston model and involved well 
publicised, multi-agency crackdowns as a means to apply leverage to gang 
members and to prevent shootings. It was hoped that during the ‘fire break’ other 
interventions offering support to young people could be implemented to deter 
young people from joining gangs or to divert them if they had done so. In practice 
the project staff came to understand the crackdown element of the project 
somewhat differently: enforcement activities (crackdown) would be targeted only 
on individuals who had been offered help and support to remain clear from 
offending and gangs and had either refused it or continued to offend or engage in 
gang activity. As this quote from the housing practitioner in February 2003 
demonstrates '... the carrot and stick. You work with us we work with you. You 
don’t work with us, these things will happen to you. That message needs to be 
made crystal clear ’. One of the Youth Offending Team practitioners stated in June 
2002 ‘...I think we have to chat to people but i f  they don’t play ball with us, 
enforcement will follow. ’ And one of the education workers stated:
[My main tasks] are to reach out to the most vulnerable young people who are on 
the periphery of getting involved in gun crime and also explain to them the no 
tolerance rule. The crackdown procedure and stuff like that. Explain to them that, 
if you work with me you’ve got a better chance of moving forward, getting out of 
gun crime and getting involved in education or a job and things like that. If you 
don’t work with me you’ve got more chance of being locked up.
Education worker, March 2003
The crackdown was therefore seen as a threat for individuals who would not co­
operate with agencies who offered support, rather than a threat for groups of
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individuals if they behaved in particular pre-determined ways. As has been seen 
there was very little enforcement activity in this project either as it was originally 
envisaged or reinterpreted:
The thing that hasn’t worked well is crackdown. I haven’t really seen it and I’m 
not fully convinced that it wasn’t needed. I think that there are still people who 
think that enforcement is someone else’s business.
Deputy Chief Executive, March 2003
The crackdown has not happened and I am not clear why 
Housing officer, June 2002
The primary consequence of this renegotiation of aims was that the project was 
taken in ways that had not been originally intended. It also shaped patterns of 
implementation in two other main ways. First, as has been seen, it had the effect of 
detaching the project from its Boston project roots based on the situational 
determinants of shootings and instead moved the project towards tackling the 
social determinants of gang membership. As set out in the previous chapter this 
impacted on the implementation of the project because the concept of gang 
membership proved to be very difficult to operationalise for preventative purposes. 
Second, renegotiation of the aims of the project resulted in observed differences 
between the practitioners in terms of how they conceived the project, its objectives 
and what it was supposed to be achieving. There was limited consensus amongst 
the practitioners in respect of what the project was trying to achieve and how to go 
about delivering project interventions. Some of the practitioners working on the 
project conceptualised the project in terms of the focus on shootings, as set out in 
the original strategy. Others saw it in terms of the much wider issue of gang 
culture. The housing practitioners were especially clear that the focus of the project 
was on reducing shootings and injuries. For example, a housing officer stated in 
November 2001 that the aim of the project was ‘...to reduce violent crime, 
especially that which is gun related’. Similarly, another housing officer stated in 
January 2002 that ‘ ...the aim o f the project is to reduce shootings \ Other 
practitioners on the project, however, conceived the aims of the project to be more 
general than this. As well as focusing on reducing shootings some of the
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practitioners focused on the wider issues of gang membership and the development 
of social interventions to support young people and deter them from joining gangs. 
The probation service practitioner, for example remarked in November 2001 that ' 
... I  think the aim is o k -  to remove people from the periphery o f gangs. To remove 
the future generations o f gangs An education services practitioner stated in 
November 2001 ‘.. .[the aims of the project are] to support people with needs and 
to set up sustainable support structures to reduce the number o f people joining 
gangs’.
These observed differences in the conceptualisation of the project were also 
evident within the steering group and at the level of line management. Some of the 
steering group members conceived the project in terms of preventing or diverting 
young people away from gang activities. For example, the project manager 
remarked in September 2001, .. [The aim of the project was] to create a situation 
where individuals involved in gang-related criminal behaviour do more productive 
things Similarly, the headmaster on the steering group stated in January 2001 ‘ ... 
[The aim of the project was] to develop strategies to enable gang members to leave 
-  to present choices and to have an impact on life styles.’ Others on the steering 
group continued to conceptualise the project primarily in terms of its firearms 
roots. For example, somewhat in contrast to the quote from the headmaster, the 
Manchester City Council’s deputy chief executive stated in August 2001 that ‘ ... 
[the aim of the project was] to reduce the numbers o f deaths and injuries in the 
city \
The differences between agencies in terms of how the project and its aims were 
conceived were actually noted by practitioners early on and they raised concerns 
about it. The education steering group member remarked in August 2001 ‘... Iam  
concerned that there are disparate views about the project and how it looks. ’
The nature of inter-agency working
The partnership arrangements for the two projects were described in chapter five 
and it has been seen that they were rather different in the two projects. The nature 
of the partnership arrangements for the two projects is discussed in more detail in
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the following sections followed by the implications for how the project delivered 
interventions.
In the Cambridge project the project manager was working largely independently, 
drawing in resources (mostly in terms of expertise) from other agencies as required 
to implement the project interventions. In contrast, the Manchester project 
involved the development of a new, seconded inter-agency structure that existed 
independently of established organisational boundaries.
The contrasting partnership arrangements of the two projects have resonance with 
Crawford’s 1997 dichotomy of inter-agency structures. Crawford distinguished 
between multi-agency and mter-agency working arrangements. Multi-agency 
working largely leaves the individual practitioners unaffected as they come 
together only for briefing and tasking with specific actions. They then go back to 
their own agencies and implement these actions independently. Crawford argued 
that the implementation of this kind of partnership working tends to be 
straightforward because it does not involve blurring of practitioner roles to any 
great degree. Indeed, this reflects the situation observed in the Cambridge project, 
where the project manager drew on expertise and advice from the relevant agencies 
as required or liaised with them to implement specific interventions within existing 
organisational frameworks and structures. This partnership arrangement was 
largely implemented in a non-problematic manner. As has been seen (and will be 
elaborated in the following sections) delays were created in this project because the 
procedures and practices of the City Council had not been accounted for in the 
project plans. These eventually had to be negotiated and led to delays and some 
frustration for the project manager but fundamentally the arrangement did not 
muddle existing organisational boundaries and was implemented in a 
straightforward manner.
In contrast, Crawford (1997) described inter-agency relationships which entail a 
higher degree of fusion and welding of relations between agencies: inter-agency 
working involves new structures that operate outside of boundaries of the 
participating agencies. As set out in chapter five, the arrangements in Manchester 
were of this sort. The practitioners represented a range of existing agencies and
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worked outside of existing organisational boundaries to implement interventions in 
new ways. These, Crawford contended, are harder to implement because the 
boundaries between participating organisations become blurred and the 
opportunity for conflict is opened up. Chapter six has already discussed the role 
played by aspects of the Manchester project’s inter-agency structure on project co­
ordination, management and accountability. However, the inter-agency structure 
also shaped the implementation of this project in different ways. Reflecting the 
greater tangle of organisational boundaries, differing day-to-day routines, 
organisational values and conflict between practitioners also shaped the nature of 
the Manchester project in ways that were not evident in Cambridge.
The following sections discuss the roles played by the organisational values of 
practitioners, their day-to-day routines and conflict in shaping the implementation 
of the two projects.
Values
In Manchester, the existing organisational values of the practitioners had an impact 
on the sorts of interventions that they perceived to be appropriate in tackling the 
problem of gangs and shootings. The practitioners (representing different 
organisations) held differing values about the sorts of interventions that they 
deemed to be appropriate. These different organisational values clashed and 
created arguments within the practitioner team. The marked differences in the 
practitioners’ understanding of what constituted appropriate interventions for 
tackling problems were observed predominately in relation to the failure of the 
crackdown element of the project. It has been seen that (however conceived) there 
was little enforcement activity in this project and this was predominately the result 
of the differences between the practitioners regarding the types of interventions 
that they considered to be appropriate for dealing with the behaviour of these 
young people, in particular, in respect to the extent to which they felt it was 
appropriate to work together to implement enforcement-based interventions. There 
were differences between the agencies regarding the balance of ‘enforcement’ type 
interventions and ‘preventive’ or ‘supportive’ type interventions and when they 
should be applied. In this context, enforcement activities related primarily to the
203
enforcement powers of the police service (arrest, charge and prosecution) and 
those of the housing service (Anti-social Behaviour Orders, Acceptable Behaviour 
Contracts, warnings and evictions). In theory, it could have also related to the 
enforcement powers of the probation service and Youth Offending Team in respect 
to breach of bail and other sentencing conditions but in practice these were not 
used. The preventative and supportive interventions refer to the very wide ranging 
activities that practitioners thought would provide the conditions which would 
prevent or deter the young people from joining the gangs or which might have 
facilitated their exit. These interventions might have included: education support to 
minimise the chances of a young person playing truant or being expelled from 
school; attempts to find a young person suitable employment, or the development 
of training and skills; youth and diversion schemes at the weekends, evenings and 
holidays to attempt to occupy their time and prevent them from being drawn 
towards the gangs or crime; general and wider support for their families (probably 
from social services) to try and stabilise the family environment; attention to a 
family’s housing needs; and, help and support for young people with mental health 
problems and substance misuse.
The different agencies were strongly associated with different values regarding the 
sorts of interventions they felt the project should be implementing. In discussing 
the issue in an interview in December 2001, the project information officer ranked 
the agencies working on the project on a scale in terms of the extent to which they 
favoured enforcement interventions. He drew this on a piece of paper which is 
represented in box 7.1 below:
Box 7.1: Scale of practitioners’ values
Most enforcement Least enforcement
< ►
Housing, police service, YOT, education, social services, probation, youth service
As the picture drawn by the project information officer demonstrates, the housing 
service in Manchester was especially associated with a preference to use their 
enforcement powers to tackle problems. Indeed, the practitioners working on the
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project widely perceived the housing service to be primarily preoccupied by the 
enforcement element of this project. The project information manager, for 
example, remarked in June 2002 that:
Housing is very supportive of enforcement action. More even so than the police. 
[The chief superintendent] thought about 70-30 per cent for enforcement for this 
project but [the housing manager] thought it would be about 90 per cent 
enforcement.
The housing practitioners themselves also stated that they had anticipated that 
enforcement activity would constitute a substantial element of the project and that 
enforcement was their main role on the project:
[Our role] is to do with using levers to control behaviour. Where people were 
involved in shootings it was assumed that levers would be pulled. We thought that 
this would have been a bigger aspect of the project than it has been. It might be 
the result of the people on the project: they are more keen on why people are 
doing things than what they are doing. This is a balance. But the balance is too far 
in the why side.
Housing officer, June 2002
My focus in the project is on crackdown. I realise that others do not agree but that 
is my focus.
Housing officer, January 2002
A similar situation applied in respect to the police service which is clearly 
primarily associated with an enforcement agenda. As was set out in chapter five, 
there were no police officers seconded other than the police inspector project 
manager. However, the practitioners raised concerns that the police officer project 
managers (especially the second project manager) did not understand the concerns 
of the agencies that did not come with an enforcement agenda. For example, one of 
the education workers remarked in February 2003 that '... quite a few people 
round the table are coming from a welfare perspective and the welfare workers 
would find it difficult to understand the way GMP work and vice versa.' The 
Manchester housing service and the police service were then, for this project,
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primarily concerned with using the criminal and civil law in respect to firearms 
and gang related activity.
In contrast, the representatives from the other agencies working on the project, 
which included the education service, the youth service, the social services, the 
probation service and the Youth Offending Team were not typically in favour of 
implementing enforcement interventions against the young people targeted for the 
project. These practitioners tended to see their roles (generally and in this project 
specifically) in terms of providing support to individuals and families in order to 
facilitate an environment in which young people would be deterred or diverted 
from the gangs and crime, as demonstrated by the following quotes:
I am less concerned about the number of shootings and more concerned about the 
choices that people make. I am looking for MMAGS to stop the spiralling 
problems.
Head teacher, September 2001
My role is to work with kids aged between ten and seventeen who are connected 
with gang culture -  it’s a mentoring role.
Youth Offending Team, December 2001
It’s [the project’s] intention to bring humanity back to the kids. This means being 
about to support parents in parenting their children.
Education officer, December 2001
I am specifically involved in looking at holistic need and in linking in with other 
agencies to take on aspects of care when necessary.
Social worker, June 2002
Some practitioners then came to the project with a view to enforcing the law as a 
means of tackling problems and others came to the project with a view of 
providing help and support to address problems much more broadly. These two 
approaches to tackling problems are quite evidently different. As one member of 
the youth offending team in June 2002 stated ‘... people have got different 
agendas. Housing is about enforcement. We are about improvement and help. The
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two come against each other’. The enforcement focused practitioners clashed with 
the welfare focused practitioners as the team struggled to negotiate a common 
understanding of the project, agree interventions and implement them. The issue of 
conflict between the practitioners will be returned to later in this chapter.
The difference in organisational values had an impact on the ability of the 
representatives to engage in this partnership and to implement enforcement- 
focused interventions. For example, the project manager stated in August 2001 '... 
social services and probation have had problems with multi-agency work. They 
are ‘touchy feely ’ but they need to recognise their enforcement role ’. The project 
manager similarly stated in December 2001 that ‘...somepractitioners are not 
happy with it [crackdown]. [The youth worker] especially does not want to be 
associated with it. He is concerned that i f  a crackdown is associated with MMAGS 
he will lose respect and it could put practitioners like [the out reach workers] in 
difficult and dangerous positions. ’
The anti-enforcement agenda of some of the practitioners was certainly noted by 
those working on the project. For example, the probation service manager stated in 
January 2002 that ‘...there was suspicion about crackdown amongst probation 
officers ’. Later in the same interview she went on to say that ‘... this was not a 
popular post. There was concern about the carrot and stick approach. Well, the 
concern was about the stick bit’. Similarly, speaking in relation to the crackdown 
elements of the project strategy the social worker in June 2002 stated ‘. . . I ’ve not 
had much involvement in this ... 1 think that we need to think about what would be 
achieved anyway by a crackdown and think about solving problems more 
holistically. ’ As the quote from the project manager of December 2001 (above) 
suggests, some of the concerns raised by the practitioners about implementing the 
crackdown related to worries about staff safety and the impact that it would have 
on the image of the project, but generally the concerns were more related to the 
strong anti-enforcement agenda that permeated their work.
The difficulties caused in practice by the differences in values were observed at the 
practitioner meetings. At a meeting held on 2 November 2001 arguments were 
observed between practitioners regarding the nature of any crackdown and the
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consequences that it might have. The probation officer was adamant that a 
crackdown could not work at all and generally the group wanted clarity on how the 
crackdown would work and on whom it would be focused. More specifically, the 
group argued with the housing officer about the role of Anti-social Behaviour 
Orders in the project. They were especially concerned that Anti-social Behaviour 
Orders could cover the area in which a person worked or where their families lived 
and the impact that this could have on a person’s quality of life. They were not 
content with reassurances from the housing officer. These issues were still evident 
a year later. At a practitioners meeting observed on 6 November 2002 a similarly 
long discussion was observed about the role of Anti-social Behaviour Orders in 
tackling the behaviour of the young people on the target list and the general 
agreement was that the group would not co-operate with the housing officers in 
respect to them. In addition concerns were still being expressed about whether 
enforcement activity could impact on the safety of staff.
Despite the strong anti-enforcement sentiment of some of the practitioners many of 
them stated in interview that enforcement interventions were appropriate in some 
circumstances. In particular, they said that they could see that enforcement activity 
might be appropriate if the individual had failed to engage with the preventative 
interventions:
The problem with crackdown is an issue of balance. At one point we thought that 
there was too much emphasis on enforcement rather than support. For example 
housing has stressed enforcement rather than help. But if they are not co-operative 
then enforcement does make sense.
Youth Offending Team June 2002
Enforcement is not contentious as such, but it shouldn’t be put first. If you have 
tried to engage with someone then so be it. Housing seems to be gathering 
information to enforce but they should be gathering information to prevent. 
Probation practitioner, June 2002
However, despite some common understanding of the potential use of enforcement 
powers within this project the strong anti-enforcement agenda (fuelled by the
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welfare philosophy underpinning their work) strongly influenced the nature of 
implementation of the project. The welfare-focused practitioners undermined 
attempts at enforcement and this resulted in little enforcement action against the 
young people despite their behaviour. In practice, this took a number of forms 
which are described in the following sections.
Some of the practitioners who saw their roles as to support the young people 
refused to support and implement enforcement-based interventions even in the 
circumstances when they were supposed to. For example, this was demonstrated 
from the minutes of the meeting held on 17 November 2002, which stated that ‘... 
at the invitation o f [the project manager] a discussion took place on the roles and 
responsibilities o f the practitioners within the crackdown system. Issues that arose 
were: [the social worker] and [the youth worker] saw their roles as entirely 
supportive. ’
Subsequently the steering group issued strongly worded guidance that all 
practitioners on the project would support all the elements of the strategy as this 
extract from the minutes of the practitioners meeting held on 5 February 2003 
demonstrates:
[The project manager] took the opportunity to reiterate that in the event of 
enforcement action being taken all practitioners were expected to evidence failure 
to engage by target individuals. This followed from the unequivocal direction 
from the board that all practitioners should subscribe to all aspects of the strategy.
As an extract from the meeting held on 5 February 2003 minutes (above) implies, 
the anti-enforcement feeling of some practitioners was so strong that they would 
not engage with enforcement agencies even where their clients had broken the 
terms of their agreements and were persisting in conducting gang activities and 
offending. This is despite the claims made by the probation officer and the Youth 
Offending Team officer in interview (quoted above) that enforcement activity 
against the young people where they failed to engage with the project was 
appropriate. They frustrated attempts to implement enforcement interventions 
mostly by refusing to share information on the nature of their clients’ violations of
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bail and other conditions with the police and housing officers. Examples of the 
many attempts to frustrate enforcement-based interventions by the social services 
and probation officers are demonstrated in the quotes below:
They [the probation service] are desperate to provide every single opportunity to 
rehabilitate even when the individual is engaging in gang activity. One particular 
example was where an offender was released and the information from the prison 
was that he was going to get involved in a gang as soon as he came out. Within a 
day of his release he’s brought together a load of gang members that hadn’t been 
seen together for six months. They were all driving around in a car when none of 
them had a driving license. Two of them were in breach of licence conditions. We 
wanted to put a very stem warning to him that if he didn’t stop this behaviour we 
were going to do everything in our power to get him into prison. Probation is 
determined not to allow any enforcement activity to take place until he’s been 
spoken to face-to-face. And he’s not engaging. He is in breach of his conditions. 
Project information, manager February 2003
The situation was this person was being released and was on probation and we 
thought of the possibility of him forming a new gang. One thing we thought we 
might do was check on what the bail conditions were. And if the guy was out of 
line I would get people as quickly as possible to report it to probation and they 
would take action. But I was refused the bail conditions.
Housing practitioner, February 2003
[The project manager] fed back from one of his practitioner meetings where the 
youth service and probation service were causing some difficulties. Partly 
philosophical. The probation service person wouldn’t release information about 
the terms of a particular license. This didn’t appear to be a data protection issue. 
Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council March 2003
Opportunities for action have been lost. For example, I felt that an [Anti-social 
Behaviour Order] could usefully have been taken out on a young lad who was 
visiting his girlfriend at a children’s home and causing trouble there. But the 
social services wouldn’t allow it because they felt that it would make the problem 
worse.
Housing officer, January 2002
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The anti-enforcement agenda of some of the practitioners then meant that they 
would not implement enforcement-based interventions and frustrated the efforts of 
others to do so.
The difficulties observed engaging partners in criminal justice initiatives, because 
of differing organisational cultures, have been documented in previous research. 
Pearson and colleagues (1992), for example, noted the very different tasks and 
responsibilities that social workers and police officers have which clearly has an 
impact on the job that they actually do. They went on to argue that, inevitably, the 
same problem would impact differently on the different agencies and so 
practitioners often have different perceptions of the nature of problems and how to 
deal with them. Similarly, Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994), drawing on Wilson 
(1992), argued that there are unacknowledged problems of deep-rooted ideological 
differences between the police service and social services which makes working 
together difficult. Crawford (1997) also argued that the police service and 
probation service are traditionally associated with rather different understandings 
and conceptual definitions of criminal justice. This, he argued, is bom of different 
occupational cultures, training and working practices. The probation service has 
traditionally been associated with a social work basis and is client focused 
(Crawford, 1997). That said, over the last thirty years, the probation service has 
struggled to defend these historical ideals which have been discredited and 
displaced (Garland, 2000). Garland (2000) noted that under pressure to reform the 
probation service tightened its procedures and controls and represents itself as a 
community punishment organisation, moving from its original mission to one that 
better reflects modem concerns with crime and criminal justice: changing 
behaviour and reducing crime. Crawford (1997) also noted the attempts to engage 
the probation service in joint co-ordinated approaches to crime reduction. He 
argued that although broadly this might have been accepted at senior management 
level, it was far less clear that it has been accepted at practitioner level.
Indeed some of the quotes provided in this chapter have demonstrated that there 
was stated commitment to this new agenda (with a greater focus on enforcement) 
at the managerial level within the probation service. The probation manager herself
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stated in January 2002 ‘ ...for me though, this [enforcement] was what the 
probation service should have been doing anyway. They need to do it and should 
use their enforcement powers when necessary ’. However, as noted by Crawford, it 
appeared that the day-to-day values of the probation service practitioners were still 
strongly framed in terms of their historical welfare focus. For example, the project 
information manager stated in February 2003 ‘ ... generally probation and the 
[Youth Offending Team] claim to use their powers but they don’t really. And 
again, in the same interview ‘...they believe strongly that the probation officer is 
the good guy. They do not see themselves as a law enforcement agency. They see 
themselves as a glorified re-hab agency. They are desperate to provide every 
single opportunity to provide rehabilitation ’. The project information manager 
went on to note the difference between what the management state is agency 
policy and what the practitioners actually do in practice ‘...there are differences 
between what the managers say and what the practitioners do. Education officers 
are very reluctant to include truancy type orders in court. Youth workers don't 
have powers and are very anti it. They see their role to support the youth. ’ In 
respect to youth service the deputy chief executive at Manchester City Council 
made a similar point about the differences in views between the management and 
line level officers in respect to enforcement:
Youth service at managerial level are fully signed up for it [enforcement]. There 
have been some practical difficulties on the ground because there is a residual 
force in parts of the youth service that doesn’t think that their role is about 
enforcement and therefore are protecting the young people. Which makes it more 
difficult to work with particular enforcement agencies.
Deputy chief executive, Manchester City Council, March 2003
Indeed, more generally there were differences in commitment to the multi-agency 
project at the different levels within the agencies. It has been seen that there was 
commitment to the Manchester project at the strategic level. One of the education 
managers remarked in February 2003 that ‘...a t the board level, people work well 
together; people seem to work together very well. There was a good level o f  
engagement on the whole in those meetings ’. However, this board level 
commitment to the project agenda and to inter-agency working to reduce shootings
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was not replicated at the manager and practitioner level in all of the agencies 
represented on the project. The project implementation manager remarked in 
August 2001 for example, ‘.. .there is uncertainty about the extent o f commitment 
through the agencies. [The deputy chief executive] gives orders but they are not 
always practical to do on the ground \ Similarly, the project manager in June 2002 
stated that ‘ ... some people haven’t embraced multi-agency work, especially 
middle management. Practitioners are under pressure with mutual project loyalty 
and agency loyalty ’. He concluded that ‘... managers advocated multi-agency but 
didn ’t deliver This too is resonant with previous research that has suggested that 
senior level commitment to a project may not be reflected amongst their line level 
colleagues. As has been seen, this issue was important for Lipsky (1980) who 
argued that managers and practitioners may have distinctly different interests, 
preferences and perceptions and it cannot be assumed that they are working 
towards shared goals. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) also argued that co-operation 
observed at a senior level within organisations may coexist with rather 
acrimonious relations at line level. They argued that this might be to do with 
differences in conceptualisations of roles or policies (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 
1994).
Routines
Differences in organisational routines helped to shape the nature of the 
implementation of both projects although, again, this was much more evident in 
the inter-agency Manchester project. Key issues related to the organisational 
routines of practitioners in this study related to: differences in responsibilities and 
powers between agencies; differences in rigidity of organisational procedures and 
management; and, differences in performance indicators.
Differences in responsibilities and powers between agencies
The different statutory agencies working on the projects had different 
responsibilities, legal powers and procedures that needed to be followed which 
shaped how they worked on a day-to-day level. This influenced the 
implementation of both of the projects.
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In Cambridge, delays resulted from differences in organisational procedures and 
powers between the City Council and the police service. The original project 
proposal, prepared by the police based community safety manager, had not 
accounted for the procedures of the City Council when preparing the timetable for 
the implementation of the situational aspects of the project. The police-based 
project manager himself did not understand the policies and procedures of the City 
Council building regulations which led to delays in implementing the situational 
elements of the project as these were attended to. It has been seen that especially 
late was the indoor high security cycle park. The main reason for this was that the 
project manager did not understand the rules and procedures that govern 
contracting and overseeing building works in the context of a local authority. The 
project manager and the police project management had no experience of the 
processes and procedures that needed to be followed to get permission to contract 
building works. In particular, he did not understand the need for and had no 
experience in implementing the processes of competitive tendering for building 
works. These differing organisational procedures did not, of course, prevent these 
interventions from being implemented: they just delayed them.
The implementation of the Manchester project was also influenced by differences 
in the roles and responsibilities of the agencies participating in the project. These 
different procedures, responsibilities and powers were not always understood by 
the practitioners and it resulted in time-consuming debates and arguments between 
the practitioners as they struggled to come to understand one another’s roles and 
responsibilities when implementing interventions. The differences made it harder 
for the practitioners to negotiate a common understanding of the project and to 
work together to get things done. These powers and responsibilities were not 
always understood by the different agencies who struggled to understand the 
decisions made by other agencies in respect of the young people on the project 
target list. As well as debate and conflict, the lack of understanding of each other’s 
roles, powers and responsibilities resulted, in some instances, with decisions to 
implement inappropriate interventions, in the absence of the specialist workers.
An example of this in practice is demonstrated by the quote from the social 
services manager in June 2002 (see below). The social services department had
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been under a lot of pressure from the group to explain why a Section 25 (an order 
that the social services can use to retain a young person in their care in secure 
housing for their own protection) was taken out on a very young woman in the 
‘looked after system’ who was being physically abused by her boyfriend. The 
majority of the group felt that this was unfair and was punishing the young woman 
for something she was not responsible for. In the end, the social services felt that 
they had to act because this young woman, for whom they were legally 
responsible, was at risk of continued violence from her boyfriend. The social 
worker manager explained the situation as follows:
Everyone said that the Section 25 for the girl who was experiencing domestic 
violence was a punishment. I felt uncomfortable about going down this route but 
the rest of the group felt that it was outrageous! They felt we should punish the 
young man. But the trouble was we [the social services] had been working with 
her for a long time and looking at ways of making her relationship safer and she 
wasn’t taking them up. I was seen as the villain, trying to punish her and not him. 
But I wouldn’t have wanted a collective decision on this. The rest of the group 
did not understand our duties towards that girl.
Social services manager, June 2002
Similar examples were described by one of the housing representatives who found 
that other practitioners questioned the housing officer’s decision making because 
they did not understand the regulations and procedures that shaped how their 
department worked in relation to re-housing:
Practitioners are asking frustrating questions about why the housing department 
works one way and not another. The housing department cannot stop people living 
where they want to. They can live where there are vacancies. There are still 
understanding problems.
Housing officer, June 2002
There seems to have been some kind of expectation that MMAGS cases would be 
prioritised, no matter who they were. This, however, is all on the condition of risk 
assessment.
Housing officer, June 2002
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The practitioners struggled to understand each others roles and procedures. They 
also occasionally made inappropriate decisions on behalf of specialist workers in 
their absence. The social services manager gave another lengthy example of the 
problems caused when inappropriate decisions were made by the inter-agency 
group in an interview in February 2003:
It’s about a lack of recognition of expertise. I can give you an example. In cases 
where young people have come to us and we haven’t known them before we 
complete something called a core assessment. It’s quite a weighty document 
looking at each area of the child’s family life. And that’s about assessing needs 
and our intervention. When a case comes through, [the social worker] picks it up. 
If it’s a case that’s known to another worker already they will be responsible for 
the core assessment. And the advantage of the core assessment is giving you a 
much more rounded picture of the family’s needs and involving the family in that 
as well. So you are very clear what the understanding is. That may throw up things 
that you didn’t know about, entirely different needs that aren’t apparent. It may 
throw up strengths in the family. So when you start a piece of work you are much 
better informed about that and on the whole you would expect to have the family 
with you and have some agreement about the areas you are going to work on. If 
something comes up through MMAGS there maybe other pressing, more 
important things that need dealing with then and there but they don’t take away 
the need for a core assessment to be completed. At the last MMAGS meeting 
when [the social worker] was absent on a case where just such a thing was going 
on, a worker in the main office is doing a core assessment and [the social worker] 
is involved in it. The core assessment isn’t completed. The group decided that it 
would be a good thing if the family went to parenting classes. So another member 
of the group entirely was told to investigate parenting classes, through an agency 
who I’m fairly sure don’t do them. That seems ludicrous to me because the worker 
in question has no contact with the family and knows nothing about them, but 
unless the family agrees they need parenting classes everyone’s wasting their time 
running around like headless chickens trying to find programmes for them to go 
on. You work through that, you go through your core assessment with them, look 
at areas where there might be difficulty. And then your time is to say, it strikes me 
you have difficulty in there areas, maybe a parenting class would be a good thing 
for you? You can’t decide on that when you don’t have the information. And the
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decision was for [the social worker] to follow up on that. It isn’t appropriate for 
him to do it. And it wastes time going back to the group each time this happens 
and saying this is not appropriate.
Differences in rigidity of organisational procedures and management
As well has having different roles and responsibilities, the practitioners represented 
on the Manchester project worked within different levels of rigidity of 
organisational procedures and management. This was not evident in the Cambridge 
project.
In Manchester, the practitioners from the housing department worked in a very 
rigid manner, following pre-determined set rules and procedures that were applied 
consistently in prescribed circumstances. Other agencies, and especially the youth 
service, were much less rigid in their organisational procedures when addressing 
issues:
There is also a very different relationship between the managers and the 
practitioners of the agencies -  some are very relaxed -  some are much more 
formal. Housing is very formal. So basically there are very different approaches to 
management and structure.
Information manager, December 2001
The rigidity of procedural routines was also reflected in rigidity of management 
styles and performance management. In terms of monitoring outputs and 
performance the practitioners from the housing service were used to more rigid 
performance management regimes than others were. These practitioners were 
expected to produce measurable outputs whereas others were not, as this quote 
from the project information manager in December 2001 demonstrates 
‘. . .interesting dynamics between the agencies. Big differences in tone. Probation 
is very laid back whilst housing seem to be very frightening. Homing is much more 
likely to enforce than probation. There is a lot ofpressure on the housing staff to 
get measurable results. Like evictions ’.
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The practitioners on the project routinely followed differing levels of rigidity in 
their day-to-procedures. This had an impact on the implementation of the project 
because the practitioners attempted to recreate those organisational routines in the 
new project setting. That resulted in tensions between the practitioners as they 
struggled to negotiate new routines for the project:
Differences between agencies are partly to do with differences in structure and 
process. Housing is very structured -  so they want structure. But others are less 
bothered about how things are achieved so long as they are achieved.
Project manager, December 2001
In addition, some practitioners became frustrated at what they saw as failure to 
achieve measurable outputs:
I don’t think we have achieved as much as we should have should have done [...] I 
don’t think that there has been enough to do and some opportunities for action 
have been missed [...] my colleagues would be surprised if they knew how little 
legal action there has been.
Housing practitioner, January 2002
The issue of differing organisational routines was exacerbated because some of the 
practitioners on the project were not used to working within organisational routines 
at all. This was the case for the former gang members who were employed to work 
as outreach workers on the project. Early on in the project the practitioners and 
managers were very positive about the role that the outreach workers might play in 
the project in terms of providing a gateway into the gangs and in providing support 
to aspects of the overall strategy because of their contacts within the South 
Manchester community. The project implementation manager noted in August 
2001 for example, that ‘... [the outreach workers] are very useful for providing 
introductions for some o f the lads ’. Similarly, the information manager, also in 
August 2001, stated that ‘...One problem is community mistrust o f agencies and 
this is unlikely to get better. [The outreach workers] will help in this and help with 
introductions and so on. ’ However, it soon became apparent that their lack of 
experience working within organisations caused specific difficulties for those
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managing the two outreach workers. Their lack of organisational experience meant 
that they struggled to understand the organisational constraints in which they were 
working:
The street worker perspective is very different. They do not have knowledge of 
the constraints of agencies. They can also get the wrong end of the stick. Perhaps 
the street workers should have been more specifically targeted in their use.
Social services manager, June 2002
[The outreach workers] also have no idea how to work in organisations. They’ll 
will ring the directors and order them about.
Youth Offending Team manager, September 2001
The problem with the outreach workers is that they weren’t trained in council 
etiquette and policy.
Information manager, February 2003
[The outreach worker] though employment issues not yet resolved -  matters to do 
with health and safety, cultural issues to do with working with organisations. [The 
outreach workers] want respect. It’s not a payment issue. [The outreach workers] 
don’t understand how organisations work.
Project manager, August 2001
Ultimately, as has been seen, it became very difficult to manage the outreach 
workers and as a result those responsible for them became unhappy about doing 
so. The Youth Offending Team tried to pass responsibility to other agencies, as 
demonstrated by this quote:
[The Youth Offending Team] are now a bit unhappy about the management of 
[the outreach workers]. [The City Council chief executive] had said that the Youth 
Offending Team would do it and gave it to [The Youth Offending Team 
manager]. [The police] didn’t want to manage them and [the Youth Offending 
Team manager] doesn’t want to do it. [The Youth Offending Team manager] 
thinks [the implementation manager] is responsible for it. [The project manager] is 
going to try and sort it out.
Implementation manager September 2001
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As has already been discussed, the outreach workers resigned in June 2002.
Differences in performance indicators
The implementation of the Manchester project was shaped by the pressure that 
agencies were under to achieve different things. This was not evident in 
Cambridge. The different agencies in Manchester had different targets and 
different pressures to meet these targets and these were not always compatible. The 
problem was that this aggravated the differences between the agencies as they 
struggled to find common ground for implementing the project:
It isn’t just about personalities because you see it at line manager and board level 
as well. Its not even about working styles, it’s about pressures on agencies to do 
different things. It’s nothing to do with personality. It’s to do with performance 
indicators and targets that are placed on these agencies and the pressures that 
people are placed under to achieve. I’ll illustrate this crudely. GMP exists, in part, 
to lock people up and to get people convicted and imprisoned and if you speak to 
a lot of police officers they would argue that the best way to reduce crime is to 
take people out of circulation. And to have them imprisoned, especially say with 
prolific burglars, for periods of time. Because they are denied the opportunity to 
burgle. That’s without any high level debate about prison as a rehabilitative 
measure. Whereas the probation service would argue that they don’t want to get 
people locked up at all costs, they want to keep them out of prison. You’ve got 
friction between the two. That’s nothing to do with personality, its to do with 
performance indicators and the targets that are placed on these agencies and the 
pressure that people are under to achieve them.
Project manager, March 2003
Conflict
It should be clear that in Manchester the differences in organisational values and 
routines along with pressures to achieve different outputs and targets described in 
the preceding sections resulted in conflict between the participating agencies as 
they tried to negotiate the direction that the project should take. Conflict was not 
evident in the Cambridge project.
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The conflict in the Manchester project was observed and remarked upon by both 
practitioners and managers in interview quite early on in the implementation of the 
project. The project manager, for example, remarked in August 2001 that ‘...there 
are interagency conflicts about what to do.' And one of the housing 
representatives in November 2001 ‘ there has been a lot o f debate and 
disagreement’. This was related in part to the vague project aims and objectives, 
described in chapter five, which gave the project a potentially very wide remit and 
was compounded by practitioners’ preferences for different types of intervention 
and different day-to-day routines. This resulted in ongoing debate about the project 
focus and remit instead of implementation of the project interventions. This is 
demonstrated by a comment by the Youth Offending Team manager in March 
2003 ‘ ... the practitioners group floundered at the beginning. Practitioners get 
mixed up as to what their role is; get mixed up in debating processes when they 
need to do actions. I t ’s difficult for the police to manage that, and to set them 
action. ’ In Manchester the very differing value systems and day-to-day routines of 
practitioners led to conflict between agencies as they struggled to negotiate 
common ground for implementing the project interventions. As one member of the 
Youth Offending Team in June 2002 stated ‘... people have got different agendas. 
Housing is about enforcement. We are about improvement and help. The two come 
against each other’.
The implementation of the Manchester project became characterised by the 
conflict that arose as the practitioners attempted to ensure that their conception of 
appropriate interventions and appropriate means of achieving them became 
dominant in the project. However, it was far from the case that the implementation 
of the project was wholly constrained by the conflict about project interventions 
and the means of delivering them. Indeed agreements were reached between the 
participating agencies about the scope of the project and interventions were 
implemented, as outlined in chapter five.
Crawford’s 1997 discussion of the creative management of potential areas of 
conflict is useful in helping to understand how it was possible to make decisions 
and to implement interventions in the conflictual situation in Manchester.
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Crawford (1997) demonstrated how managers could sometimes ‘define away’ 
potential conflict in order to facilitate the implementation of project interventions. 
By this he was referring to the ability of practitioners to manage conflictual 
situations to get things done in practice. Crawford described a number of ways that 
conflict was managed in multi-agency settings. The aims and scope of a project 
might, for example, be redefined to make it more acceptable to the participating 
agencies to maximise the chances of implementing interventions. Project managers 
might set vague and multiple aims and be flexible about what counts as successful 
in order to avoid conflict between agencies. Conflict might be managed through 
creative construction of the minutes and agendas to minimise the outward 
appearance of conflict. It also might occur through addressing issues and problems 
informally, outside of formally recorded meetings.
In the Manchester project, a range of strategies for ensuring that decisions were 
made and interventions implemented in the conflictual project were indeed 
observed. The presence of the broad and multiple aims in this project has already 
been noted. Crawford (1997) saw vague and multiple aims as a characteristic of 
inter-agency crime prevention work. Crawford, however, considered that the 
creation of vague and multiple aims could be a tactic for managing potential 
sources of conflict between agencies working in a partnership setting. He argued 
that where a range of project aims and objectives were claimed, it is more likely 
that an agency will identify with one of them. Crawford argued that there is some 
sense in this approach as a pragmatic means of getting support for projects. There 
is no evidence that the Manchester project was transformed purposefully for this 
reason. However, given the anti-enforcement agenda it may well be the case that 
had the project not been transformed in this manner -  to focus generally on gang 
membership rather than firearms and to encompass a very wide range of 
interventions -  it would have not been able to attract and maintain the support of 
the range of agencies that it did. However, the development of broad and multiple 
aims is not without risks. Crawford (1997) argued that in the longer term this can 
create difficulties as projects may become pulled in different and competing 
directions as they attempt to satisfy diverse interests (Crawford, 1997). This was 
indeed evident in Manchester.
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Creative construction of project minutes which minimised the outward appearance 
of conflict in this project was also observed. The minutes tended to note that 
generally an issue had been discussed or that concerns had been voiced but did not 
record what these issues were or what the nature of the discussion was. For 
example, on at the meeting held on 6 February 2002 the minutes state that ‘ ... [the 
outreach worker] has requested time to discuss several issues related to MMAGS’. 
The minutes do not provide a record of what these issues were. In the minutes of 
the following meetings there is no evidence of this discussion taking place. 
Whether this means that the requested discussion did not occur, was dealt with 
informally or that the issues raised were simply not formally recorded in the 
minutes is of course unclear. The point is whatever the outreach workers wanted to 
discuss was not recorded in a formal manner. Similarly, the minutes from the 
meeting held on 13 February 2002 stated that ‘...a general conversation took place 
concerning the level o f information provision prior to meetings at the present 
time’. No information was recorded about what the nature of that information was. 
A few months later on 8 May 2002 the following was recorded in the minutes 
‘..following last week's meeting, there were concerns raised over the manner in 
which events unfolded’. Again, no information was recorded about what those 
‘unfolding events’ were and what the ‘concerns raised ’ were. The following 
extract was taken from the minutes of the meeting held on the 5th February 2003 
‘...in relation to some o f the questions raised by the case [the project manager] 
made it clear that practitioners should communicate with each other as often as 
possible’. What these ‘questions raised’ were of course is unclear from a read of 
the minutes. Likewise, on 26 March 2003 the following statement was recorded 
‘...a discussion took place over the extent o f data sharing that was being requested 
by MMAGS. [The probation officer] felt that some o f the issues would constitute a 
breach o f confidentiality ’. Again, there was no indication of what the ‘issues that 
would constitute a breach’ were. This issue was also highlighted by the 
practitioners working on the project, as this interview quote from the housing 
practitioner in November 2001 demonstrates, ‘ ... sometimes issues just drop off 
the agenda, but for no apparent reason. I t ’s frustrating’.
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As well as being extremely vague, omissions, errors and reconstruction of the 
minutes were also evident. The minutes of the meeting held on 11 December 2002, 
for example, state that ‘...[the probation officer] commented on some omissions 
from the AOB section from last week’s meeting. These were noted’. The 
construction of the minutes had in fact become a matter of discussion and debate 
amongst the practitioners themselves. For example, the minutes of 5 February 
2003 stated that '...should there be amendments that practitioners would like to be 
made to minutes they should notify [the project information manager] by close o f 
play o f business on Fridays. The arbiter o f any conflicting views will be [the 
project manager] Moreover perhaps, some forms of debate and discussion played 
out in the practitioner meetings was not recorded at all. At an observed meeting 
held on 22 May 2002, the practitioners decided that ‘personal type ’ comments 
would not be recorded in the minutes at all. This decision was not recorded 
formally in any of the minutes of the meetings. The conflictual nature of the 
meetings would not be evident from a reading of the minutes alone. This would 
have implications for how the accountability of the meetings and also for any 
management efforts to try and manage conflict between the practitioners.
As was also observed by Crawford (1997), addressing issues informally outside of 
the group was evident as a means of making sure that decisions were made. For 
example, the minutes from 13 February 2002 stated that ‘...a separate meeting will 
be held to discuss other matters'. There was no indication of what those 'other’ 
matters were but clearly also there was no formal record of that meeting and any 
decisions that might have been made there. Similarly, on 11 December 2002 the 
minutes stated that ‘.. .[the education practitioner] raised some concerns about the 
minutes that would be addressed outside the meeting. ’
The issue of informal decision making outside of the formal project meetings was 
also noted by the practitioners themselves. In particular, some respondents felt that 
decisions were indeed being made by the police service and the implementation 
team and imposed without discussion. The education manager, for example, stated 
at an interview in August 2001:
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I am concerned that there are things going on that the steering group does not get 
to hear about. I feel a bit like I do not know what is going on. An inner circle of 
people are organising things and the rest of us are not aware of what is going on.
Key then is who had access to informal meetings at which decisions were made 
(Crawford, 1997). Indeed (and related to the issue of informal decision making) 
some of the practitioners stated that they felt that some agencies had unequal 
influence within the project, through differential access to the project manager, as 
this statement from the probation manager suggests in February 2003:
Part of the problem is on the board. Some of the board members are also line 
managers. The question is that some of the board members and line managers 
have more of an influence on [the project manager]?
Crawford and Jones (1995) argued that these sorts of problems are caused by lack 
of trust and that the establishment of trust is important in establishing effective 
multi-agency working relationships. This, they suggested, is related to the ability 
of front-line workers to go beyond their professional roles and develop 
interpersonal trust relations with practitioners from other agencies. Difficulties 
getting along at a practitioner level and building trusting relationships were 
certainly present in this project for some of the practitioners. The Youth Offending 
Team member stated in February 2003 4 ... personalities are an ongoing problem 
as well. People are not willing to work with each other and get on with it’. And 
similarly, from the project manager in March 2003:
Some have done it better than others [have]. And the extent to which they have 
collaborated has been directly in proportion to the quality of interpersonal 
relationships between individual practitioners. And you see it with things like 
social services and youth services [who] work pretty much together because the 
practitioners get on.
Practitioners on the project indicated that there was mistrust of the sort described 
by Crawford and Jones (1995). The youth worker stated in January 2002 ‘...the 
police and youth services have a poor record o f working together and youth
225
services are very mistrustful. Similarly, the project manager stated in August 2001 
that, '... they need to get used to talking freely. There is still some wariness 
between the agencies. ’
In Manchester then overt conflict was evident but decisions were nevertheless 
made and interventions were implemented. This was facilitated by, for example, 
making informal decisions to resolve difficulties and to minimise the appearance 
of conflict in the minutes. In this sense, informal decision making offered a means 
through which the project interventions could be implemented. On the other hand, 
by doing so, conflicts were left unacknowledged and unaddressed and the project 
became less accountable to those who were responsible for overseeing it. Crawford 
and Jones (1995) also argued that informal decision-making systems seem to offer 
a more workable basis for communication and negotiation in inter-agency 
working. However, they also noted that these can be risky and can endanger 
confidentiality and civil liberties and that the practice of informal conflict 
management results in pragmatic compromise, rather than negotiation of 
competing interests. Pearson et al. (1992) noted in their study that practitioners 
tended to feel that inter-agency working was most effective in an informal setting. 
However, the authors argued that a degree of formality is required to prevent 
blurring of roles and identities and to prevent breaches of confidentiality. Crawford 
(1997) also argued informal decision making is not necessarily a good thing, even 
if it does facilitate action in some circumstances. Informal decision making leaves 
differential power relations unchecked and it hides decision making from formal 
review. Like Pearson et al. (1992) he argued that more formal systems of 
representation would be appropriate in inter-agency working to improve clarity and 
prevent blurring of practitioner roles and identities (Crawford, 1997). The trade­
off, as this study also suggests, might be that it is harder to reach consensus in the 
first place and hence to subsequently implement projects.
This chapter ends with a brief discussion of the role played by race and gender in 
the implementation of the Manchester project. It has been argued that gender 
issues could be a significant obstacle to inter-agency working, in particular that 
female line-level practitioners in the social services, probation services and health 
care may be reluctant to work with the male-dominated police service. It is
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conceivable that similar issues may be present in respect to race. As such, efforts 
were made in this study to assess the role played by race and gender in explaining 
the nature of implementation. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the 
conflict in the Manchester project was caused by gender or race relations: the 
observed conflict between the agencies was caused primarily by differences in 
values and routines between the practitioners.
Summary of chapter seven
This chapter has examined the bottom-up factors that help to explain the 
implementation of the Manchester and Cambridge projects. These included 
negotiation of project aims, the role of practitioner values, routines and conflict. 
Renegotiation of the original project plans was evident in the Manchester project 
but not in the Cambridge project. In Manchester the project implementation team 
shifted the project theory to focus much more widely on the problem of gang 
membership rather than shootings early on in the project. In doing so, the scope of 
the project widened considerably leading to differences at all levels about how the 
project was conceptualised by those working on it and difficulties operationalising 
the project for practical purposes. Additionally, the project in Manchester took on a 
new meaning, which was not the same as that developed in the original project 
plans. The enforcement element of the project came to be seen as individual level 
enforcement action against individuals who would not co-operate with offers of 
support rather than in terms of the multi-agency crackdowns that were the main 
thrust of the Boston Gun Project that the project was attempting to replicate.
The implementation of the Manchester project was influenced by differences in 
organisational values between the practitioners. This related especially to 
differences about what were perceived by practitioners to be appropriate 
interventions. This was bome of differing conceptions of how best to tackle 
problems. In particular, there were differences between the agencies that came 
from a client-based welfare perspective and those who saw their role primarily as 
being to enforce regulations and the law. This was played out in terms of the extent 
to which enforcement initiatives should be implemented in relation to welfare and 
supportive interventions. The consequence of the differences in values was that
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little enforcement activity (however conceived) was implemented as the welfare- 
focused practitioners undermined attempts at enforcement. The influence of 
organisational values in shaping the nature of implementation was not evident in 
the Cambridge project.
Organisational routines were also evident in shaping the two projects, again most 
notably in the Manchester project. There, the practitioners struggled to understand 
one another’s roles, procedures and processes. This resulted in problems 
understanding each other’s decision making and resulted in conflict between them 
as they struggled to agree on project scope. The different agencies were marked by 
differences in working styles. Some agencies operated rigid working procedures 
and operated within much more rigid organisational structures. This caused 
problems as some practitioners wanted a flexible working environment and others 
wanted to work within a more rigid organisational structure. Similarly, concern 
with attending to differing and sometimes conflicting performance indicators also 
caused difficulties. The role of routine was also evident in the Cambridge project 
albeit not to the same degree. That the project had not anticipated the City 
Council’s routines for building works led to delays, but did not fundamentally 
prevent the project from implementing its situational interventions in the long 
term.
The Manchester project was also shaped by conflict between the agencies as the 
practitioners struggled to co-operate and to come to a common understanding of 
what constituted suitable interventions. Within the conflictual nature of inter­
agency working in the Manchester project, a number of strategies were employed 
to ensure that interventions were implemented. Creative management of agendas 
and minutes to avoid areas of conflict were observed. Details of minutes of 
meetings were vague; omissions and errors were evident. Issues were left off 
meetings’ agendas and dealt with outside of the official meetings. Conflict and its 
negotiation were not evident in Cambridge.
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Chapter eight
Integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches
Introduction
Drawing on evidence from the case studies, the aim of this thesis was to examine the 
legitimacy of the top-down and bottom-up approach to analysing and understanding 
the implementation of problem-oriented projects within the police service and wider 
crime reduction arena. This chapter is concerned with examining the extent to which 
this was achieved and the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches.
The chapter will start by reviewing those factors that shaped the implementation of 
the two case studies in light of the top-down and bottom-up literature. It will discuss 
what was planned and what the projects achieved in relation to top-down and bottom- 
up features of project implementation. It will be argued that whilst both top-down 
and bottom-up approaches play a role in explaining and understanding patterns of 
implementation, they are limited and these limitations are discussed with reference to 
evidence from this study. In light of these limitations this chapter finishes by outlining 
an alternative way of conceptualising project implementation, drawing on the 
ontological framework provided by Giddens (1984).
The role of top-down and bottom-up factors in the Cambridge project
In the Cambridge project there was limited deviation from the original plans although 
the enforcement interventions were not implemented at all and some interventions 
were implemented late. Top-down features of project implementation were strongly 
evident in shaping the nature of the Cambridge project. These included project 
leadership, the availability of resources, project theory, objectives and management 
and compliance. The role they played is discussed in the following sections.
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Leadership played an important in role in the delivery of the Cambridge project. The 
support of senior managers facilitated access to the grant funding required to get the 
project up and running. Senior support from the City Council facilitated 
implementation of the situational interventions in particular. However, external 
pressures on senior police managers to prioritise other forms of crime to meet 
centrally determined performance targets meant that they would not release officers to 
work on the enforcement interventions and these were not implemented in any form 
as a result. Top-down analysts acknowledge that circumstances beyond the control of 
those directly managing projects can play a role in shaping implementation of projects 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Generally, however, they have argued that these are 
inevitable, that there is little that can be done about them and they do not tend to 
examine their role in detail.
Whilst external pressures on available resources and the preferences of senior police 
management thwarted the delivery of the enforcement interventions, the nature of the 
resources available for this project shaped its implementation in other ways. As has 
been stressed, the availability of adequate resources is very important for top-down 
explanations of project implementation. In particular, the availability of adequate time 
and money at the right stages of implementation play an important role in shaping the 
nature of implementation of projects (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It has been seen 
that, for the most part, the resources required to implement the Cambridge project 
were available and this helped explain the nature of the implementation of this 
project. As set out in detail in chapter six it has been contended that the Cambridge 
project was feasible in terms of its plans, the levels of staffing (and other) resources it 
had access to and the time available to implement the interventions. This match is an 
important condition for facilitating the delivery of interventions for top-down analysts 
(Hood, 1976; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
Top-down analysts do, however, conceive resources more widely than just the 
availability of money and refer also to the staffing required to implement projects and 
other tools that might be required (in the context of problem-oriented projects the 
availability of data and analysts is especially important). Indeed, the implementation 
of the Cambridge project was shaped in part by the project manager who, it was
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agreed by those working on the project, had some of the necessary skills to co­
ordinate the project interventions. The Cambridge project manager, however, did not 
have all of the right skills and his lack of project management and particularly lack of 
procurement experience led to delays delivering the situational aspects of the project. 
The data and skills required to analyse the problem of bicycle theft and develop 
responses were also available in the Cambridge project as was discussed in detail in 
chapter six.
As well as being essential in explaining the implementation of projects in terms of 
capacity and feasibility, resources are also important because they influence the nature 
of other top-down features of project implementation. In the Cambridge project, the 
availability of resources played a role in shaping the development of the project 
theory. Top-down analysts have argued that a successful project depends on a detailed 
understanding of the problem that it is seeking to tackle and on a clear theory 
specifying cause and effect mechanisms because an initiative might just be a bad idea. 
In the Cambridge project, the resources (in terms of availability of data and skills to 
analyse the problem of bicycle theft) facilitated this and so played a role in shaping 
project theory. It has been argued that the theory of the Cambridge project (drawing 
on a range of data and observations) was based on a fairly detailed understanding of 
the problem of bicycle theft in Cambridge and on situational crime prevention 
methods for which there is a well-established evidence base indicating that they can 
be successful in tackling problems. Looking at the project from a top-down point of 
view, the project theory based on understanding of the nature of the problem and clear 
cause and effect mechanisms was more likely to lead to success in addressing cycle 
theft.
For top-downers, in developing project theory and objectives dependency links 
between agencies should be kept to a minimum because where implementation 
requires agreement from a wide number of agencies it is harder to make decisions to 
implement interventions (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). As has been seen, Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1973) stressed that programmes and projects reliant on a range of 
agencies to make decisions and get measures put in place can break down because of 
the complexity of decision making and the time that it takes to reach agreements. The 
Cambridge project relied on a small number of key agencies to implement its
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interventions and as such had limited dependency on other agencies. As top-downers 
suggest, this would seem to be important in explaining the nature of the 
implementation of this project. The Cambridge project implemented all its situational 
interventions and the delivery of these was facilitated because the project manager 
was not dependent on negotiating with large numbers of agencies and individuals 
within them to make decisions to get interventions implemented. There were, of 
course, dependency links to other agencies in this project, the most important being 
the reliance on the city council in respect to the building works. This led to delay 
(which will be discussed again in more detail shortly) but the dependency links were 
minimal here which fundamentally facilitated making decisions in this project and 
implementing the planned interventions in the long term.
That the project had a theory based on clear, short cause and effect relations had a 
subsequent impact on the development of the role played by the project objectives in 
explaining implementation. For top-down analysts well-stated objectives are very 
important in explaining project implementation. Related to the issue of dependency 
links between agencies there needs to be understanding and agreement of objectives 
which are clearly communicated and understood by those responsible for delivering 
them (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). There needs to be agreement at all stages because 
initial agreements can break down. In Cambridge, this point would seem to be useful 
in helping to explain the nature of implementation of the project. Generally, there was 
agreement between the main agencies (police, City Council and universities) about 
this project’s aims and the means through which these were to be achieved. There 
were, of course, delays as different agencies’ procedural routines were negotiated but 
generally the agreement about the aims and the means of the project facilitated 
implementation of this project.
More importantly, perhaps, top-down analysts argue that where theory and objectives 
are broad and unspecific, so will the guidance stating what practitioners should 
actually do (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Guidance needs to be fully specified in 
terms of what needs to be done and when and who is responsible for it (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984). There is thus a relationship between the provision of well-stated 
objectives and the subsequent development of guidance for implementing a project. 
This top-down feature was present in the Cambridge project (summarised in chapter 5
232
and set out in full in Annex three) and was followed by the project manager in a 
largely unproblematic manner.
The nature of the guidance in turn has an impact on the role played by other top-down 
features of project implementation. In particular, it played a role in shaping the 
management of the project. For top-down analysts it is a managerial task to ensure 
that elements of a programme are implemented. Perfect compliance with guidance is 
considered to be unlikely but it is argued that there does need to be good 
communication and management to ensure that tasks are completed and to minimise 
deviation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It has been seen that the minimal project 
monitoring by regionally based Home Office officials made it easier for Cambridge 
Constabulary to renege on their original promise to provide the resources to 
implement the enforcement-based initiatives. However, locally, for the most part the 
project manager in Cambridge did comply with the guidance for the elements of the 
project that he was responsible for. Management of the project was further shaped by 
the single line of management authority in the project. Top-downers argue that 
projects with single lines of authority are less complex to manage than those with 
multiple lines (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hood, 1976). Here the project 
manager was responsible directly to the community safety manager within the police 
service organisational structure. So there was a very clear, single line of management 
of the project manager which top-downers argue facilitates project implementation.
Top-down conceptions of project implementation then help to explain the nature of 
implementation of the Cambridge project. Deviation from the original plans was 
minimal in this project and this project indeed satisfies many of the conditions that the 
top-down analysts state need to be present to minimise deviation: adequate resources 
for the plans and timetable were available; the theory was based on short cause and 
effect relationships; there were well-stated objectives and guidance; there were few 
lines of dependency between agencies; and, there was a single line of management for 
the project manager. However, even here, where many of the top-down conditions 
were satisfied, it is not the case that these top-down features can wholly explain the 
delivery of the project. Importantly, whilst top-downers acknowledge the possibility 
of external events or pressures playing a role in implementation they do little to 
explain or understand their impact. Yet it has been seen that external pressures (in this
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case the role of central performance indicators) were important in shaping what was 
done in this project. To neglect to account for this would limit understanding of the 
implementation of this project. Bottom-up features also played a role in the 
implementation of this project. As was set out in detail in chapters six and seven, 
delays resulted from differences in organisational routines between the city council 
and the police service. The police-based project manager struggled to understand the 
policies and procedures of the City Council building regulations which led to delays 
in putting in place some of the situational elements of the project.
The role of top-down and bottom-up factors in the Manchester project
It has been seen that the Manchester project deviated widely from its original plans 
and many intended interventions were not applied at all. As in Cambridge, top-down 
features help to explain the nature of the implementation of the Manchester project 
and again these include the nature of leadership, the availability of resources, project 
theory, objectives and management and compliance. These factors, however, shaped 
implementation in rather different ways than they did in the Cambridge project and 
are discussed in the following sections.
In Manchester, strong leadership was evident and played a role in shaping 
implementation through facilitating access to some of the resources required for the 
project. In contrast to Cambridge, senior management did release the staff required to 
work on the inter-agency project and this fundamentally facilitated the delivery of the 
project. However, more generally, the role played by resources in shaping 
implementation was more problematic here than in the Cambridge project. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, quite simply, this project was too ambitious for its 
allocated timescales and finances and this restricted what could realistically be 
achieved. Second, concerns were raised about the motivation and ability of some of 
the staff who worked on the project who were not considered by some managers and 
others working on the project to have all the right skills to deliver this project. Third, 
adequate data to understand the problem of gang violence were not readily available 
and this made it much harder to develop an understanding of the nature of gang- 
related violence in the first place and it was less clear that data and evidence were 
being used to guide the development of the new renegotiated theory over time.
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In Manchester, the project theory shifted in the early days of the project to focus 
broadly on the wider social determinants of gang membership rather than on the 
situational determinants of shootings. This shift in project theory was not framed in 
terms of the analysis that had informed the original strategy or indeed any other 
evidence about how gang-related problems should be tackled. This shift in project 
theory was not questioned by the Regional Office who oversaw the accounts for the 
grant but did little to monitor what the project was delivering in practice.
The importance of basing project theory on clear cause and effect mechanisms for 
top-down accounts of project implementation has been discussed. In moving the 
project theory to focus on social determinants of gang membership, the cause and 
effect mechanisms underpinning the project theory were much longer and less clear 
than they were in the original strategy based on situational determinants of shootings 
and replicating the successful Boston arrangements. Long sequences of cause and 
effect relationships are problematic as they are far more likely to break down over 
time and so interventions are less likely to be implemented '...the fewer the steps, the 
fewer the opportunities for disasters to over take it ’ (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: 
147). Looking at the Manchester project theory from a top-down perspective then, 
conceiving the project in terms of the long-term social determinants of gang 
membership was likely to be problematic not least because these were not well 
understood but also because there was an increased risk that the sequences of cause 
and effect would break down over time.
It has been seen that top-down analysts make much of the role played by dependency 
links between agencies in shaping what projects deliver. Projects which rely on 
multiple agencies contain many different decision paths that have to be negotiated to 
make decisions and to get interventions implemented (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973). This complicates the delivery of projects and programmes. As was set out in 
chapter five, the broad and ambitious project theory drew on the resources of a large 
number of individuals and agencies, including youth workers, education workers, 
outreach workers, housing officers, teachers, probation officers, social workers and 
police officers who all had to make decisions to act and/or negotiate decisions with 
their home agencies before interventions could be delivered. Thus the implementation
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of this project was heavily reliant on multiple dependency links. Top-downers argue 
that this will make implementation much more problematic, as indeed was observed 
in Manchester.
The diverse project theory shaped patterns of implementation in two other ways. First, 
for top-downers there needs to be understanding and agreement of project objectives 
amongst those responsible for implementing them to minimise difficulties delivering 
interventions (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In the Manchester project this was not 
straightforward. It has been seen in chapter seven that there was some general 
agreement about the importance of the project but there were differences between the 
practitioners in respect to the extent to which the project aims focused on reducing 
shootings or on addressing gang membership. This was evident at all levels of the 
project. Moreover, it is quite clear that there was no agreement about how to meet 
those aims, and the differences between practitioners in terms of whether the project 
should focus on enforcement or preventative and supportive interventions has been 
discussed at length. In short, there was some general agreement about the project ends 
but not about the means of getting there. Top-downers argue that this is problematic 
for project implementation and indeed in Manchester the fundamental disagreement 
about project objectives resulted in conflict between the practitioners (discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter). Second, project objectives need to be well-specified, 
mostly in order to facilitate the development of adequate guidance ‘...if objectives are 
not uniquely determined, neither are the modes o f implementation for them9 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). In Manchester, it did indeed prove difficult to 
operationalise the broad objectives for practical purposes and this led to difficulties. 
These were set out in chapter six and included the identification of those young 
people with whom the project should be working; when and how to take referrals; 
and, more widely, knowing what the practitioners should have been doing and when.
As top-downers would have foreseen, the fact that the guidance was not well stated 
had wider implications for this project. In the absence of clear guidance setting out 
what practitioners should have been doing it was much harder to manage on a day-to- 
day basis. As discussed in chapter six, it was difficult for the project managers to 
know what the practitioners should be achieving day-to-day and hence how and when 
to hold them to account.
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The management of the project was complicated by the multiple lines of authority 
present in the multi-agency project. As has been seen, the practitioners had line 
management responsibility to the project manager but also to their differing home 
agencies. Top-down analysts have argued that these multiple lines complicate 
implementation because project authority becomes blurred (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973) and that implementation of projects is more likely to be successful where there 
is a single line of authority (Hood, 1976). The problems caused by multiple lines of 
management in this project were discussed in chapter six and included the differences 
in the levels of line management support that the practitioners received; the 
difficulties faced by the project managers who struggled to manage and co-ordinate 
the different specialisms on a day-to-day basis; and, the difficulties of holding 
practitioners to account because the project manager did not have responsibility for 
discipline and performance management of the seconded practitioners. Ultimately the 
project managers struggled to control the behaviour of the practitioners and attempts 
to be more authoritative were unsuccessful.
Top-down features of project implementation were evident then in shaping the nature 
of the implementation of the Manchester project. However, the role these played in 
shaping the project were very different than they were in the Cambridge project.
There was a high degree of deviation from the original plans in this project and 
around a third of the specific project interventions were not implemented in any form. 
In contrast to the Cambridge project, many of the conditions that top-down analysts 
have argued need to be present to minimise deviation and implementation problems 
were not satisfied in this project: namely, there was a mismatch between the available 
resources, the plans and the timetable; the theory was based on long sequences of 
cause and effect; the objectives were broad and ambitious and there was little 
agreement on them; the guidance was not formally stated; delivery of the project was 
dependent on multiple agencies; and, there were multiple lines of authority in staff 
management.
Whilst the nature of these top-down features played a role shaping implementation, 
bottom-up features were also very clearly evident in explaining the implementation of 
the Manchester project. It has been seen that a wide range of practitioners from a wide
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range of backgrounds were brought together to implement it. In particular, the 
different practitioners came to the project with very different organisational values 
and routines which shaped the implementation of the project in various ways. The 
different practitioners were associated with different preferences about how to tackle 
problems associated with young people. The most obvious were the very marked 
differences between those practitioners who favoured supportive and rehabilitative 
interventions and those who favoured more punitive enforcement-based interventions. 
The different practitioners also had different day-to-day routines and procedures in 
respect to how they addressed problems with young people and their associated 
arrangements for management of staff. The practitioners thus came to the project with 
different values and routines and this shaped the implementation of the project in two 
main ways: first, practitioners started to attempt to renegotiate the project theory and 
objectives to better reflect their values and routines; and second, it ultimately led to 
conflict between the agencies.
Over time the practitioners’ values and routines then shaped the very nature of the 
project aims and objectives in Manchester, removing them from those that had been 
planned to better reflect their values and established organisational routines. This 
started with the implementation team who renegotiated project aims to better reflect 
their view that the problem of shootings should be tackled through addressing gang 
membership. It continued as the practitioners undermined the delivery of enforcement 
elements of the project. This resonates strongly with the bottom-up literature which 
points to how policy is not fixed but negotiated over time by those responsible for 
implementing it (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjem and Porter, 1981). Top-down 
analysts do not (as has been stressed) reject the potential for practitioners’ behaviour 
to influence the nature of implementation in this way, they just minimise its role and 
assume that the impact can be reduced through project management and 
accountability. However, the Manchester project shows that practitioners were able to 
resist the attempts of the project management to influence their behaviour. As 
indicated above, the nature of compliance had an impact on the implementation of this 
project as the practitioners were able, to an extent, to resist the directives of senior 
management to implement particular interventions that they did not agree with, most 
notably the enforcement elements of the project. Moreover, the change to a more 
directive project management style, associated with the second project manger, to try
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to influence the behaviour of some of the practitioner team members did not result in 
any change in their behaviour (and if anything made matters worse). This suggests 
that the practitioners still had the capacity to resist attempts to marshal their activities 
in certain ways. This too strongly resonates with bottom-up analysts who have argued 
that it cannot be assumed that managers and practitioners have the same interests; that 
practitioners might not consider orders from above to be legitimate; and, that the 
means managers have to make practitioners comply might not be sufficient to ensure 
that they do so (Lipsky, 1980).
Lastly, it has been see that this project was characterised by conflict between the 
practitioners as they struggled to agree a project scope and the means of delivering it. 
The problem of conflict in inter-agency environments has been identified by both top- 
down and bottom-up analysts. As has been seen, for top-down analysts this has tended 
to be conceived in terms of project complexity: the involvement of multiple agencies 
makes implementation more complicated because many more perspectives have to be 
accounted for and more decision paths have to be cleared before decisions can be 
made and interventions delivered (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The involvement 
of many actors in implementation creates a number of problems. It introduces a 
multiplicity of perspectives as practitioners become involved in projects for different 
reasons, for example, because they have jurisdiction over elements of the programme, 
because they feel that their interests were being impinged on or to build up local 
support (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). This potentially can result in conflict 
because practitioners try to impose their priorities and their preferred sequence of 
events (which may differ) onto others. For top-downers this conflict is an issue that 
should be resolved through project management.
Bottom-up analysts have also noted the issue of conflict in inter-agency environments 
but conceive it somewhat differently: as well as differing priorities and means of 
achieving them, they also highlight the role played by differing values and ideological 
perspectives in shaping implementation and creating conflict between practitioners. 
As discussed in chapter three, Barrett and Fudge (1981) conceived implementation in 
terms of achieving consensus: a consensus that needs to be negotiated between those 
participating in the implementation of a project over time. The negotiation of this 
consensus is partly dependent on the degree to which different actors and agencies
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share value systems and objectives to support and execute particular policies or 
programmes. Compliance and co-operation with programmes and projects may only 
be achieved by negotiation and compromise. They argued that different values, 
attitudes and experiences combine to form ‘...the perception o f the different actors 
which shape their whole approach to defining problems and issues and to determine 
whether or not action is needed or cannot be avoided’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981:24). 
They argued that there is a need to understand the ways the practitioners arrive at 
goals and priorities to understand implementation properly at both the individual and 
the agency level. Hjem and Porter (1981) noted that many novel programmes are in 
fact implemented in new multi-agency settings which bring together a range of 
practitioners with different perspectives, priorities and means of implementing 
interventions. They argued that practitioners participating in new programmes attempt 
to adapt parts of the new programme to best fit wider organisational strategies and 
priorities. Lipsky (1980) also pointed to the difficulties caused where there are 
multiple actors involved in implementation. He argued that there are conflicts of 
interest between agencies which stem from their different ideological perspectives. 
This results in a need to negotiate an agreed course of action which satisfies all 
involved ‘...conflicting interests are deeply rooted and each side has marked out 
territory where it is influential. Each side must be content with the arrangement 
because neither can prevail ’ (Lipsky, 1980:41).
In Manchester, the conflicts about the nature of the project proved hard to control 
through project management. Ultimately this conflict had an impact on the formal 
accountability and management of the project as decisions were made in informal 
settings to ensure that decisions were made and interventions implemented.
The relationship between top-down and bottom-up features
Top-down concerns of theory, objectives, guidance and management and 
accountability helped explain the patterns of delivery of both the Manchester and 
Cambridge projects, albeit in very different ways. This picture is, however, 
complicated by the role played by the practitioners themselves who influenced the 
projects through negotiating project aims, their different values and routines and
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through the conflict between them. Top-down analysts fundamentally downplay the 
part these play in delivering projects. Practitioners have different values regarding 
which interventions constitute the most appropriate means of dealing with problems 
and different day-to-day procedural routines and processes and this shapes what 
projects achieve. This was evident in both of the case studies, though clearly very 
much more so in the complex inter-agency Manchester project.
In addition this study points to evidence of interaction between top-down and bottom- 
up factors. This furthers the view that projects cannot be understood through one or 
the other approach. This study suggests that the structural and behavioural features of 
projects are not independent of one another. The very nature of the top-down and 
bottom-up factors are influenced by their interaction with one another and this shapes 
how projects are delivered.
The following sections discuss the nature of the observed relationships between top- 
down and bottom-up features of project implementation with examples from the case 
studies.
Interaction between top-down and bottom-up features in the Manchester project
It has been seen that a feature of the Manchester project was renegotiation of the 
project theory by practitioners. Over time, the Manchester practitioners were able to 
renegotiate the scope and procedures of the project and this resulted in a project that 
looked very different from the one that had originally been planned. This negotiation 
was influenced by the practitioners’ values and routines and the strategy was 
transformed to better reflect what they perceived to be appropriate interventions and 
procedures for dealing with the problem of gang-related violence. It is misleading 
then to conceive the top-down issue of project theory and objectives as independent of 
the bottom-up feature of renegotiation: practitioners very clearly influenced the 
evolution of the top-down features of theory and objectives over time. This, however, 
is not where the role played by the practitioners in determining the nature of top-down 
features of this project ended. It should be clear that top-down features of projects are 
not independent of one another and there are reciprocal relationships between them. 
The literature review and the discussion of top-down features of the Cambridge and 
Manchester projects in the preceding sections show that the nature of one top-down
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feature of implementation has implications for the nature of others. For example, it 
has been seen that the provision of data has implications for the nature of the project 
theory, the theory has implications for how the project objectives are specified, and in 
turn the specification of the objectives influences how well the project guidance is set 
out and this ultimately influences how the project is managed.
In Manchester, the practitioners shifted and expanded the project theory and 
objectives which had an impact on the nature of the other top-down features of the 
project. It has been shown that notions of ‘gangs’ and ‘gang membership’ are difficult 
to operationalise for practical interventions and indeed the wide-ranging objectives 
negotiated by the Manchester practitioners proved difficult to translate into guidance 
for operational purposes. It was not clear how to identify and target young people for 
interventions and how and when to take referrals. This in turn led to increased work 
loads and difficulties in knowing whether the correct individuals had been selected for 
the project. The lack of specific guidance in turn shaped the nature of the management 
task in this project. As the guidance was not well specified it meant that it was not 
clear what the practitioners were supposed to be doing which complicated the 
management task. In the Manchester project, practitioner behaviour also shaped the 
very nature of the systems of accountability that were supposed to control their 
behaviour. In particular, the conflict between the practitioners on the group resulted in 
decision making outside of the formal project meetings and efforts were made to 
minimise the appearance of conflict through creative construction of project meeting 
minutes. Thus, the conflictual situation was not immediately apparent to those 
responsible for overseeing it. That the practitioners could shape the role played by 
formal systems of accountability clearly reduced the impact that those systems could 
have in controlling their behaviour.
In Manchester then, bottom-up features of practitioner renegotiation, values, routines 
and conflict helped to shape the very nature of those top-down features of theory, 
objectives, guidance, management and accountability that were supposed to orient 
their activities.
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Interaction between top-down and bottom-up features in the Cambridge project
The same kind of interaction between top-down and bottom-up factors was not 
evident in the Cambridge project mostly because of the project structure and the 
nature of partnership interaction in this project. As has been seen, the Cambridge 
project was comprised only of a project manager who was situated in the community 
safety department of the police service and liaised with the relevant (mainly City 
Council) practitioners to implement very specific interventions. It is probably 
reasonable to infer that those different individuals involved with the project did have 
varying values and routines that informed and structured their day-to-day activities. 
The difference here is that the project did not attempt to bring these people together in 
a new structure where these could potentially interact and conflict. Instead, the 
project, in effect, provided a co-ordination function for the interventions and therefore 
did not blur the organisational boundaries of participating agencies to any great 
degree.
Nevertheless, there was some interaction between top-down and bottom-up features 
here too. It has been seen that bottom-up routines of the City Council interacted with 
the top-down features of guidance in this project, to a degree. The project manager 
had to change elements of the project guidance to reflect the procedural routines of 
the city council which had not been accounted for. This created delays but it did not 
fundamentally change either the nature of the project theory or objectives or mean 
that the interventions could not be implemented at all. This was because the City 
Council and the project manager agreed about the project objectives and worked 
together to achieve them. It may be the case that there were conflicting views about 
aspects of the project, but they did not come to the fore.
Limitations of top-down and bottom-up conceptions of implementation
This study demonstrates the complexity involved in analysing and understanding 
project implementation. On the basis of evidence from the case studies it has been 
argued that top-down and bottom-up conceptions of project implementation go some 
way to explaining aspects of project implementation but neither goes far enough. 
Like other studies, it has shown that the application of strict top-down models do not 
square with the reality that is found when projects are executed on the ground and to
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approach implementation solely like this would lead to limited understanding of the 
complexity of implementation. Top-down features of theory, objectives and 
management all played a role in shaping what the two projects delivered, albeit in 
different ways. Whilst acknowledging that practitioners’ preferences can play a role in 
shaping implementation, the top-down approach does not do enough to understand 
this. Bottom-up features of renegotiation of aims, pre-existing organisational routines, 
values and conflict between agencies all shaped what was delivered in practice. In 
addition, whilst again taking for granted their existence, top-downers do little to 
examine the potential role of external factors on implementation.
It is contended then that neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches are sufficient for 
analysing and understanding the implementation of problem-oriented projects. This 
resonates with the concern of the various synthesisers (discussed in chapter three) 
who pointed to limitations of strict top-down or bottom-up approaches and so have 
argued that both need to be examined when approaching analysis of implementation. 
Whilst bringing aspects of top-down and bottom-up approaches together may lead to a 
better understanding of implementation it is contended that this too is limited. It has 
been argued that conceiving top-down and bottom-up features as independent of one 
another in a project setting may be misleading. Many factors shape the delivery of 
interventions and there are reciprocal relationships and dependencies between them. 
The bottom-up practitioner behaviour can shape the very nature of those top-down 
features that are supposed to control them. Top-down features of projects are 
themselves shaped by practitioners’ renegotiation of aims, routines and preferences 
and vice versa, at least in part. As such, the two do not exist independently from one 
another. It is contended that there is a further contradiction in the top-down/bottom-up 
categorisation of project implementation: the shape of and role played by top-down 
and bottom-up features in influencing patterns of implementation and in determining 
what projects manage to deliver in practice is determined by the nature of their 
interaction with each other.
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Reconceiving project implementation
In seeking to conceptualise the nature of project implementation more widely, the 
discussion will now turn away from top-down and bottom-up approaches and existing 
attempts at synthesis towards the ontological framework provided by Giddens (1984). 
The principal concern of Giddens’ analysis is connecting structural features and 
human agency in social systems.
The framework is useful because it provides a means of conceptualising the 
relationship between human action and organisational constraint and moves analysis 
away from merely descriptive accounts of these interrelations (Fielding, 2002). The 
previous sections of this chapter describe the observed relationships between the top- 
down and bottom-up features in the projects. Giddens’ framework would appear to 
offer a means of moving away from descriptions of these relationships to wider 
conceptualisations of the relationships between organisational structures and human 
action in projects.
For clarity, this section starts by setting out briefly Giddens’ argument about the 
nature of structure and agency in social systems. Giddens’ framework is then used as 
a framework for examining relationships between project structures and practitioners’ 
actions and interactions in project settings. It discusses how Giddens’ conception of 
the relationship between structural and behavioural features of social systems may 
help explain the patterns of implementation observed in this study and to extrapolate 
them more widely to the nature of project implementation generally.
Social systems, structure and action
Social systems refer to the patterns of social action and interaction in social groups of 
all kinds, from small groupings of friends to large bureaucracies. Giddens (1984) 
argued that social systems consist of reproduced social relations between individual 
actors and structures. Structures are the organising properties of social systems that 
give them systematic form across time and space and comprise the rules and resources 
which regulate a given situation:
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Structure refers to the structuring properties allowing the binding of time-space in 
social systems, the properties which make it possible for discemibly similar social 
practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 
systematic form.
Giddens, 1984: 17
By agency, Giddens is referring to the capacity of human beings to act intentionally in 
any given social situation and to potentially transform that situation in ways that had 
not been intended. Actors maintain an understanding of the grounds for their 
behaviour and can choose to act in different ways. Reflexive monitoring of activity is 
a feature of the everyday behaviour of human beings. Individuals monitor the flow of 
social action and expect others to do the same. People make choices about action and 
inaction and central to Giddens’ conception of agency is the human ability to 
influence events:
Actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to 
do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical of 
the contexts in which they move.
Giddens, 1984: 5
Human beings then act purposefully and they have reasons for their actions and can 
explain them. They are ‘learned’ in respect to the knowledge of social rules that they 
possess and they apply this in the production and reproduction of social life ‘...to be 
human is to be purposive and humans have reasons for their actions and can explain 
them ’ (Giddens, 1984: 3). This enables humans to respond to and influence the 
situations that they encounter. For Giddens, individuals behave intentionally to meet 
specific goals and are capable of exercising choice and transforming action over time. 
However action is constrained by the structural conditions in which it takes place. The 
knowledgeability of agents is also bounded through unintended consequences of 
actions (which are hard to predict), unconscious motives for action that individuals 
are not aware of as well as by unacknowledged conditions of action which are 
structurally influenced.
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Mutual dependency of structure and action in projects
Giddens (1984) casts structure and agency as mutually dependent on one another. 
Structures of social systems are not independent of human action as structures are 
products of human actions and vice versa the constitution o f agents and structure 
are not two independently given sets o f phenomena, a dualism, but represent a 
duality ...the structural properties o f social systems are both the medium and outcome 
o f the practices they recursively organise ’ (Giddens 1984: 25). In this sense, 
structures (those rules and resources that govern any social system) do not exist 
independently of the knowledge that human beings have in going about their day-to- 
day lives. The structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the 
outcome of those practices that they organise: structures do not merely restrict 
activities but they create possibilities. Structural properties of social systems are 
related to human action because it is through that action that structures are produced 
and reproduced. The structural features of social systems both transform and are 
transformed by their interaction with and reproduction by individual actors.
In this context, the structural properties of a project refer to those rules and resources 
that govern them and include the project’s financial (and other) resources, systems of 
management, accountability and guidance. Agency refers to the capacity of 
practitioners to act with purpose to make choices about action and inaction in 
delivering project interventions. Through exercising these choices, practitioners 
influence the situations that they encounter and as such modify what projects achieve 
over time.
Drawing on Giddens’ conception of structure and agency in social systems as 
mutually dependent, it is suggested that the structures of projects are not necessarily 
independent of the actions of practitioners as they shape and reshape the nature of 
structural features of projects over time. Drawing on evidence from the case studies a 
relationship between project structures and practitioner actions in determining the 
nature of implementation has already been pointed to. The nature of rules and 
resources associated with a project do not exist independently of individual level 
practitioner action and the form that these structural features of a project take and the 
role that they play in shaping what projects deliver can be, at least in part, shaped by
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the actions and interactions of the practitioners themselves.
This can be illustrated with examples from Manchester. The project theory was re­
negotiated and expanded by practitioners in the early stages of its development to 
better suit their views about the nature of the problem of gang violence. As has been 
seen, this renegotiation played a significant role in explaining what this project 
delivered. In this sense, practitioners in Manchester acted purposefully to influence 
the structural form of this project. They drew on their wider values and routines about 
how they believed that problems should be tackled and applied them in coming to 
understand, renegotiate and deliver the project interventions. The practitioners acted 
purposefully to transform the original structures in the Manchester project; they had 
reasons for doing so and (as has been seen) they could explain those reasons. As well 
as shaping the nature of the project theory and objectives, the purposeful action of the 
practitioners shaped the nature of other structural features of the project. The actions 
of the practitioners shaped the nature of project guidance and the role that guidance 
ultimately played in delivering project interventions. It has been seen that through 
focusing on gang membership rather than shootings, identifying individuals who were 
suitable for preventative interventions proved problematic in a practical sense. 
Because notions of gang membership were difficult to operationalise in practice, the 
project practitioners struggled to assess who was at risk and suitable for project 
interventions and very many young people were meeting the vague criteria given the 
resources available. In addition, there was no system set up for taking referrals which 
led to an increasing work load and individuals were selected for inclusion on the 
scheme on different levels of evidence of gang activity. The practitioners’ re­
negotiation of the project theory also helped to shape the nature of the management 
arrangements in Manchester because, as has been seen, it proved difficult for the 
project manager to know what the practitioners should be doing and when. As such, it 
became harder to hold them to account in delivering interventions.
This is of course not to say that structural properties of project settings do not play a 
role in determining what gets done. Giddens contended that the structural features of 
social systems both transform and are transformed by their interaction with and 
reproduction by individual actors. The key here is that there is a relationship between 
the two: structural features of a project setting can influence the behavioural ones and
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vice versa. The structural features of the Manchester project were shaped by the 
practitioners’ actions and interactions but in turn those structures came to influence 
the activities and actions of the practitioners and how they understood and delivered 
the project. For example, it has been seen that the enforcement aspects of this project 
took on a meaning that was not present in the original strategy. The practitioners came 
to understand enforcement in terms of interventions against individuals who had been 
offered help and support to remain clear from offending and gangs and had either 
refused it or continued to offend or engage in gang activity rather than in terms of the 
well-publicised multi-agency crackdowns. This new conceptualisation of the nature of 
the enforcement interventions was shaped by the views and preferences of the 
practitioners in the early days of the project. Ultimately that reshaped 
conceptualisation of the enforcement interventions drove how the practitioners came 
to understand that element of the project and to deliver it.
The limits to constraint in project settings
Structural features of social systems, then, are not external to individuals and do not 
merely constrain their behaviour but are shaped and moulded by purposeful human 
action. Giddens (1984) argued that formal systems of social control have little 
authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilised by individuals. It has already been 
pointed out that individuals are conscious of flows of action and interaction and the 
context in which social interaction takes place. For Giddens, constraint, in the form of 
rules, will ‘...not push someone to do something i f  they have not all ready been pulled 
to do so ’ (Giddens, 1984). Giddens went on to argue that even where compliance is 
achieved, it is of a fragile and contingent nature. That is, once compliance has been 
achieved, it cannot be guaranteed that this will last over time and it is conditional on 
people continuing to accept that authority.
These points both resonate strongly with evidence from the Manchester case study 
regarding the nature of control of the practitioners’ behaviour and offer a way of 
understanding authority in project settings. It has been seen that there were limits to 
the effectiveness of the use of authority in constraining the behaviour of practitioners 
in Manchester. Giddens (1984) argued that human action is purposeful even where 
constraints limiting action are very severe because people have an understanding of 
the grounds for their actions and can choose to act differently from what those with
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authority intended. Evidence from this study suggests that individuals in project 
settings can and will actively contest formal means of constraining behaviour unless 
they have been previously sanctioned by them. For example, it has been seen that it 
proved very difficult to control the behaviour of the practitioners in the Manchester 
project through management. Bom of their differing values and routines, the 
interaction between the practitioners in Manchester resulted in conflict. This conflict 
between practitioners helped to shape the nature of the systems of accountability and 
the role that they could play in delivering this project. The outward appearance of the 
conflict was minimised by the practitioners through manipulation of the project 
minutes, and decisions were made in informal situations to facilitate the delivery of 
certain interventions. This masked the problems that the project was facing from 
formal review and consequently limited the role that the formal project (steering 
group) management arrangements could play in shaping how the project was 
delivered.
The nature of compliance in this project was also fragile. As discussed in chapter six 
the flexible and negotiable management style of the original project manager was 
preferred by some of the practitioners and as a result of this they largely accepted the 
management of the police officer. However, this compliance dissolved with the 
recruitment of the second project manager who was associated with a much less 
flexible and a much more directive style of management. Some of the practitioners 
did not accept the authority of the second project manager and the result was conflict 
as these practitioners resisted this attempt to control and restrict their behaviour. 
Practitioners, then, may contest means of constraining their behaviour unless these 
very means of constraint have been sanctioned by them. They will not necessarily 
accept the authority of project management passively; it is fragile and contingent on 
continued legitimisation by practitioners over time.
Project interaction with organisational routines
For Giddens, the nature of a particular social structure depends on both its pre­
existing form and its continual reproduction by human beings. Humans are reflexive 
and it is in and through their activities that the conditions that make action possible 
are reproduced. Social practices endure across time and across space because they 
become routinised and are reproduced by human beings:
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The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of 
structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any 
form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human 
social activities, like some self-producing items in nature, are recursive. That is to 
say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them 
via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their 
activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible 
Giddens, 1984: 2
Human beings draw on rules and resources in a diverse set of contexts to produce and 
reproduce social systems through interaction. The routines (that which is done 
habitually) of day-to-day life are essential for the reproduction of social life '...routine 
is integral to the personality o f the agent, as he or she moves along the paths o f daily 
activities, and the institutions o f society, which are such only through their continued 
reproduction' (Giddens, 1984: 63). These routines provide people with a certain 
amount of security about the social world ‘...ordinary day-to-day social life ... 
involves an ontological security founded on autonomy o f bodily control within 
routines and encounters’ (Giddens 1984: 64). Human beings then, draw on the 
routines of day-to-day life which are founded in wider experiences and in doing so 
they reproduce or change characteristics of their previous experience over time and 
over space.
In this sense, projects are not isolated from existing organisational routines: they 
interact with them and are transformed by them. Routinely understood processes and 
practices vary over time and over space and in this context between practitioners and 
groups of practitioners. New project processes and new interventions associated with 
them may be different from and so, potentially, interact with these routinely 
understood practices and processes. This would seem to be especially the case where 
projects are ‘inserted’ into pre-existing organisational contexts where practitioners 
already have sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. This 
is likely to occur where projects are reliant on short-term grant funding. These short­
term projects may set up processes and practices to tackle problems that differ from 
those that are routinely understood. Many problem-oriented projects are grant-funded
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and seeking to tackle problems in different ways. In these circumstances the form of 
the new processes and practices may be influenced by the nature of those pre-existing 
processes and practices over time. As such, new practices and processes are unlikely 
to be put into operation by practitioners in a straightforward manner.
It has been argued that organisational routines were important in explaining patterns 
of implementation in the Manchester project and were also evident in the Cambridge. 
In delivering the Manchester project, the practitioners drew strongly on their previous 
organisational routines. To complicate this, as has been seen, these different agencies 
came to the new project with very different organisational routines. These different 
routines interacted with the proposed project structures differently and as a result 
transformed the project and created conflict between the practitioners. For example, 
as was set out in detail in chapter seven, the housing practitioners drew on day-to-day 
routines that were highly disciplined, hierarchical and output driven in terms of 
behaviour and they sought to reproduce these as they set about implementing the new 
project. At the other extreme, those working in social services drew on organisational 
routines that were flexible and endlessly negotiable as they sought to understand the 
project and influence the processes through which it sought to tackle the problems of 
gang-related violence.
The issue of routines helps to make sense of why patterns of implementation were so 
different in the Manchester and Cambridge projects. As has been seen, one of the 
main differences between the Cambridge and Manchester projects was that the 
Cambridge project did not blur existing organisational boundaries and so did not 
interact with any pre-existing organisational routines and practices, at least not to any 
great degree. In the Cambridge project, the project manager largely negotiated around 
existing practices and processes to implement the interventions with, for example, the 
planners in the City Council, procurement managers and contractors. In terms of their 
day-to-day activities, those practitioners were largely unaffected by the existence of 
the new project because it did not seek to introduce new processes or procedures and 
so did not seek to influence or interact with their pre-existing organisational routines. 
The situation in the Manchester project was clearly very different. The project 
structures and processes interacted heavily with existing practices and processes 
because the project brought together a wide range of practitioners from different
252
agencies in a new setting to attempt to tackle a difficult problem in new ways.
Through drawing the practitioners together in this way, the new project interacted 
strongly with existing routinely understood practices and processes. The planned 
project was transformed by those routines as practitioners brought them to bear in the 
new setting and this subsequently helped explain patterns of implementation and 
particularly the conflict that resulted as the project staff renegotiated these different 
routines in the development of project processes.
The meandering nature of project implementation
Implementation of projects is clearly not static: it meanders and changes over time. 
Giddens’ argument that social structures are continually reproduced by those who 
constitute them would seem to offer a means of explaining this. For Giddens, 
structures do not exist independently of action in social systems and repeated patterns 
of action constitute structural reality. Social practices endure because they become 
routinised and they are reproduced. Although there are regularities in these patterns of 
action and there are constraints on individual behaviour, action, flexibility and 
creativity are, nevertheless, allowed for and it is through this that change over time 
can be explained, at least in part.
Practitioners construct projects over a period of time. Quite evidently, as well as being 
situated in a specific space, projects are also situated over a specific period of time 
and during that time the nature of implementation changes. Drawing on Giddens’ 
framework, it is inferred that the nature of project implementation changes over time 
because practitioners continue to construct and reconstruct projects over that period. It 
has already been argued in this chapter that when they come to interpret and 
implement projects over time practitioners draw on routinised organisational practices 
and values. As has been stressed by Giddens, key is the reproductive nature of social 
life and day-to-day routines are integral to this. Routines are important because they 
provide individuals with a sense of predictability and security about their lives. It is 
perhaps not surprising that people would seek to reproduce that which is familiar to 
them. The point is, however, that practitioners continually reproduce social activity. 
They continually recreate the conditions that make implementation possible, hence 
they continually reinterpret projects and the project setting; in doing so the project 
will change over time. Practitioners do not come to a project and interpret it and then
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implement it in a straightforward manner based on that initial interpretation. Instead, 
they come to the project and continue to interpret it and recreate it over time and as 
such patterns of project implementation change.
In this sense change is an inevitable feature of project implementation but it can also 
result from specific events and disruptions. Giddens argued that disruption in external 
conditions or in the reflection or thoughts of individuals can create the possibility of 
change. Whilst such disruption might lead to uncertainty, individuals will nevertheless 
draw on their history, experiences and their ability (their ‘knowledgeability’) to 
interpret and react to these events. However this knowledgeability and capability is 
constrained by the unintended consequences of social action which conditions social 
reproduction. For Giddens the unintended consequences of actions and 
unacknowledged conditions play a key role in explaining change because it is through 
these that action is diverted from its intended, more ‘ordered’ course.
In project settings, ‘disruptions’ would appear to have an impact on the nature of 
implementation. A number of disruptions had an impact on the projects. These events 
evidently disrupted the flow of implementation and had an (unintended) impact on the 
delivery of the projects. Most of these were related in some way to the discipline or 
movement of staff. Two examples for the Manchester project will be mentioned here. 
First, the disruption associated with the change in project manager in the Manchester 
project has been discussed at length. The new project manager had little experience 
of working in a multi-agency setting and his management style was more authoritative 
and directive than the previous project manager. It has been seen that practitioners did 
not respond passively to this change. The practitioners reacted to this planned change 
in project scope and direction and through this reaction the project was shifted in 
directions that had not been intended. Most specifically, the practitioners rejected the 
legitimacy of the authority of the new police project manager. They undermined his 
attempts to implement forms of accountability and to hold them to account resulting 
in further arguments and delays in implementation of the project initiatives. This very 
clearly is not what the project steering group planned when they changed the project 
manager.
Second, as discussed in chapter six, one of the original practitioners from the Youth
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Offending Team was sacked from the project because of a previous criminal 
conviction. Again, the practitioner team did not react passively to this event. Many of 
the practitioners argued that the sacking did not reflect what they saw as the 
rehabilitative nature of the project. As well as involving disagreements and conflict, 
the practitioners’ discussions about this issue served to reinforce the views amongst 
some of the team that the project should primarily be supportive and rehabilitative in 
nature and fuelled the movement from the project’s roots in the Boston Gun Project. 
This clearly is not what the management team had in mind or would have predicted 
would have been the outcome of the decision to remove this member of staff and this 
demonstrates the unanticipated impact that events can have on the flow of social 
action.
Particular events may be associated with disruption to and, potentially, changes in the 
flow of implementation of projects. It is, however, not so much the events themselves 
that generate disruption: such events are inevitable. Rather, reflecting their 
knowledgeability, it is the ways in which practitioners and managers construe and 
react to events that creates that disruption and alters the flow of implementation. In 
Manchester, the practitioners’ interpretation of these events was influential in 
determining the flow of implementation over time. There was, perhaps, little reason 
why the sacking of a Youth Offending Team member should have been quite so 
disruptive and had quite such an impact on the subsequent course of the project but in 
this instance it was the practitioners’ strong reaction to the event which helped to 
move the project in a specific direction rather than the decision itself. Similarly, the 
change of project manager in August 2002 need not have been as disruptive as it 
proved to be. Again, the point is that practitioners reacted against the change in the 
style of project management rather than accepting it more passively.
In a project setting then, what drives change in the nature of the implementation of 
projects over time? On the one hand, it follows that changes in the nature of 
implementation of projects over time is almost inevitable. Practitioners continue to 
draw on their knowledgability, framed by wider institutional and social settings, to 
implement projects but also to recreate and potentially change them as they do so. 
Practitioners continue to interpret and reinterpret the nature of projects and project 
settings. This would seem potentially to offer a useful way of conceptualising the
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nature of project change over time. On the other hand, ‘events’ also have the potential 
to create disruption and thence to alter the course of implementation, quite possibly in 
ways taking the initiative from its originally intended direction. The nature of the 
disruption to implementation will depend on the way that practitioners and their 
managers react to those events. To borrow Giddens’ language, it is quite possible that 
the practitioners observed in this study could have ‘acted otherwise’ when confronted 
with particular events. This too would seem to be important in explaining the nature 
of the implementation of projects and in particular would help to explain why similar 
events occur in different projects but do not have the same impact on the nature of 
implementation. The implication here is that disruptions to the external and structural 
conditions of projects are important in explaining the nature of implementation and 
need to be understood. These disruptions lead to uncertainty within the projects and to 
varying degrees, to changes in the nature of what is delivered.
Summary
It has been argued that there are limitations to top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
analysing and understanding project implementation. Neither approach adequately 
captured the complexity of implementation of the two projects. There are also 
relationships between top-down and bottom-up features of projects which limit the 
applicability of approaches that seek to conceive implementation as either top-down 
or bottom-up and also limits the applicability of approaches which seek simply to 
draw elements of the two together.
This chapter has described an alternative way of conceptualising the relationships 
between structural and behavioural factors using the ontological framework described 
by Giddens (1984). It has been argued that the structural and agency features of 
project implementation are related: the structural features of projects are not 
independent from human action because structures are products of action. As such, 
project structures both transform and are transformed by their interaction and 
reproduction by the actions of practitioners. Additionally, it has been contended that 
there are limits to the nature of constraint in project settings: formal systems of social 
control have no authority unless they are sanctioned and mobilised by the very people 
they are trying to control. Human action remains purposeful even where constraints
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limiting action are very severe. The routines of everyday life are essential for the 
reproduction of social life. Human beings draw on these routines and attempt to 
reproduce them and in doing so they influence the nature of the implementation of 
projects. Projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing 
sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. The new 
processes and practices introduced by projects are likely to be influenced by and have 
an influence on existing routines over time. Lastly, it has been argued that projects are 
not static and that the nature of implementation will of course vary over time. 
Practitioners continue to interpret and reinterpret the project over time and as such 
implementation will change. In addition, events will disrupt implementation and the 
practitioners’ reaction to this will influence the nature of the implementation of the 
project.
The final chapter of the study will summarise the main findings in respect to the 
project’s aims.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
Introduction
This final chapter returns to the original aims of the study, reviews the evidence in 
relation to these aims and provides final conclusions.
The study
This study started from the premise that there are shortcomings, in the existing 
accounts of the implementation of problem-oriented policing. As well as suffering 
from certain methodological weaknesses, existing studies are limited because they 
have largely sought to analyse and understand the implementation of projects within a 
top-down framework. They have largely neglected to take account of the bottom-up 
concerns of the action, interaction and day-to-day routines and values of practitioners 
in explaining patterns of implementation. This study aimed to examine the adequacy 
of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to understanding the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing through testing the following two hypotheses.
1. That top-down approaches are sufficient to explain the implementation of 
problem-oriented projects in the UK; and,
2. That bottom-up approaches are sufficient to explain implementation of 
problem-oriented projects in the UK.
In assessing these hypotheses this study drew on evidence from an examination of 
two very different problem-oriented projects: one addressing gang-related shootings 
in Manchester and the other addressing bicycle theft in Cambridge. The Cambridge 
project sought to reduce high levels of cycle theft in the city centre through the 
establishment of a small dedicated and proactive policing team, situational 
improvements to the locations where there were high levels of bicycle theft and
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through setting up systematic cycle registration schemes. The Manchester project was 
based on the seemingly successful Boston Gun Project which had seen reductions in 
the number of shootings through targeted, highly publicised crackdowns.
It has been seen that in both projects some of the planned interventions were 
implemented, some were partially implemented and some were not implemented at 
all. In neither project were reductions in crime due to project activities evident. In the 
Cambridge project most of the project plans were put in place though some were 
implemented very late. The exception was the targeted cycle squad which did not 
happen at all. In Manchester the situation was very different. The interventions that 
were ultimately introduced bore little resemblance to the original plans. The size and 
the scope of the project grew as the nature and scope of the project was renegotiated 
by practitioners in its early stages and it took on a direction that was absent in the 
original strategy. This transformation resulted in an extremely wide-ranging project 
that encompassed a large number of broad interventions that had not been originally 
proposed. In the event, one-third of the planned measures were not implemented in 
any form and the multi-agency crackdown, the major initial thrust of the project, was 
not employed in any form whatsoever.
Findings
On the basis of evidence from the two case studies it is contended that neither of the 
two hypotheses set out above are substantiated. This study has shown that both top- 
down and bottom-up features of project implementation helped to explain patterns of 
implementation observed in the projects. Top-down features, including leadership and 
communication, project theory and objectives, guidance, management and 
accountability all played a role in shaping what was done in the two projects. 
Bottom-up features of renegotiation of aims, routines, values and conflict also played 
a role in shaping what was and what was not delivered in practice.
Whilst these factors influenced the nature of both of the projects, they did so in very 
different ways. In Cambridge, many of the conditions that top-down analysts suggest 
need to be in place to minimise deviation from project plans and implementation 
problems were indeed present. For example, as has been seen, the project plans were
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feasible in terms of the resources and timetable available; there were sufficient data to 
analyse the problem of cycle theft; the project theory was based on plausible 
sequences and short chains of cause and effect; there were well-stated objectives and 
guidance; there were minimal lines of dependency between the agencies responsible 
for the project; and, there were single lines of management for project staff.
In contrast, in Manchester, many of these top-down preconditions for successful 
implementation conditions were not present. There was a mismatch between the 
resources available, the plans and the timetable; the theory was based on fragile and 
multiple, longer-term sequences of cause and effect; the objectives were broad and 
wide-ranging and there was little agreement on them between the partners; the 
guidance was not formally stated; the project was dependent on multiple agencies; 
and, there were multiple lines of authority in the project management. There were 
indeed high levels of deviation from the original project plans and substantial 
difficulties delivering the planned interventions were observed in this project.
Despite the role played by these top-down factors in shaping the projects, they are not 
sufficient for understanding what went on within them. In Cambridge, implementation 
was influenced by pressures to meet central performance indicators. Pressures to meet 
centrally determined crime targets meant that senior police management would not 
release police officers to work on the enforcement interventions and as such these 
were not implemented in any form. This is an external factor to which top-down 
approaches pay little attention. In bottom-up terms organisational routines also played 
a role in shaping the nature of this project: those of the City Council had not been 
accounted for in the project plans. Attending to these Council routines and 
incorporating them into the project plans led to delays in implementing the situational 
interventions. In Manchester, bottom-up features were strongly evident in shaping 
how the project was delivered. Over time the practitioners’ values and routines shaped 
the very nature of the project’s aims and objectives. In turn this influenced the shape 
of the project guidance and management. This led to conflict between the 
practitioners as they struggled to agree the project scope and to work together in the 
inter-agency environment.
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This study suggests that top-down models do not make sense of the complexity faced 
by practitioners as projects are implemented on the ground. Even though 
organisational and technical features played a role in shaping both projects they are 
insufficient to explain what they delivered and why. They do not account for the 
complexity of what was actually done primarily because they neglect the role played 
by practitioners who are overlooked in top-down analyses of implementation. In 
addition, whilst taking for granted their existence, they do little to take account of the 
role of external factors in shaping patterns of implementation. In contrast, bottom-up 
approaches play down the role played by structural features in shaping the nature of 
implementation.
It has also been argued that conceiving top-down and bottom-up features of 
implementation as independent of one another is misleading. The top-down features 
of projects can be influenced by practitioner behaviour and vice versa. It has been 
shown that practitioners’ behaviour can shape the very nature of those top-down 
characteristics that are supposed to govern their behaviour and orient patterns of 
implementation. As has been seen, practitioners were able to shape project theory and 
objectives and consequently the content of project guidance and systems of 
accountability and management. Neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches account 
for this interdependency.
Because of weaknesses in conceiving implementation in terms of either bottom-up or 
top-down processes the study turned to Giddens’ ontological framework in seeking to 
understand the relationships between the structural features of projects and 
practitioner behaviour.
First, it is suggested that structural and behavioural features of projects are related. 
The nature of and role played by those structures in project implementation are, in 
part, products of the actions of the practitioners themselves. Practitioners are able to 
influence the nature of project theory, guidance, management and accountability.
Over time these structures will, however, influence their behaviour as they come to 
shape how projects are conceived and understood.
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Second, there are limits to the nature of constraint in project settings. Formal systems 
of project management have limited authority unless they are sanctioned and 
mobilised by the very people they are trying to monitor and control. Human action 
remains purposeful even where constraints limiting action are severe. Thus it is 
contended that there are limits to the role that management and accountability can 
play in shaping the nature of the implementation of a project unless those systems 
have been sanctioned by those who work on the project.
Third, projects are inserted into organisational contexts where there are existing 
taken-for-granted sets of routinely understood organisational processes and practices. 
Projects interact with these processes and practices and are likely to be influenced by 
and to have an influence on those existing processes and routines. As such projects 
are not likely to be implemented in a straightforward manner.
Fourth, projects meander over time. It is suggested that practitioners continue to 
construct and reconstruct project structures and in doing so the patterns of 
implementation change over time. In addition, patterns of implementation are shaped 
by practitioners’ reactions to events. Whilst change of this sort is inevitable it has 
been suggested that specific ‘disruptions’ in the project settings can also have an 
impact on patterns of implementation, often in ways that had not been intended or 
anticipated.
262
References
• Arber, S. (1995) Designing Samples, in Gilbert, N. (editor) Researching Social 
Life. Sage: London.
• Barrett, S. and Fudge, C. (1981) Policy and action. London: Methuen.
• Bazemore, G. and Cole, A. (1994) Police in the Laboratory of the Neighbourhood: 
Evaluating Problem-Oriented Strategies in a Medium Sized City. American 
Journal o f the Police Vol. XIII, no 3.
• Becker, H. (1970) Sociological Work: Method and Substance. Chicago: Aldine.
• Becker, H. (1986) Doing Things Together. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press.
• Bennett, T. and Kemp, C. (1994) An Evaluation o f Sector-Based Problem- 
Oriented Policing in Thames Valley Police Force Area. Home Office Research 
and Planning Unit (unpublished).
• Berman, P. (1980) Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: 
Matching Strategies to Situations, in H. Ingram and D. Mann (editor) Why 
Policies succeed or fail. Sage: Beverly Hills
• Braga, A., Kennedy, D., and Piehl, A. (1999) Problem-Oriented Policing and 
Youth Violence: An evaluation of the Boston Gun Project. Unpublished Report to 
the National Institute of Justice, Washington DC.
• Braga, A. (2002) Problem Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention. Criminal 
Justice Press: New York.
• Brown, R. (2006) The role of project management in implementing community 
safety initiatives, in J. Knutsson and R. Clarke (editors) Putting Theory to Work: 
Implementing Situational Crime Prevention and Problem-Oriented Policing. 
Crime Prevention Studies Volume 20. Cullompton Devon: Willan.
• Brown, R. and Sutton M. (1997) Problem-oriented Policing and Organisational 
Form: Lessons from a Victoria Experiment. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 
July 21-33.
• Bryne, S. and Pease, K. Crime Reduction and Community Safety, in T. Newbum 
(editor) (2003) Handbook o f Policing. Cullompton: Willan.
263
• Buerger, M. (1994) The Problems of Problem-solving: Resistance, 
Interdependencies and Conflicting Interests. American Journal o f Police 13 (3) 1- 
36.
• Bullock, K., Farrell, G. and Tilley, N. (2002) Funding and Implementing Crime 
Reduction Projects. Home Office Online Report IS. London: Home Office.
• Bullock, K. and Tilley, N. (2002) Shootings, Gangs and Violent Incidents in 
Manchester: Developing a crime reduction strategy. Crime Reduction Research 
Series Paper IS. London: Home office.
• Bullock, K. and Tilley, N. (2003) Problem-oriented Policing: The concept, 
implementation and impact in the UK and USA, in K. Bullock and N. Tilley. 
(Editors) (2003) Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing, Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing.
• Bullock, K. and Tilley, N. (2003) From Strategy to Action: the Implementation of 
Crime Reduction Initiatives, in K. Bullock and N. Tilley. (Editors) (2003) Crime 
Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Bullock, K., Erol, R., and Tilley, N. (2006) Problem-oriented policing and 
Partnership. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Capowich, G. and Roehl, J. (1994) Problem-oriented Policing: Actions and 
Effectiveness in San Diego in D, Rosenbaum (editor) (1994) The Challenge o f 
Community Policing. Sage: London.
• Chan, J. (1997) Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
• Clarke, R. (1995) Situational Crime Prevention, in M. Tonry, and F. David 
(editors) Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. 
Crime and Justice: A Review o f Research Volume 19. University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago
• Clarke, R. (1998) Defining Police Strategies in, Shelley, Tara O., and Anne C. 
Grant (editors) Problem-oriented Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical 
Issues and Making POP Work. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research 
Forum.
• Cohen, D. (2001) Problem-oriented Partnerships: Including the Community for 
Change. US Department of Justice, Washington: Office for Community Oriented 
Policing Studies.
264
• Cohen, 1. and Felson, M. (1979) Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine 
Activity Approach. American Sociological Review 44, 588 -  608.
• Cordner, G. (1998) Problem-Oriented Policing vs Zero Tolerance Problem 
Oriented policing, in Shelley, Tara O., and Anne C. Grant (editors) Problem 
Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP 
Work. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.
• Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance o f Crime: Appeals to Community and 
Partnerships. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Crawford, A. (1998). Crime Prevention and Community Safety. London:
Longman.
• Crawford, A. and Jones, M. (1995) ‘Community Crime Prevention: Some 
Reflections on the work of Pearson and Colleagues’, British Journal o f 
Criminology, 35, 17-33.
• Crawley, P. and Hope, T. (2003) Measuring the outputs of crime reduction 
projects. Community Safety Journal, Volume 2, 3.
• De Paris, R. (1997) Situational Leadership: Problem Solving Leadership for 
Problem Solving Policing. The Police Chief Pp 74 -  86.
• De Vaus, D. (1996) Surveys in Social Research. London: University College 
London Press.
• Denzin, N. (1970) The Research Act In Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction To 
Sociological Methods. London: Butterworths.
• Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (editors) (2000) Handbook o f Qualitative Research 
Second Edition. Sage: London.
• Eck J (2001) Problem-oriented Policing and its Problems. The Means Over Ends 
Syndrome Strikes Back and the Return of the Problem Solver (unpublished draft)
• Eck, J. (2003) Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem Theory, Research 
and Evaluation, in J. Knutsson (editor) Problem-oriented Policing from Innovation 
to Mainstream. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 15. Cullompton: Willan.
• Eck, J. and Spelman, W (1987) Solving Problems: Problem-oriented Policing in 
Newport News. Washington: Police Executive Research Forum.
• Eck, J. and Rosenbaum, D. (1994) The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity 
and Efficiency in Community Policing. In D. Rosenbaum (editors) Community 
Policing: Testing its Promises. Newbury Park CA: Sage
265
• Elmore R. (1978) Organisational Models of Social Programmes Implementation. 
Public Policies, 26, pp. 185-228.
• Elmore, R. (1980) Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy 
Decisions, Political Science Quarterly, 94 (4): 601-16.
• Elmore, R. (1985) Forward and Backward Mapping in Policy Implementation in 
K. Hanf and T. Toonen (editors) Federal and Unitary Systems. Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff.
• Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1993) Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation 
and its Implications for Crime Reduction. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 46. 
London: Home Office.
• Feagin, J., Orum, A. and Sjorberg, G. (editors) (1991) A Case for the Case Study. 
Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press.
• Felson, M. (1987) Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing 
Metropolis. Criminology, 25: 911-31.
• Fielding, N. (1994) The Organisational and Occupational Troubles of Community 
Policing. Policing and Society. Volume 4 305-322.
• Fielding, N. (1995) Qualitative Interviewing, in N. Gilbert (editor) Researching 
Social Life. Sage: London.
• Fielding, N. (2002) Theorising Community Policing. The British Journal of 
Criminology. Volume 42. No.l.
• Forrest, S., Myhill, A. and Tilley, N. (2005) Practical lessons for involving the 
community in crime and disorder problem-solving. Home Office Development and 
Practice Report, 43. Home Office: London.
• Garland, D. (2000) The Culture o f Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution o f Society. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press.
• Gilling, D. (2005) ‘Partnership and Crime Prevention’, in N. Tilley (editor) The 
Handbook o f Crime Prevention and Community safety. Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing.
• Gilling, D. (1996) Problems with the Problem-oriented Approach, in R. Homel 
(editor) The Politics and Practice of Situational Crime Prevention, Crime
266
Prevention Studies Volume five. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press and 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Goldblatt, P. and Lewis, C (1998). Reducing Offending: An Assessment of 
Research Evidence on Ways of Dealing with Offending Behaviour. Home Office 
Research Study 187. London: Home Office.
• Goldstein, H. (1979) Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Crime 
and Delinquency, April 1979. Pp.236-258.
• Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. New York: Mcgraw Hill.
• Goldstein, H. (2003) On Further Developing Problem-Oriented Policing, in J. 
Knutsson (editor) Problem-oriented policing: from Innovation to Mainstream. 
Crime Prevention Studies Volume 15. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Goggin, M. Bowman, A. Lester, J. and O’Toole, L. (1990) Implementation Theory 
and Practice: Toward a Third Generation. Glenview Illinois: Scott 
Forseman/Little, Brown and Company.
• Green, J. (1981) Organisational Change in Law Enforcement. Journal o f Criminal 
Justice Volume 9 Pp 79 -  91.
• Hamel, J., Dufour, S., and Fortin, D. (1993). Case study methods. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage Publications.
• Hamner, J. (2003) Mainstreaming solutions to Major Problems: Reducing Repeat 
Domestic Violence in West Yorkshire, in K. Bullock and N. Tilley (editors) Crime 
Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Hill, M and Hupe P. (2002) Implementing Public Policy. Sage: London.
• Hjem, B. and Porter, D. (1981) Implementation Structures: A New Unit of 
Analysis. Organisation Studies 2 pp 211-227.
• Hoare, M., Stewart, G. and Purcell, C. (1984) The Problem-oriented Approach: 
Four Pilot Studies. Metropolitan Police Management Services Department Report 
Number 30/84. London: Metropolitan Police Service.
• Hood, C. (1976) The Limits to Administration. London: John Wiley.
• Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1984) Why perfect implementation is unattainable, in 
M. Hill (editor) The Policy Process: A  Reader. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall.
• HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2000) Calling Time on Crime: A 
Thematic Inspection on Crime and Disorder conducted by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate o f Constabulary. London: Home Office.
267
• Home Office (1998) The Data Protection Act. London: The Stationary Office.
• Home Office (1998) The Crime and Disorder Act. London: The Stationary Office.
• Home Office (2000) Review o f Crime Statistics: A discussion Document. Home 
Office: London.
• Homel, P., Nutley, S., Webb, B. and Tilley, N. (2005) Investing to Deliver: 
Reviewing the Implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Programme. Home 
Office Research Study 281. London: Home Office.
• Hood, C. (1986) The Limits o f Social Administration. London: John Wiley.
• Hope, T. and Crawley, P. (2003) Measuring the outputs of crime reduction 
projects. Community Safety Journal Volume 2, Issue 3, June, pp. 4-12.
• Hope, T. and Murphy, J. (1983) Problems of Implementing Crime Prevention: The 
Experience of a Demonstration Project. The Howard Journal XXII 1983, pp. 38- 
50.
• Hough, M. (2006) Not Seeing the Wood for the Trees: Mistaking tactics for 
Strategy In Crime Reduction Initiatives, in Knuttson, J. and Clarke, C. (editors) 
Putting Theory to Work: Implementing Situational Crime Prevention and 
Problem-Oriented Policing. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 20. Cullompton 
Devon: Willan.
• Hough, M. and Tilley, N. (1998) Getting the Grease to the Squeak. Crime 
Detection and Prevention Series Paper 85. London: Home Office.
• Irving, B., Bourne, D. and Collins J. (2001) Crime Tracking: developing a 
community safety intelligence system for the West Ham and Plaistow New Deal 
Programme. London: Police Foundation.
• Irving, B. and Dixon, B. (2002) Hotspotting. London: Police Foundation
• Kennedy, D., Piehl, A. and Braga, A. (1996) Youth Violence in Boston: Gun 
Markets, Serious Youth Violence, and a Use-reduction Strategy, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol 59, No. 1, pp. 147-196.
• Kirby, K. and Reed, D. (2004) Developing a Problem-oriented Organisation. 
London: Association of Chief Police Officers.
• Knutsson and Clarke (2006) Introduction in, J. Knuttson and R. Clarke (eds) 
Putting Theory to Work: Implementing Situational Crime Prevention and 
Problem-Oriented Policing. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 20. Cullompton 
Devon: Willan.
268
• Lamm Weisel, D. (2003) ‘The Sequence of Analysis in Solving Problems,’ in J. 
Knutsson (editor) Problem-Oriented Poling: From Innovation to Mainstream. 
Crime Prevention Studies, Volume 15. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Laycock, G. and Webb, B. (2003) Conclusion: The role of the Centre, in K. 
Bullock and N. Tilley (editors) Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing, 
Willan: Cullompton.
• Leigh, A., Read, T. and Tilley, N. (1996) Problem-oriented Policing: Brit POP. 
Crime Prevention and Detection Paper 75. London: Home Office.
• Leigh, A., Read, T. and Tilley, N. (1998) Brit Pop II: Problem-oriented Policing in 
Practice. Police Research Series Paper 93. London: Home Office.
• Liddle, M. and Gelsthorpe, L. (1994) Crime Prevention and Interagency Co­
operation. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 53. London: Home Office.
• Liddle, M. and Gelsthorpe, L. (1994) Interagency Crime Prevention: Organising 
Local Delivery. Crime Prevention and Detection Unit Paper 52. London: Home 
Office.
• Lipsky, M. (1980) Street Level Bureaucrats. Russell Sage Foundation
• Macdonald, K. and Tipton, K. (1995) Using Documents, in N. Gilbert, (editor) 
Researching Social Life. Sage: London
• Maguire, M. (1998) ‘Problem-oriented Policing, Intelligence-led Policing and 
Partnership, Criminal Justice Matters no 32 Summer 1998.
• Maguire, M. and John, T. (1995) Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: 
integrated approaches. Crime Detection and Prevention Series paper 64. London: 
Home Office.
• Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching. London: Sage.
• Matassa, M. and Newbum, T. (2003) Problem-oriented Evaluation? Evaluating 
Problem-oriented Policing Initiatives, in K. Bullock and N. Tilley (editors) (2003) 
Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Matland, R. (1995) Synthesising the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity -  
Conflict Model of Policy Implementation, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 5(2): 145-74.
• Metcalf, B. (2001) The Strategic Integration of POP and Performance 
Management: a Viable Partnership? Policing and Society Volume 11 pp 209 -
269
234.
• Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis (2nd edition). 
Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage.
• Mountjoy, R. and O’Toole, L. (1979) Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: 
An Organisational Perspective, Public Administration Review, 40 (5): 465 -75.
• Norris, G. (1999) POP: Putting Policy into Practice: Lancashire Police/POP 
Workshop and Questionnaire Analysis. District Audit, unpublished.
• Oppenhein, A. (1992) Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement. London: Pinter.
• Patton, M. (1987) How to use qualitative methods in social research. London: 
Sage.
• Parsons, W. (1999) Public Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
• Peck, E. and Perri 6. (2006) Beyond delivery: Policy Implementation as Sense- 
Making and Settlement. Paulgrave: Macmillan.
• Pearson, G., Blagg, H., Smith, D., Sampson, A., and Stubbs, P. (1992) Crime, 
Community and Conflict: The Multi-agency Approach, in D. Downes (editor). 
Unravelling Criminal Justice. London: Macmillan.
• Pease, K. (1998). Repeat Victimisation: Taking Stock. Crime Detection and 
Prevention Series Paper 90. London: Home Office.
• Pease, K. and, Bryne, S. (2003) Crime Reduction and Community Safety, in T. 
Newbum, (editor) The Handbook o f Policing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Philips, C., Considine, M., Lewis, R. (2000) A Review of Audits and Strategies 
Produced by Crime and Disorder Partnerships in 1999. Home Office Briefing Note 
8/00. London: Home Office.
• Phillips, C., Jacobson, J., Prime, R., Carter, M. and Considine, M. (2002) Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships: Round One Progress. Police Research 
Paper 151. London: Home Office.
• Pollard, C. (1996) Problems Solved. Police Review 19.
• Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (1973) Implementation: How great expectations 
in Washington are dashed in Oakland; Or, Why it's amazing that federal 
programs work at all, this being a saga o f the economic development 
administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a 
foundation o f ruined hopes. Berkeley: University of California Press.
270
• Punch, K. (1998) Introduction to Social Research. London: Sage.
• Ragin, C. and Becker, H. (eds) (1992) What is a Case? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
• Read, T. and Tilley, N. (2000) Not Rocket Science?: Problem-solving and Crime 
Reduction. Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 6. London: Home Office.
• Reiner, R. (2000) Politics o f the Police (3rd ed) Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Roman J. and G. Farrell. (2002) Cost-benefit Analysis for Crime Prevention: 
Opportunity Costs, Routine Savings, and Crime Externalities, in N. Tilley (editor) 
Evaluation for Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies, volume 14. 
Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Sabatier, P (1986) Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation 
Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis. Journal o f Public Policy 6 
21-48.
• Sampson, R. and Scott, M. (2000) Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety 
Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
• Scott, M. (2000). Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years. 
Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services.
• Scott, M. (2006) Implementing crime prevention: Lessons learned from problem- 
oriented policing projects, in J. Knuttson and R. Clarke (editors) Putting Theory to 
Work: Implementing Situational Crime Prevention and Problem-Oriented 
Policing. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 20. Cullompton Devon: Willan.
• Sherman, L. (1992) Attacking Crime: Police and Crime Control, in M. Tonry and 
N. Morris. Modern Policing, Crime and Justice: A Review o f Research. Vol 15 
University of Chicago Press.
• Sherman, L., Gottffedson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., Bushway, S. 
(1997) Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. Report 
to US Congress prepared by the National Institute of Justice.
• Stake, R. (1995) The Art o f Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
• Stone, C. (1980) The Implementation of Social Programmes: Two perspectives. 
Journal o f Social Issues Volume 36 no 4 pp 13-34.
• Sutton, M. (1996) Implementing Crime Prevention Schemes in an Multi-agency 
Setting. Home Office Research Study 160. London. Home Office.
271
• Tilley, N. (1996) Demonstration, Exemplification, Duplication and Replication in
Evaluation Research, Evaluation, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 35 - 50.
• Tilley, N. (1999) The Relationship between Crime Prevention and Problem-
oriented Policing, in C. Sole Brito and T. Allan (editors), Problem-oriented 
Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP Work, Vol.
2. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.
• Tilley, N. (2005) Introduction: Thinking Realistically about Crime Prevention, in, 
N. Tilley (editor) Handbook o f Crime Prevention and Community Safety. 
Cullomption. Willan.
• Tilley, N. and Laycock, G. (2002) Working Out What to do: Evidence Based 
Crime Reduction. Crime Reduction Research Paper 11. Home Office: London.
• Tilley, N., Pease, K., Hough, M. and Brown, R. (1999). Burglary Prevention:
Early Lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme. Crime Reduction Research 
Series Paper 1. London: Home Office.
• Townsley, M. and Pease, K. (2003) Two go Wild in Knowsley: Mainstreaming 
Evidence-led Crime Reduction, in K. Bullock and N. Tilley (editors) Crime 
Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing, Willan: Cullompton.
• Townsley, M. Johnson, S. and Pease, K. (2003) Problem-orientation, Problem­
solving and Organisational Change. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 15. Willan: 
Cullompton.
• Weick, K. E. (1984). Small Wins: Redefining the Scale of Social Problems. 
American Psychologist, 39(1), 40-49.
• Weisburg, W. (1994) Evaluating Community Policing: Role Tensions Between 
Practitioners and Evaluators, In D. Rosenbaum (editor) The Challenge o f 
Community Policing. Sage: London.
• Wilkinson, D. and Rosenbaum, D. (1994) The Effects of Organisational Structure 
on Community Policing: a comparison of two cities, In D. Rosenbaum (editor)
The challenge o f community policing. London: Sage.
• Yin, R.K. (1992) The case study method as a tool for doing evaluation, Current 
Sociology, vol 40, no 1.
• Yin, R. (1993) Applications o f Case Study Research. Newbury Park: Sage.
• Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: Sage
272
• Yin, R. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (third edition) Applied 
Social Research Methods. Sage: London.
• Younis, T. and Dawson, I. (1990) The study of Implementation, in T. Younis 
(editor) Implementation in public policy. Dartmouth: Aldershot.
273
Annex One
Breakdown of interviews 
Interviews in Manchester
The following is a breakdown of the interviews conduced in Manchester. The first 
column gives the interview number, the second the cumulative number of people 
interviewed (e.g. some interviews had more than one person present), then the 
interviewee’s role, their organisation and whether the interview was taped or if note 
were taken.
Steering group autumn 2001
Interview
number
No.
present Date
Role of 
interviewee
Organisation Means of 
recording
1 1 31/07/2001 Borough
commander
Greater
Manchester
Police
Notes
2 2 31/07/2001 Assistant director Housing Notes
3 3 01/08/2001 Deputy Chief 
executive City Council Notes
4 4 01/08/2001 Head access and 
inclusion
Education
Department
Notes
5 Manager social 
inclusion
Education
Department
Notes
5 6 21/08/2001 Assistant director Probation
service
Notes
6 7 21/08/2001 Project manager Greater
Manchester
Police
Notes
7 8 21/08/2001 Information officer
Greater
Manchester Notes
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Police
(civilian)
8 9 21/08/2001 Information officer Greater
Manchester
Police
(civilian)
Notes
9 10 10/09/2001 Manager Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
11 Manager Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
10 12 10/09/2001 Head teacher Bumage High 
School
Notes
Practitioners winter 2001
Interview
number
No.
present Date
Role of 
interviewee
Organisation Means of 
recording
11 13 27/11/2001 Out reach City Council Notes
14 Out reach City Council Notes
15 Manager Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
12 16 28/11/2001 Re-housing
specialist
Housing
service
Notes
13 17 28/11/2001 Probation officer Probation
service
Notes
14 18 28/11/2001 Education and 
welfare
Education
department
Notes
15 19 28/11/2001 Policy officer Housing
service
Notes
16 20 12/12/2001 Mentor Education Notes
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department
17 21 12/12/2001 Officer Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
18 22 12/12/2001 Project manager Greater
Manchester
Police
Notes
19 23 12/12/2001 Information
manager
Greater
Manchester
Police
(civilian)
Notes
20 24 11/01/2002 Neighbourhood 
nuisance officer
Housing
department
Notes
21 25 11/01/2002 Youth worker Education
department
Notes
22 26 28/01/2002
Manager Probation
service
Notes
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Practitioners spring 2002
Interview
number
No.
present Date
Role of 
interviewee
Organisation Means of 
recording
23 27 17/06/2002 Officer Probation
service
Notes
24 28 17/06/2002 Manager Social
services
Notes
25 29
17/06/2002
Officer Education
department
Notes
26 30 17/06/2002 YOT officer Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
27 31 17/06/2002 YOT officer Youth
Offending
Team
Notes
28 32 17/06/2002 Policy officer Housing
department
Notes
33 Manager Housing
department
Notes
29 34 18/06/2002 Officer Social
services
Notes
30 35 18/06/2002 Information
manager
Greater
Manchester
Police
(civilian)
Notes
31 36 18/06/2002
Project manager
Greater
Manchester
Police
Notes
32 37 18/06/2002 Out reach City council Notes
38 Out reach City council Notes
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Practitioners winter/spring 2003
Interview
number
No.
present Date
Role of 
interviewee
Organisation Means of 
recording
33 39 10/02/2003 Officer Youth
Offending
Team
Taped
34 40 10/02/2003 Out reach City council Taped
35 41 10/02/2003 Education and 
Welfare
Education
department
Taped
36 42 10/02/2003 Housing Housing
department
Taped
37 43 10/02/2003 Out reach City council Taped
38 44 10/02/2003 Information
manager
Greater
Manchester
Police
(civilian)
Taped
39 45 11/02/2003 Officer Probation
service
Taped
40 46 11/02/2003 Officer Youth
Offending
Team
Taped
41 47 11/02/2003 Manager Probation
service
Taped
42 48 11/02/2003 Manager Social
services
Taped
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Steering group winter/spring 2003
Interview
number
No.
present Date
Role of 
interviewee
Organisation Means of 
recording
43 49 03/03/2003 Head teacher 
Bumage High
Education
department
Taped
44 50 03/03/2003 Deputy chief 
executive
City council Taped
45 51 03/03/2003 Project manager Greater
Manchester
Police
Taped
46 52 04/03/2003 Manager Education
department
Taped
47 53 04/03/2003 Manager Youth service Taped
48 54 04/03/2003 Manager Education
department
Taped
49 55 06/03/2003 Manager Youth
Offending
Team
Taped
50 56 06/03/2003 Deputy director Education
department
Taped
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Interviews in Cambridge
The following is a breakdown of the interviews conduced in Cambridge. The first 
column gives the interview number, the second the cumulative number of people 
interviewed (e.g. some interviews had more than one person present), then the 
interviewee’s role, their organisation and whether the interview was taped or if note 
were taken. In Cambridge eight interviews were conducted in spring 2002 as follows:
Interview
number
Cumulative
interviewed
Role Organisation Means of recording
1 1 Project manager Cambridge
Constabulary
(civilian)
Notes
2 2 Head procurement 
division
Cambridge
Constabulary
(civilian)
Notes
3 3 Bike shed manager Cambridge
Constabulary
(retired
officer)
Notes
4 4 Bike shed manager Cambridge
Constabulary
(retired
officer)
Notes
5 6
Two with police 
officers who had 
managerial 
responsibility for 
the project
Community
safety
sergeant and 
manager of 
project 
manager Notes
6 7 Divisional
commander
Cambridge
constabulary
Notes
7 8 Head of planning Cambridge Notes
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city council
8 9 Head of security Anglia
Polytechnic
University
Notes
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Annex Two
Interview Guides
Manchester project interview guides
Manchester project steering group 
Autumn 2001
• Background/main role
• On what basis did you get involved in CHROME?
• What are the objectives of CHROME?
• How is CHROME going to bring about change?
• Has understanding of the project changed?
• What have the key events so far been?
• Who have been the main actors -  how might this change?
• What have the problems been?
Funding/interagency/within agency/staff
• What do you see as the main tasks/interventions?
• How does CHROME differ from what you/your agency were doing in relation to 
gangs anyway?
• How has CHROME been seen internally? -  at what level, in which roles.
• How does CHROME fit with wider aims of you/your agency?
• Relationship with Home Office/Regional office
• Data on gangs and shootings
• Who is missing from the partnership
• How does CHROME fit with wider crime and disorder strategy/other relevant 
strategies
• What future difficulties do you foresee?
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• How can they best be overcome?
• What are the benefits?
Long term sustainability of CHROME
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Manchester project steering group spring 2003
Role of interviewee 
Background -  I f  don’t know 
Role in MMAGS -  i f  don’t know
On what basis did you get involved in MMGAS -  i f  don ’t know 
Main role you have played in MMAGS since March 2001
Understanding of MMAGS
What were the objectives of MMAGS?
What were the main tasks/interventions going to be?
How was it going to bring about change?
Has understanding of the project changed?
Setting up
What did they think about the way the project was set up?
• How smoothly did it all go? Who was involved? Was there anyone who 
should have been involved who was not? Was there anyone who should not 
have been involved who was?
What did they think of the processes by which staff were appointed?
• Especially the police co-ordinators? What impact did these processes have on 
the project? Are the right people on the staff -  are people missing? Is there 
anyone who should not be involved who is?
What lessons can be drawn from the setting up process?
• What was done well? What was done not so well? Were there any external
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factors that helped or hindered the process? If so, which?
If the project were to be repeated, with the benefit of hindsight, how would they go
about it?
Project structure
What do they think of the structure of the project? [show project structure.]
• Has it worked well? Why, or why not? How does it compare with the 
structures of other projects they have worked on?
How well have the different agencies worked together?
• Prompt for strategic and practical levels?
• What differences have there been in agendas? What effect have any 
differences had on MMAGS?
What about co-ordination of the project?
• How well has this been done? What has worked well? What has worked less 
well? How has it worked having a police inspector as co-ordinator? How 
could it have been done better?
What advice would they give to future projects with similar objectives with regard to
structure?
• Would they recommend that they copy the structure of the MMAGS? Why, or 
why not?
Time line of the project
Once the project got underway, who were the key people involved?
• What is their understanding of their roles?
What have been the key events / key interventions in the project?
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• List them
What positive events have been encountered?
• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on 
the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems 
been overcome?
What problems have there been?
• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on 
the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems 
been overcome?
Other issues
How has MMAGS been seen within their agency?
• How well do the aims of the project fit with the aims of their agency? Does it 
fit with their internal targets and objectives? How much does it differ from 
what they were doing anyway?
Have they come across any media reaction to the project?
• If so, what, and where? What did they think of the reaction? Was it fair? 
Have the media been managed effectively?
Have there been any problems with funding?
• How well did it work with the police being the budget holder? Were there any 
problems with resources? If so, what?
Outcomes of the project
What has the project achieved so far?
• What impact has it made? Has it achieved more than they expected or less? 
Has it achieved as much as it could have? If not, how could it have achieved 
more?
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Overall, has the project been a success?
• Why, or why not? How do they feel to have been involved?
What will the project have achieved by the time it finishes?
• Will it have reached a satisfactory conclusion? If not, what more should it 
have done?
What do they think will happen in the future?
• How will the project progress? How should it progress?
What advice would they give to future initiatives of this sort?
What advice would they give to people taking on their role in future initiatives of this 
sort?
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Manchester project practitioners
Winter 2001
Role
Objectives of MMAGS 
Key events 
Difficulties 
Training
Difference from before 
How MMAGS is seen internally 
Missing agency?
Benefits seen so far?
Future difficulties
Key individuals in implementation of the project so far? Has this changed? How 
might it change?
Sustainability
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Manchester project practitioners
Spring 2002
Name -  i f  don’t know 
Role -  i f  new or don’t know
Background and how did they get involved in MMAGS -  i f  started after the last set 
o f interviews
Describe your main tasks over the last few months 
What do you typically do in a week?
How much non- MMAGS work do you do?
Describe what you did last week 
Roughly how much was non-MMAGS work?
What have been your main achievements in the last few months?
What problems have you encountered?
What have the key achievements of MMAGS overall so far?
What problems have been encountered?
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Practitioners
Spring 2003 
Role of interviewee
Background -  I f  don’t know 
Role in MMAGS -  i f  don’t know
On what basis did you get involved in MMGAS -  i f  don’t know 
Main role you have played in MMAGS since March 2001
Understanding of MMAGS
What were the objectives of MMAGS?
What were the main tasks/interventions going to be?
How was it going to bring about change?
Has understanding of the project changed?
Setting up
What did they think about the way the project was set up?
• How smoothly did it all go? Who was involved? Was there anyone who 
should have been involved who was not? Was there anyone who should not 
have been involved who was?
What did they think of the processes by which staff were appointed?
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• Especially the police co-ordinators? What impact did these processes have on 
the project? Are the right people on the staff -  are people missing? Is there 
anyone who should not be involved who is?
What lessons can be drawn from the setting up process?
• What was done well? What was done not so well? Were there any external 
factors that helped or hindered the process? If so, which?
If the project were to be repeated, with the benefit of hindsight, how would they go
about it?
Project structure
What do they think of the structure of the project? [show project structure.]
• Has it worked well? Why, or why not? How does it compare with the 
structures of other projects they have worked on?
How well have the different agencies worked together?
• Prompt for strategic and practical levels?
• What differences have there been in agendas? What effect have any 
differences had on MMAGS?
What about co-ordination of the project?
• How well has this been done? What has worked well? What has worked less 
well? How has it worked having a police inspector as co-ordinator? How 
could it have been done better?
What advice would they give to future projects with similar objectives with regard to
structure?
• Would they recommend that they copy the structure of the MMAGS? Why, or 
why not?
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Time line of the project
Once the project got underway, who were the key people involved?
• What is their understanding of their roles?
What have been the key events / key interventions in the project?
• List them
What positive events have been encountered?
• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on 
the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems 
been overcome?
What problems have there been?
• What positive events have been due to the project itself, or people working on 
the project? Which have arisen externally? How successfully have problems 
been overcome?
Other issues
How has MMAGS been seen within their agency?
• How well do the aims of the project fit with the aims of their agency? Does it 
fit with their internal targets and objectives? How much does it differ from 
what they were doing anyway?
Have they come across any media reaction to the project?
• If so, what, and where? What did they think of the reaction? Was it fair? 
Have the media been managed effectively?
Have there been any problems with funding?
• How well did it work with the police being the budget holder? Were there any 
problems with resources? If so, what?
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Outcomes of the project
What has the project achieved so far?
• What impact has it made? Has it achieved more than they expected or less? 
Has it achieved as much as it could have? If not, how could it have achieved 
more?
Overall, has the project been a success?
• Why, or why not? How do they feel to have been involved?
What will the project have achieved by the time it finishes?
• Will it have reached a satisfactory conclusion? If not, what more should it 
have done?
What do they think will happen in the future?
• How will the project progress? How should it progress?
What advice would they give to future initiatives of this sort?
What advice would they give to people taking on their role in future initiatives of this 
sort?
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Cambridge Cycle Project Interview guide
• Name of respondent if don’t know
• Length of involvement in project
• Level of involvement
• Understanding of aims of project
• Role in the project
• If relevant how the project fits in with aims and objectives of home agency? 
Across which levels and roles.
• Project set up -  what worked well, what worked less well, who was involved, 
should anyone else have been involved.
• What about the processes through which people were appointed?
• If the project were to start again, in hindsight, how could the set up have been 
better?
• What about the project structure -  what worked well, what worked less well
• Management and support -  has there been sufficient management support, role 
of individual line managers, role of steering group?
• Time line -  who was key in implementing the project, how have agencies 
worked together, who have you worked closets with and why? Who worked 
least with and why?
• Description of main tasks in relation to the project. Describe typical weak? 
What sort of tasks would be normal? Has work load been about right?
• Main personal achievements? Problems personally encountered with role 
played in the project.
• Overall aims achieved
• Over all elements of project that worked well
• Overall elements of project implemented
• Obstacles to implementation measures now in place
• Learning points
• Advice for other areas attempting to deal with cycle theft and cycle parking
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problems
• If there are continuing problems with cycle theft in Cambridge what could be 
done about them?
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Annex Three
Cambridge cycle theft reduction project plan
Critical dates Task to be completed Who is involved
June 2000 -October 
2000
Preparation of bid to release Home 
Office funding
21 June -  20 July Preparation of project definition form 
Person specification for police 
constables
Survey of current university registration 
schemes
Additional research from the county 
group
Additional research to cycle crime at the 
railway station
Preparation of programme of work 
Identify further of areas of work form 
the Home Office
Community safety manager 
and five others
Early August Task group to meet and discuss the 
proposals and other information
Community safety manager
By end August Tidy up the bid with research documents 
and other information
Community safety manager 
and task group
End September/early 
October
Feed information to Home Office and 
receive Home Office money
Community safety manager 
and others
296
June 2000 -  October 
2000
Person specification for the project 
manager
End June 
Mid July
Write person specification 
Evaluation of the post
Community safety manager 
to take responsibility
31st July Advertise the post
31st August First stage interviews
7th September Second stage interviews
October 2000 In post
October 2000 -  July 
2001
Cycle parking
Oct -  Dec 2000 Research different racking for different 
locations
Project manager and task 
group
Oct -  Dec 2000 Identify types of racking for use in pilot 
schemes
Project manager and task 
group
Oct -  Dec 2000 Identify locations for trialling the racks Project manager and task 
group
Oct 2000-Ju ly  2001 Park street -  design for conversion Project manager and task 
group
Oct -  Dec 2000 Trial the racks and determine the most 
appropriate locations
Project manager and 
Cambridge cycling campaign
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Jan -  July 2001
Determine locations for installing new 
and replacing existing inadequate racks
Project manager and tack 
group
Jan-July  2001 Survey the cycle parking the city centre 
(twice)
Project manager and 
Cambridge cycling campaign
August 2001 -  July 
2002
Cycle parking
Aug 2001 -  Dec 2001 Work on the installation of cycle raking 
at park street car park, including 
alterations to the car park
Project manager and city 
council
Aug 2001 -  Dec 2001 Install new cycle racks in the identified 
locations throughout the city
Project manager and city 
council
August 2001 -  July 
2002
Survey the cycle parking in the city 
centre
Project manager and 
Cambridge Cycling Campaign
Jan 2002- July 2002 Work with the Home Office to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the scheme
Project manager, task force 
and Home Office
Oct 2000-Ju ly  2001 University registration scheme
Oct 2000-M ar 2001 Work with the University of Cambridge 
porters, welfare officers, students & 
academics to determine the best 
registration scheme.
Project manager and 
University of Cambridge
Research registration schemes used in Project manager
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other towns and counties and ones 
currently used by the university
April -  July 2001 Develop a registration scheme for 
implementation from Autumn 2001
Project manager and task 
group
Aug 2001 -  Sept 2002 University registration scheme
Aug 2001 -  Sept 2001 Equip the university to receive and set 
in place a registration scheme to be 
running for freshers week
Project manager and the 
University of Cambridge
Oct 2001 Start to use the scheme University of Cambridge
Oct 01 -  Dec 01 Monitor scheme and assess 
effectiveness over first term
Project manager, task group 
and Home Office
Nov 01-F eb  02 Start negotiations with Anglia 
Polytechnic University, 6th form 
colleges and schools for rolling out the 
scheme in 2002
Project manager and heads of 
institutions
Jan 02 -  Jul 02 Further monitoring and evaluation of the 
university of Cambridge scheme, 
checking how it might be transferred
University of Cambridge 
Project manager, task group 
and Home Office
Apr 02 -  Jul 02 If appropriate start to transfer the 
scheme or amended scheme
Project manager and heads of 
institutions
Jul 02 -  Aug 02 Equip institutions to receive and set up 
scheme to be running for start of term
Heads of institutions
Sept 02 Start to use scheme
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Jan 2001 - Jul 2001 Poster campaign and other literature
Design a poster warning the public that 
thieves operate in the area
Project manager and task 
group
Identify other literature around 
responsible ownership of cycles that can 
be used as part of work with students 
and other members of the public
Project manager and task 
group
Oct 2 0 0 1 -July 2002 Poster campaign and other literature
Identify locations for the use of posters. 
Monitor on a weekly basis
Project manager and police 
officers
Ongoing through out 
the project
Police targeting offenders
Mid July Write the person specification 
Advertise the post
Police inspector
31st Aug - end Sept Interviews Police inspector
Nov 2002 In post
Nov 2000 -  Sept 2002 Identify offenders of cycle theft, through 
crime pattern analysis, identify locations 
for using the trap cycle, investigate 
offenders to determine locations for 
selling on cycles, other related crime.
Project manager and two 
police constables
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On going through the 
project
Research
Oct 2000 -  Sept 2002 Research of cycle crime to continue 
throughout the project development, to 
determine where to concentrate work, 
where new work needs to be developed 
etc.
Project manager
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Annex Four
Outputs of Manchester project
Abbreviated action Count of abbreviated 
action
Planning type activity
Action plan 3
Assess 16
Risk assessment 10
Collate further information 17
Identify means to contact 6
Llocate individual 5
Contact individual 9
Sub total 66
Meetings
Arrange meeting 5
Home visit 9
Prison visit 12
Visit 13
Introduction to MMAGS 10
Sub total 49
Specific intervention
Childcare 4
Developing diversionary activities 14
Enforcement options 8
Sub total 26
Housing options
Re-housing 5
Secure accommodation 3
Supported housing 1
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Housing unclear 3
Sub total 12
Education type
Secure education 11
Supporting education 3
Sub total 14
Link to existing provision
Link to key worker 19
To link with other agencies 9
Sub total 28
Monitoring type
Monitoring 5
Update 7
Sub total 12
Other 26
Total 233
303
Annex Five
Timeline of Manchester project
Date Activity Main decisions / actions
• Pre-implementation and research stages
January 2000 Greater Manchester Police approach to Home Office for funding
June 2000 Research roles and responsibilities agreed by Home Office Research 
Development and Statistics Directorate
August 2000 Recruitment of first civilian researcher (later the project implementation 
manager)
August 2000 Trip to the Boston Gun Project
September 2000 Recruitment of second civilian research (later the information manager)
13 th March 2001 Manchester Executive 
Partnership Board meeting
• Broad strategy outlined by Nick 
Tilley (CRRS 13) accepted by Board
29“  March 2001 Board meeting • Chief Superintendent expands board 
to include more partner agencies and 
fewer police representatives
• Name of project change suggested
• Implementation team tasked to 
develop a range of interventions to 
encompass the whole strategy
April 2001 Original chief 
superintendent replaced
April 6“  2001 Intervention document 
circulated
• The long document detailing 
potential interventions for the 
project board to consider
• Implementation stages
24th April 2001 Board meeting • Issue of name of project discussed
• Agreed would not be feasible (time 
constraints) to ‘pass’ the whole
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strategy developed by 
implementation team
• Agencies were to consider options 
from a template on the basis of 
‘desirability, viability, priority and 
means of implementation’ and 
submit for consideration from 
implementation team
• Consideration of sustainability 
discussed
May 2001 Recruitment of the first project manager (police inspector)
22nd May 2001 Board meeting • Strategy of 31 interventions agreed 
to be started immediately
• Implementation team to provide 
‘aims and philosophy’ of project
• Head teacher invited to be 
permanent member of the group
• Issue of name for the project 
discussed
• The two researchers provided with 
new job descriptions 
(implementation manager and 
information manager) and role 
requirements
25“  May 2001 Funding formally agreed with Crime Reduction Unit at the Home 
Office
20th June 2001 Board meeting • Name and mission statement for 
project agreed
• Decision to hold off formal launch 
of project until agencies are ready to 
implement crackdown
• Decision that YOT would sort out 
the recruitment of the two outreach
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workers by the end of June
End June 2001 Two outreach workers recruited as planned
June 2001 Recruitment of the remaining practitioners begins
7th August 2001 Board meeting Decisions made to:
• Develop media strategy
• Develop draft project objectives
• Develop risk to practitioners 
assessment model
• Develop training course for 
practitioners
• Confirm project appointments
• Circulate target list by 12th August
17th October 
2001
Board meeting
24th-26th 
October 2001
Three day training for practitioners
31 st October 
2001
First weekly multi-agency problem solving group
December 2001 Practitioner with Youth Offending Team sacked for conviction for 
violence in the past
6th December 
2001
Board meeting • Decision made for no major launch 
because of trials
• Decision made to revised strategy
• Need for some for communication 
with the community identifies
• Concerned that outreach worker and 
the implementation team in money 
runs out in May and the rest in 
September raised
• Most funding bodies will not fund 
salaries and so mainstreaming the 
posts is the only option
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• Project manager suggests the focus 
crackdown should be changed
• Practitioner issues -  proj ect manager 
raised some of the early practitioner 
issues
• The matter of the sacking of Youth 
Offending Team member was 
considered closed
29th January 2002 Board meeting • Evaluation update presented by Nick 
Tilley and Karen Bullock
• Agreement to develop performance 
indicators
• Agreement that the strategy should 
remain as it is until September 2002
• Important questions of 
mainstreaming staff or maintaining 
the pilot to be addressed at the next 
meeting
1st March 2002 Board meeting • Agreed further work on performance 
indicators necessary
• Agreed performance indicators 
should be ‘ viewed with the full and 
shifting circumstances o f the 
problem. The principle aim o f 
reducing firearms injury and death 
should not be forgotten\
• Deputy chief executive of 
Manchester City Council and the 
project manager agree to contact 
Training Manager of City 
Magistrates to raise awareness of the 
project and implications for 
sentencing
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• Decision made for media release of 
the project and to release the report. 
This was to be coordinated with the 
end of the ‘Nile’ trial (a long 
prosecution against some gang 
members which had resulted in 
delays to the media launch of the 
project lest it interfered with the 
trial)
• MMAGS leaflet generally agreed 
with some caveats
• Need for representation from mental 
health discussed
• Greater Manchester Police agree to 
pay for project manager until Sept 
2002 and to dissolve the post of 
implementation manager
• Decision to clarify issues associated 
with the extension of the outreach 
workers
26th April 2002 Board meeting
9th May 2002 Board meeting • Agreement to keep the structure but 
that the project required ‘a greater 
degree o f authority in its 
management ’
• Decision consequently made to seek 
new project manager
• Strong commitment to the crack 
down elements of the strategy 
expressed by steering group 
members
• Stated that the project manager 
needs more support from the home
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agencies, project manager should be 
more directive of the secondees
• Concern about the running of the 
practitioners meeting expressed 
Decision made to follow the MAPPS 
model
• Decision to move the management 
of the street workers from the Youth 
Offending Team to the project 
manager
• The positions of the outreach 
workers to be re-advertised and 
existing outreach workers 
encouraged to apply
May 2002 Project implementation manager leaves the project
1st June 2002 Gang stop march • March organized by members of the 
public well attended and decent feed 
back
June 2002 Outreach workers go off work on long term sick leave
June 2002 Decision made for project manager to manage street workers
10th June 2002 Board meeting • New job descriptions for outreach 
prepared
• Decision made to maintain a police 
officer as the project manager
• Board considered to fully understand 
and agree to crackdown -  housing 
department to produce a survey of 
law enforcement options
• Agreed that consensus on the issue 
of crackdown was important and that 
if there were problems reaching 
agreement board members should be 
approached to resolve issues
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9th July 2002 Board meeting • Agreed to extend contracts for 
existing street workers to end of 
August because of problems with 
advert
• Idea of mentors introduced
• Agreement to trial the GREAT 
scheme at a local high school
August 2002 Original project manager leaves the project
September 2002 New project manager starts as project manager
20th September 
2002
Arrest of project implementation manager
26th September 
2002
Board meeting • Intervention document circulated 
by housing department
• New outreach workers selected
• Issue of appropriate line 
management of secondees 
especially in relation to 
discipline, sickness management 
and internal agencies affairs 
discussed
• Board agrees that agency line 
managers are responsible for 
everything but the day-to-day 
activities of the practitioners 
continue to be overseen by the 
project manager
• Steering group member would 
have the final decision if issues 
couldn’t be resolved between 
practitioner and project manager
• Agreed that the management of 
the street workers would revert 
to the Youth Offending Team
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-• Concerns raised by practitioners 
regarding the consultation 
process for the GREAT 
programme discussed -  agreed 
no further consultation was 
necessary
• New ‘traffic light’ system for 
performance indictors greed
• Concerns regarding original 
project implementation 
managers media exploits shared 
(the project manager continued 
to contact the press in respect to 
aspects of gang related problems 
in Manchester and the project 
and this resulted in his arrest)
14th October 
2002
Official project launch
16th October 
2002
Launch of Home Office Research Development and Statistics 
Directorate report
4th December 
2002
Board meeting • New performance indicator 
framework agreed
• Finally decided that ‘ crackdown as 
originally intended was impractical 
for implementation ’
• Implementation team and Greater 
Manchester Police were to develop 
proposals for enforcement activity 
and were to provide details for the 
next board meeting
• Decision there was no need for the 
virtual transition school
• Early warning mechanism for
311
schools not formalised but 
considered to be on going informally
• Agreement to rationalise the number 
of performance indicators
• Recognized that the absence of 
outreach workers has had am impact 
on delivery but that recruitment 
difficulties should be sorted shortly
December 2002 Ongoing pilot of the GREAT programme at local High School
28m January 2003 Board meeting • The problem of MMAGS 
practitioners not sharing a common 
approach to the project aims and 
objectives was discussed
• Board stated commitment to 
practitioners participation in the 
whole strategy and that action 
should be taken if team members are 
not 'on message *
• Decision made that there was still 
significant amounts of work to be 
done before MMAGS could be fully 
integrated into core work
• Risk assessment still unfinished
• Generic statement of ensuring 
economic support for employment 
rather than the jobs bank and other 
specific aims
• Suggested that targets for gang 
involved adults and parents should 
be split into distinct groups
• Agreed had not managed to 
implement GREAT in the financial 
year but that it was better late than
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incomplete
• Agreed to add GREAT to the aims
• Independent advisory group agreed
• Draft data protection protocol 
circulated
January 2003 Chief superintendent and project chairman leaves and is replaced
11 April 2003 Board meeting
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Annex Six
Timeline and summary of minutes of Cambridge project
Date Main issues and detail of discussion at steering group meeting
Meeting 
7th September 
2000
• Decision to merge existing groups on bike theft in Cambridge into one
• Steering group under the umbrella of the Cambridge Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnership arrangements (set out by the 1998 Crime and 
Disorder Act)
Internal meetings about the bid to the Home Office on going
Discussions about the how to assist the project manager when appointed
Meeting 
5th October 
2000
Project manager introduced as the cycle theft reduction project manager
Registration schemes
• Students at Cambridge University are required to identify bikes with 
unique ID registered with porters
• Anglia Polytechnic University does not require this of their students and 
don’t have the capacity to sort this
Cycle racks
• Locations for stands discussed
• Discussion of how many stands will be required and how many different 
sorts of stands will be required
Decision to conduct counts of numbers of bikes in Cambridge and parking 
available for them
Discussion of which locks should be recommended to students
• Police remind project they cannot recommend commercial products
Discussion of cycle flows in and out of Cambridge 
• Counters not working properly
A survey of existing registration schemes in the colleges was discussed -  it
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showed that most colleges did have basic systems for registering their students 
cycles
6th November 
2000
Discussion of locations for cycle racks
• Maps have been produced of the proposed locations for new stands
Discussions about how to best link into the Grafton Centre re-development
Cycle racking
• Discussion of which stands to buy
Cycle counters have now arrived
Discussion of cycle park
• Loss of 24 parking spaces would result in loss of revenue to the city of 
council of £180 a day when car park is full (which is in any case only at 
the weekends)
• Need to think about how much to charge cyclists (if at all)
• Have to decide which racks to have
• Research on different types parking systems considered to be necessary
• Discussion of how to create safe areas for cyclists and pedestrians within 
the new facility
6th December 
2000
Further discussion of locations for cycle racks
Further discussions about how to best link into the Grafton Centre re-development
Further iscussion of which stands to buy
4 cycle counters have now arrived
Discussion of cycle park
Recommended locks
• www.soldsecure.com recommends locks.
• This site was set up by Essex and Cumbria police and is managed by a 
locksmith association
• The website rates the locks making it easier to make decisions about which 
ones to buy.
23rd January 
2001
Targeting offenders
• Concern raised that police not pulling their weight on the policing 
commitment to the project
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Park street car park
• Orders placed for the new racks
Cycle registration events
• Three events held since last meeting
• TV publicity encouraged people along
Experimental parking
• Paper about the experiment to be written up
Cycle parking locations
• Work scheduled to begin at Trumpington Street, St Mary's Passage, St 
Edwards Passage and Lion Yard
Cycle theft figures
• Annual summer rise not occurred
• Numbers lowest for a long time
7-Feb-01 Video of bike police in Seattle
Video sold the idea of community policing on bikes
Cycle parking trails
• Project manager showed 7 types of cycle stands and explained why they 
were selected Expected to be launched in April
University & APU cycle racks
• 50 new Sheffield’s at Downing site
• Similar area in front of APU
• Assurance that new stands would be properly spaced was achieved
Park street secure car park
• Pilot survey had been conducted and results were encouraging
• The project manager presented a map showing the routes in and out of the 
park and the pros and cons
• Discussion of cycle security leaflet
• Project manager presented booklet 'how to keep your bicycle safe ’ and 
asked for comments
University & wider registration schemes
• Oxford university have a similar bike store but do not auction bikes off
• Looking into the viability of nation wide schemes
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•  The project manager had some suggestions to make the present scheme 
better
16-May-01 Review of launch of the new racks
All agreed that the launch had gone very well
Promotion of racks in the city
• Launch was covered by radio
Evaluation
• Discussion of how to evaluate the stands
Park street secure car park
• Project manager showed partial results of the survey which indicates 
cyclists would use it
• Going to arrange some costs for signage
Cycle parking
• Discussions of where to put more stands
Report on police on bikes conference
• Report prepared by West Midlands Police contains tips and techniques for 
police on bikes
25“ July 2001 Experimental parking
Feedback very encouraging. No negative feedback. Some preferences for certain 
stands expressed
Park street secure car park
• Discussion of report of how to implement the car park
• Recommended that cyclists dismount and walk their bikes in
Cycle parking locations 
• New sites discussed
Securing parking and registration schemes
• Kits for Cambridge colleges will be distributed - this will include the 
booklet of which 40,000 have been printed
• Booklets will also be sent to the students homes with the burglary 
reduction kids
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• Discussion of how commercial kits work
• Discussion that it would be useful to have regular bike marking events
• Victims of bike theft would be invited to have their new bikes registered at 
a small cost
5-Sep-Ol Targeting offenders
• The police had apparently operated two operations over the summer but no 
one was caught
Experimental parking
• Street surveys conducted
• Triangle came out best in terms of security put people preferred the SF and 
inverted U
Park street secure car park
• Revised layout produced
• Decision to use toast racks rather than Sheffield’s to speed up process of 
installing the racks
Cycle parking locations
• More locations discussed
7th November 
2001
Cycle theft figures
• Discussion of the falls in bike theft discussed
Reporting crime on the internet
• Desire expressed to increase internet recording expressed
Policing priorities
• Cycle theft has fallen but still accounts for a lot of crime in the city and so 
should be a priority
• As such the project was going to remind senior officers of the promises 
made to provide officers
Cycle registration events
• Discussion of more planned
Experimental parking
• Survey is being analysed
• Paper will be written up for publication as the parking experience attracted
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a lot of interest in the cycling world
Park street secure car park 
• All plans now agreed
Cycle parking locations
• New sites identified including private sites where there is public access
13-Mar-02 Targeting offenders
• The police services has decided not to dedicate officers to the cycle project 
and is willing to defend decision to Home Office
• This is because of changing priorities and shortages of officers
Park street secure car park 
• Almost ready to open
Wall anchors for student accommodation
• Funding for this from another initiative has been agreed
Cycle registration events
• More have been held and more are planned
Cycle parking locations 
• Ongoing installation
Experimental parking
• Survey for journals still pending
22M May 2002 Cycle registration events
• More planned
• May request support from probationer police officers to help
Park street secure car park
• launch date of 9th July decision
• Cycle coding event will also be held
Funding
• Money runs out in September and other options are being considered
• To propose a list of action that are self financing - paid for from reductions 
in crime
• Could ask to be fully funded from the city council
• Have decided that a bike theft costs the authorities £340
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5th June 2002 Funding
• Bike theft still falling and suggested that the post should concentrates part 
time on advice and registration schemes
Park street secure car park
• Use of facility discussed at length
• Update has been slow and means of marking discussed there 250 000 pay 
on display sticker backs, articles in Cambridge Cycling Campaign 
Newsletter and a big picture in the evening news. 14 signs in the city 
centre - still low take up
• Decision to look at ways of promoting before looking for more sites
18th September 
2002
Cycle registration
• 4 commercial schemes examined
Railway station
• Progress has been made in tightening bike cull at the station
• Discussion that the bike shed had a 'vested interest' in having more bike 
culls
Park street secure car park
• Take up still low
• Suggestions for better and more signage discussed
Other
• Decision to widen the membership of the group, including representatives 
from British Transport Police
• Thanks expressed to the project manager for his work over the last two 
years
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Annex seven
Job descriptions for the Manchester project staff
The following sets out in more detail the roles of the Manchester practitioners in 
respect to the project interventions. These are reproduced almost precisely as they 
were in the project documentation.
The implementation team
• Project manger
• Implementation manager
• Information manager
The implementation team were the primarily responsible for:
• Engage CPS & Clerks of Court and establish ‘Community Prosecution’
-  Led by the implementation team with all agencies
• Drip feed awareness of gangs and gang dynamics among all agencies and schools
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Establish regular information exchange between all agencies and schools
-  To be initiated by the implementation team
• Participate in CIGS and LAPs
-  Led by the implementation team
• Employ two outreach workers as pilot project for future programme
-  Led by Chief Executive department with the implementation team 
directing programme of work and Youth Offending Team line 
managing
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• Develop regular ‘lessons learned’ workshops
-  Led by the implementation team with Chief Execs
Secondary responsibly included:
• Anti-social Behaviour Order and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by housing but with all agencies
• Regular training for all involved workers
-  Led by Chief Executive Department with the implementation team
• Engage grass roots groups
-  Led by Local Education Authority with the implementation team and 
outreach workers
• Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
-  Led by Local Education Authority with the implementation team and 
outreach workers
• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects
-  Led by Chief Executive with the implementation team
• Provide mediation between youth and residents & local businesses
-  Led by the outreach workers with the implementation team
• Establish outreach pilot project to conduct street level outreach
-  Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Team and 
the implementation team
• Establish a ‘virtual transition school' for gang involved youth who have been 
excluded
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-  Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Team and 
the implementation team
• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
-  Led by Chief Executive Department and Youth Offending Tearn and 
the implementation team
• Liaise directly with schools to develop ’early warning mechanisms4
-  Led by Local Education Authority and the implementation team
• Develop a risk assessment model
-  Led by Youth Offending Team with implementation team and Local 
Education Authority
• Monitor the impact of gangs on non gang offenders
-  Led by Youth Offending Tearn and implementation team
• Directly intervene with youth gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat 
reprisal
-  Led by outreach workers with implementation team
• Explore the full extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
-  Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and Chief Executive 
Department with the implementation team
• Train key workers (Teachers, Police Officers, Youth Offending Team, social 
workers etc) in mediation
-  Led by Chief Executive Department with implementation team and 
Manchester Mediation Services
• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth 
and community members and carry out mediation
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-  Led by Youth Offending Team and Probation with outreach and 
implementation
• Help youth broaden their experiences by linking with charities such as Fairbridge
-  Led by outreach workers with implementation team
• Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
-  Led by outreach workers with Council Youth Services
Greater Manchester Police 
Lead agency for:
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, 
Nuisance Response Team, Probation, Youth Offending Team
• Enhanced responsiveness to community concerns
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Neighbourhood Response 
Team
• Explore the full extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
-  Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and Chief Executive with 
implementation team
Involved with:
• Operation Nightlight with youth offenders
-  Led by Youth Offending Tearn with Greater Manchester Police
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish 
“Community Prosecution”
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
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• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
City Council Chief Executives Department
Lead Agency:
• Regular training for all involved workers
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with 
implementation team
• Employ two Streetworkers as pilot project for future programme
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with 
implementation team directing programme of work and Youth 
Offending Team line managing
• Encourage local businesses to support specific projects
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with 
implementation team
• Establish Streetworker pilot project to conduct street level outreach
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department and Youth 
Offending Team and implementation team
• Develop a jobs bank
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department
• Employment for youth and family members in regeneration projects
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department
• Engage gang involved youth in community and city projects
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-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with outreach 
workers
• Explore the M l extent of roles under Crime & Disorder
-  Jointly led by Greater Manchester Police and City Council Chief 
Executives Department
• Train key workers (Teachers, police officers, Youth Offending Team, social 
workers etc) in mediation
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with 
implementation team and Manchester Mediation Services
Involved in:
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish 
“Community Prosecution”
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
• Develop regular ‘lessons learned’ workshops
-  Led by implementation team with City Council Chief Executives 
Department
Housing 
Lead Agency:
• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
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• Provide independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected 
by gangs
-  Led by housing with social services 
Involved in:
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, 
Nuisance Response Team, probation, Youth Offending Team
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish 
“Community Prosecution”
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family 
situations
-  Led by social services with housing and outreach
• Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
-  Led by social services with housing and outreach
• Enhanced responsiveness to community concerns
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Neighbourhood Response 
Team
Probation 
Lead Agency:
• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth 
and community members and carry out mediation
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-  Led by Youth Offending Team, probation with outreach workers and 
implementation team
Involved in:
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, 
Nuisance Response Team, probation and Youth Offending Team
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish 
“Community Prosecution”
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
Youth Offending Team 
Lead Agency:
• Employ two outreach workers as pilot project for future programme
-  Led by City Council Chief Executives Department with 
implementation team directing programme of work and Youth 
Offending Team line managing
• Work with incarcerated gang members and family
-  Led by Youth Offending Tearn with outreach workers
• Operation Nightlight with youth offenders
-  Led by Youth Offending Team with Greater Manchester Police
• Develop a risk assessment model
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-  Led by Youth Offending Team with implementation team and Local 
Education Authority
• Monitor the impact of gangs on non gang offenders
-  Led by Youth Offending Team and implementation team
• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth 
and community members and carry out mediation
-  Led by Youth Offending Tearn and probation with outreach workers 
and implementation team
Involved in:
• Crackdown employing ‘pulling levers’ strategy
-  Led by Greater Manchester Police with Crown Prosecution Service, 
Nuisance Response Team, probation and Youth Offending Team
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service and Clerks of Court and establish 
‘Community Prosecution’
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Anti-social behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
• Establish a ‘virtual transition school' for gang involved youth who have been 
excluded
-  Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and 
implementation team
• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
-  Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and 
implementation team
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Local Education Authority
Lead Agency
• Engage grass roots groups
-  Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team and 
outreach
• Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
-  Led by Local Education Authority with outreach and implementation 
team
• Establish a ‘virtual transition school' for gang involved youth who have been 
excluded
-  Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and 
implementation team
• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
-  Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and 
implementation team
• Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms*
-  Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team
Involved in:
• Engage Crown Prosecution Service & Clerks of Court and establish “Community 
Prosecution”
-  Led by implementation team with all agencies
• Anti-social Behaviour Orders and Tenancy compliance
-  Led by Neighbourhood Response Team with all agencies
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• Develop a risk assessment model.
-  Led by Youth Offending Team with implementation team and Local 
Education Authority
Social Services
Lead Agency:
• Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
-  Led by social services with outreach workers
• Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
-  Led by social services with housing and outreach workers
• Develop links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for
relocated youth and families
-  Led by social services with outreach
• Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family 
situations
Led by social serviceswith housing and outreach workers 
Involved in:
• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
-  Led by outreach with social services
• Provide independent and/or supported living accommodation in areas not affected 
by gangs
-  Led by housing with social services 
Outreach workers
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Lead Agency:
• Conduct outreach to gang involved youth
-  Led by outreach workers
• Provide mediation between youth and residents & local businesses
-  Led by outreach workers with implementation team
• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
-  Led by outreach workers with social services
• Directly intervene with youth gang members if there is a likelihood of tit for tat 
reprisal
-  Led by outreach workers with implementation team
• Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
-  Led by outreach workers with council youth services
• Conduct emergency room intervention and mediation
-  Led by outreach workers
• Help youth broaden their experiences by linking with charities such as Fairbridge
-  Led by outreach workers with implementation team
• Engage gang involved youth in community and city projects
-  Led by outreach workers with council youth services
Involved in:
• Work with incarcerated gang members and family
-  Led by Youth Offending Tearn with outreach workers
• Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
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-  Led by social services
• Assist gang involved youth to leave disorganised and/or destructive family 
situations
-  Led by social services with housing and outreach workers
• Ensure security of young women victimised by gang members
-  Led by social services with housing and outreach workers
• Develop links with agencies in other cities to ensure continued support for 
relocated youth and families
-  Led by social services with outreach workers
• Prior to release of incarcerated youth, identify latent antagonisms between youth 
and community members and carry out mediation
-  Led by Youth Offending Team and probation with outreach workers 
and implementation team
Other partnership working
Council youth services
• Develop an array of diversionary activities for youth to keep them off the streets
-  Led by outreach workers with council youth services
Manchester Mediation Services
• Train key workers (teachers, police officers, Youth Offending Team, social 
workers etc) in mediation
-  Led by Chief Execs with implementation team and Manchester 
Mediation Services
Mothers against Violence
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• Conduct regular home visits and identify the changing needs of youth and family
-  Led by outreach workers with social services
• Provide intensive wrap around support for youth and family
-  Led by social services with outreach workers
• Engage grass roots groups
-  Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team and 
outreach
• Facilitate meetings between parents of gang members
-  Led by Local Education Authority with outreach and implementation 
team
• Develop education programmes for gang involved adults and parents
-  Led by Local Education Authority with Youth Offending Team and 
implementation team
• Liaise directly with schools to develop 'early warning mechanisms4
-  Led by Local Education Authority with implementation team
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Annex eight
Job description project manager Cambridge
The following is the Cambridge project manger’s job description, reproduced from 
project records
Cambridge Constabulary
Job description
Job title: Project Manager -  Cycle Theft Reduction Project
Department /location/telephone number:
Reports to: Community Safety Manager, Southern Division
1. Purpose of your job
Cycle theft reduction is a priority for the Cambridge Community Safety 
Partnership in their April 1999 -  March 2002 Community Safety Strategy. The 
Home Office have provided funding through their crime reduction programme 
under the Targeted Policing Initiative, to help the Partnership reduce this 
crime types.
To assist with the implementation of the police response to the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, with the aim of reducing crime and the fear of crime, 
whilst taking into account local areas of public concern,
2. Dimensions
Below are figures which give a picture of your job as follows:
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(a) Budgetary amount with which your job is either directly or 
indirectly involved
Home Office Targeted Policing Fund £167,000
Cambridge Community Safety Partnership £ 12,000 
Sponsorship
(b) Number and grading of subordinate staff
Directly none. However this post impacts of both internal and external 
personnel by providing the management of a substantial project set up by the 
multi-agency Cambridge Community Safety Partnership. They will be 
involved in setting the pro-active work of the two police constables who also 
form part of the project team, through research of cycle crime hotspots, crime 
trends and subsequent handling of the information, to focus on offenders.
(c) Any other statistics relating to your work
Representatives for the partnership on the Cycle Crime Task Group and other 
project groups whose function is to reduce cycle crime.
3. Accountabilities
Accountability 1
Project management
Manage the cycle theft reduction project on behalf of the Cambridge Community 
Safety Partnership, using project management techniques to provide the most 
effective solutions to the cycle theft problem in Cambridge City. This involved being 
the primary point of contact for the Partnership in all matters relating to the project, 
belonging to the Cycle Crime multi-agency Task Group, monitoring the Home Office 
Targeted Policing fund, maintaining regular contact with the Home Office Targeted 
Policing Department, holding regular meetings with the government appointed
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evaluators for the project and reporting regularly on the performance of the project 
within the police and city council.
Accountability 2
The University of Cambridge Registration Scheme
To carry out reviews of the current systems of cycle registration used within the 
University of Cambridge colleges and negotiate with students and bursars as well as 
security officers, in order to develop a comprehensive news scheme to be operated 
throughout the university colleges; which can also be extended to cover Anglia 
Polytechnic University, sixth form colleges, schools and businesses in the future.
Accountability 3
Secure Cycle Parking in Cambridge City
Using historical and current crime data, plan and execute pilot secure cycle parking 
schemes in Cambridge City in order that different types of secure cycle racks can be 
tested for their effectiveness, both as a measure to reduce crime and also for their ease 
of use with the general public.
Determine locations for the installation of new cycle parking in Cambridge City and 
manage their installation, both within the historic city centre as well as identifying 
additional appropriate locations for secure parking, in co-operation with the city 
council and any affected owners of premises.
Accountability 4
Research and crime pattern analysis
Analyse crime information from existing systems, external sources and self initiated 
information systems to create relevant statistical information on cycle theft. Monitor 
the effectiveness of the Cycle Theft Reduction Project against tits key indicators as
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well as against the Community Safety Strategy and the Force Best Value Performance 
Indicators. Use historical and current data to identify long and short term trends and 
areas of concern so that interventions put into place will be most effective. Present 
these findings to the Project Team, Cycle Task Group and the Cambridge Community 
Safety Partnership, together with recommendations that will improve performance 
and meet the targets. Influence police and other agency resources to ensure that the 
project had optimum outcomes.
Accountability S
Cycle Theft Offenders
Work with two police constables to pro-actively identify offenders of cycle theft 
(through analysis of crime patterns and hotspots)m with the main purpose of their 
apprehension to increase the reduction and detection of this offence type.
Accountability 6
Undertake any other relevant tasks, so that the efficiency of the Crime Reduction Unit 
can be maximised.
4. Hardest part of your job
Below is outlined the most complex or challenging part of your job and why
Working in partnership with voluntary and statutory organisations whose working 
practices and priorities may differ from those of the Community Safety Partnership, 
particularly in regard to cycling provision in Cambridge City.
Marketing the role of crime reduction within the police force to convince police 
officers of the value of preventative action to reduce crime and their role in such 
action.
5. Organisation
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How you are supervised
Supervision by immediate line management through informal meetings, departmental 
meetings and appraisals. The post holder will work independently with the general 
public and key personnel from other agencies, who may direct the work as a result of 
the Cycle Theft Reduction Project.
6. Job content
(a) Main functions of the section
To co-ordinate the district level crime and disorder strategies developed 
through the district partnership in southern division including assessment of 
the divisional resources and staff to meet the requirement of projects 
developed through the strategies.
Research, planning, implementation and evaluation of sustainable 
interventions to reduce crime and anti-social problems across the division.
(b) Work comes from/goes to
i) The majority of non-partnership work is initiated by the post-holder or 
sector staff in response to local problems identified via intelligence 
sources and data analysis.
ii) Initiated via a variety of partnership groups across the division, in 
particular district community safety partnerships via the crime and 
disorder strategies.
iii) Initiated and integrated into divisional tasking process.
iv) At county level via force headquarters e.g. the local policing plan
v) A national level in response to national campaigns, policies and 
ministerial priorities.
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(c) How your job relates to the work of other officers, groups, 
committees, general public, both within and outside of the 
Constabulary
The majority of the work of the department involves statutory and voluntary 
agencies and commerce and many departments within the Constabulary. This 
requires considerable negotiation skills and the ability to see the strategic 
picture clearly in order that work is co-ordinated and purposeful, and that 
work carried out does not conflict with the policing plan but ensures that the 
ethos of community safety is integrated into the working practices of others.
(d) The most important legislation, policies, procedures, specifications 
and working practices which affect the job
Crime and Disorder Act (1998)
Force crime strategy and crime reduction policy
Divisional performance plan
Local performance plans
Home Office crime prevention manual
Towards 2000
Date Protection Act 1998
Audit Commission and HMIC recommendations and papers
7. Knowledge and experience
• At least 12 months experience of project management, including action 
planning, implementation, assessment and evaluation using a problem­
solving approach
• Numerate and able to undertake statistical analysis
• At least 12 months experience in the identification, collection, analysis 
and interpretation of information from a wide variety of sources
• Competent and experienced in a wide range of IT systems, for example 
statistical analysis packages, relational databases, modelling sources
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• Experience of writing specialist reports for a variety of recipients
• Experience of writing and delivering presentations to large and small 
groups
• The ability to negotiate with and influence other people’s point o f view 
in a one-to-one or group setting, whether multi-agency partners, senior 
managers or divisional officers
• Ability to manage time and resources effectively, including directing 
the efforts of others
• Confidence and ability to use own initiative and theoretical knowledge 
to produce short, medium and long term solutions to unique problems
• Ability to work as part of a team under strict time and resource 
limitations, negotiating with other players, motivating team members 
and sharing responsibility
8. Additional information
Below is briefly explained any aspects of your job which have not been 
adequately covered in previous sections and which are important in 
understanding your various duties, including any temporary features
Community Safety has been places at the core of effective policing strategies 
by a number of developments, including ‘Towards 2000’. The Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 now elevates its position to one of central strategic 
management.
Due to the nature of this post and the potential for development of the project 
within two years, there is a possibility that the requirements of the role may 
change. Therefore the stakeholders needs to be willing to develop the project 
and flexible to undertake such changes.
Person specification
Post: Project manager cycle theft reduction project
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Essential Desirable
Qualifications Willing to undertake any 
relevant training including the 
force computer systems
Ability to travel within 
Cambridge city to fulfil the 
requirements of the role
Skills and 
experience
Experience of project 
management, including action 
planning, implementation, 
assessment and evaluation
Minimum of 1 years experience 
in the identification, collection, 
analysis and interpretation of 
information from a wide variety 
of sources
High levels of innumeracy
Competent and experienced in a 
range of IT systems
Minimum of 1 years experience 
of writing reports and making 
presentations to small and large 
groups of people using 
appropriate tools
Good communication skills
Knowledge and experience of 
working in the community or 
with the public
Experience of dealing with the 
media
Experience of computer data 
analysis
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Good organisational skills, with 
ability to work under own 
initiative
Personal
characteristics
Ability to manage time and 
resources effectively
Must have persistence and 
thoroughness of approach to 
ensure that information gathered 
is complete and accurate, 
especially when dealing with 
busy people and or complex 
situations
Have a flexible approach to 
hours and methods of working
Assertiveness and confidence to 
work alone
Good negotiation skills with the 
ability to motivate and influence 
others
Be of smart appearance
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